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ABSTRACT
Some part of this study was covered by Dr. S.O. 
Adeyeye. His work published in 1978 concentrated on 
a general overview of cooperative movement in Nigeria. 
Since his work, there has been remarkably little or no 
research into the development of Cocoa Marketing 
Cooperatives' policies. A review of this study shows 
that Adeyeye carried out a historical work which did 
not account for the emergence of cocoa marketing 
policies during the early years of self government in 
Nigeria and what effect these policies had on the 
cooperatives' ability to practice their principle of 
democratic control. Our study is an attempt to fill 
in this important part of Marketing Coperatives' 
history.
The theoretical part reviewed the conceptual framework 
of cooperative ideals and principles which enabled us 
to examine the operational policies of Cocoa Marketing 
Cooperatives in Nigeria, against the cooperatives' 
principle of democratic control. Our finding is that 
the adoption of cooperatives' principle of democratic 
control was not encouraged by the Governments who took 
the responsibility of promoting cooperatives in 
Nigeria. There was no provision for basic training in 
democratic procedure
KÜ
which is essential for any cooperative to be an 
independent viable organisation. The absence of 
cooperative education culminated in corruption and 
inefficient administration of the cooperative which 
was widespread over the period under study.
Finally, the study acknowledges the difficulties of 
applying the cooperative principles in a real world, 
but recommended that it is of the utmost importance 
that cooperative organisations as they try to survive 
in a real world, should find new ways of putting 
principles into practice because the principles enable 
any cooperative organisation to fulfil the basis of 
its formation, that is, the promotion of members 
interests. The principle of democratic control to 
some extent indicates who the members are and allows 
them the right to determine for themselves what is 
their common need and how the need would mutually be 
met. The idea of the cooperative was born out of 
ideally felt need of members. It is a means of self 
help through mutual help? hence members should 
participate actively in all activities of the 
organisation.
The methodology applied to this study includes 
descriptive analysis, field work, archival and 
documentary research, informal discussion and the 
author's personal observations.
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Although the cooperative movement in Nigeria was 
formalised in 1935 during the period of colonial rule, 
the need for its history was not felt until after 
independence in 1960. In a government letter dated 
30th April, 1964, the Secretary, Cooperative 
Federation of Nigeria, appealed to the Vice Chancellor 
at the University of Ibadan to secure an academic 
researcher who could produce a comprehensive document 
that would highlight the important landmarks in the 
development of the movement (1). The task of 
producing the historic document fell on the Department 
of History, University of Ibadan. The appeal 
coincided with the time when a brilliant student of 
the Department was to write an M.A. dissertation. The 
student, S.O. Adeyeye, carried out a preliminary 
investigation and produced a survey entitled "The 
Western Nigeria Cooperative Movement, 1935 - 1964" 
(2). For an M.A. dissertation, it was obvious that he 
could not do much. The work was essentially a review
(1) See the letter reference No, CFN/29/71 dated April, 1964 from the Secretary, Cooperative Federation of Nigeria, Federal Cooperative Department, 147 Broad Street, Lagos, to the vice Chancellor, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.(2) See Adeyeye S.O., The Western Nigeria Cooperative Movement, 1935 - 1964, an M.A. dissertation, submitted to University of Ibadan, June 1969,
of cooperative activities in the old Western Nigeria, 
now Oshun, Ondo, Ogun and Oyo states. His limited 
achievement notwithstanding, he felt courageous enough 
to continue, and out of his Doctorate Degree Thesis 
which resulted from further studies, a more 
comprehensive and up to date historic document of the 
movement emerged. The work was later published in 
1978 (3). The work has since remained a standard
study of Cooperative Movement in Nigeria. In the 
Study, Adeyeye defines Cooperative as :
"any organisation which runs its business in 
accordance with Cooperatives' principles". (4)
He carried out an extensive discussion of these 
principles as recommended by the International 
Cooperative Alliance in 1966, but did not establish 
the extent to which the principles were applied in the 
cooperative marketing of Nigerian cocoa. The problem 
of this study, therefore, is to examine the origin, 
nature and the development of the Cocoa Marketing 
Cooperatives' policy with the aim of assessing its 
effect on the Cooperatives' ability to practise the 
principle of democratic control.
(3) See Adeyeye, S.O. The Cooperative Movement in Nigeria, 1978.(4) Ibid, P.9
The Cocoa Marketing Cooperative policies in Nigeria 
had their origin in colonial economic policy. For 
example, prior to the contact with the Western world, 
Nigerian societies were predominantly agricultural. 
The period marked an era when resources and economic 
activities were concentrated in agriculture. Power 
was generated by non-mechanical means. The
application of technology to production was minimal. 
Land was communally owed but each member of the 
community had access to a portion which he or she 
could farm for a period and then return the land to 
the community.
The first Europeans found the Nigerian population at 
the tribal stage of social organisation. The basic 
unit of social and economic life was the extended 
family. A tribe was formed by a number of these 
families. Each tribe was led by a Chief whose title 
was either primarily passed on by inheritance or by 
democratic election. In some tribes, especially the 
Ibos, a chief was first of all a military leader who 
personally led his tribe in inter-tribal wars. Some 
chiefs were not necessarily war leaders but had the 
resources to finance wars against their neighbours. 
In the Yoruba tribes, a war leader was automatically 
a very powerful chief called "Balogun". The Balogun 
led his tribe in wars and must have been a great 
warrior. The chiefs were managers of the tribal land.
The land was considered to be the property of their 
ancestors, the chief being their representative, 
managing the land in their name. The chief was the 
principal judicial authority of the tribe, passing 
judgement and sentences in accordance with the 
indigenous legal system. The chief owned a large farm 
which was worked by fellow tribesmen or slaves. The 
slaves used in this context were domestic slaves. The 
domestic slaves were prisoners of war, many of whom 
were later assimilated into the society of their 
captors and became military leaders, vassals court 
advisers etc. (5). The domestic slaves were not the 
same as Trans-Atlantic slave chattels. The latter 
slaves were victims of slave raids who were captured, 
sold and exported overseas, whereas, the domestic 
slaves were enslaved within the society of their 
captors.
The European met a tribal society divided into a 
number of clans led by the local chiefs who were 
vassals to the supreme chief or the leader of the 
tribal federation. The leader of the tribal 
federation were crowned Obi, Oba, Diokpa or Emir 
depending on the area of the country.
(5) See Onimode B ., in Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria. 1982.
Everyone in the society lived on the land and 
cultivation was dominant since it determined the 
social organisation of the societies erected on the 
basis of the relations of production as they emanated 
from the limitations of agricultural activities and 
from the necessity of reproducing the productive 
units. Land as a means of production was not private 
property but communal property governed by complex 
regulations emphasising social responsibilities. (6) 
The production relations corresponding to the 
productive forces during the period, were cooperative 
rather than antagonistic. Mutual help, cooperative 
production and obligation to the community and group 
governed production. (7) Thus, in Nigerian society 
before the arrival of the Europeans, everybody was his 
"brother's keeper". The surplus generated was used 
for obligatory gift-giving within the family and clan.
However, with the arrival of the Europeans the society 
was transformed and incorporated into the world 
capitalist system. This transformation can be 
examined under three broad stages of imperialist 
expansion. The first stage has been named mercantile 
imperialism and started in Nigeria
(6) See Meek C.K. , Land. law and custom in colonies.1946(7) See July R.W., in ore-Colonial Africa, 1976
around 1441. (8) The era was spurred on by certain
changes in the economic structure of Britain. The 
structural changes included the establishment of 
colonies in America and the dislodgement of European 
feudalist systems by merchant capitalism. The 
interest of merchant capitalism centred on commerce 
and surplus value production. The generation of 
capital through commerce switched production towards 
exchange value, that is, the development of money 
value. The new system transformed money into capital 
and led to the dissolution of the existing communal 
organisation of production primarily geared towards 
use-value. (9) It is the trade element associated 
with mercantile capitalism coupled with the spirit of 
adventure and the quest for surplus value, the need 
for raw materials for the emerging industries in 
Britain and other European countries, which 
contributed to the push towards the colonisation of 
Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, America and the West 
Indies.
Gold and silver mines were discovered in America while 
rich and fertile lands for plantation were discovered 
in the West Indies, The mines and plantations needed 
strong and cheap labour to work at a profit. Merchant 
capitalists, in their bid for
(8) See Onimode B, op, cit., p.4(9) See Marx Karl in Capital Vol.Ill VA, III/I P, 362 - 4
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high profits, decided that the place to successfully 
secure this labour force was in Africa, Harris 
supported this claim when he wrote that:
"It was European demand for cheap labour 
that sired the Atlantic slave trade and 
the new world black slavery". (10)
Merchant capitalists sought to assure its expansion 
and its realisation of surplus value through trade 
with overseas markets, It so happened that this trade 
in African experience had man as its commodity. The 
abominable trade in human merchandise was the ugliest 
part of imperialist expansion in Africa. The 
influence of Britain in such trade was very strong and 
widespread. Britain championed the "Triangular Trade" 
between Africa, Britain and America. (11) The West 
African coast was the main source of the slaves. The 
trade started in the fifteenth century when the 
Portuguese established contact with West Africans and 
the resultant relationship was based purely on 
commercial trade in silk, spices and perfume. About 
the turn of the fifteenth century, the British 
merchant capitalist joined and changed the commodity 
involved in the trade. Henceforth, the West African 
coastal lines, from about the sixteenth century up
(10) See Harris J.E. in Africans and their History, 1975.(11) See Dike O.K., in Trade and politics in Niger Delta, 1830-1885, 1956
to the eighteenth century, became the scene of British 
and other European enterprise and rivalry. The former 
trade in spices, perfume, silk and ivory were 
relegated to the background of economic transactions.
These new European mercantile capitalists preferred 
the trade in human merchandise because it was 
considered more lucrative and the profit margin was 
higher than the profit from other commodities. In the 
scramble that ensued, British ships sailed from Africa 
and large numbers of Africans were shipped away to 
British colonies in America and the West Indies. The 
trade in slaves became a respectable trade of the 
rising capitalist class in Britain and the British 
military was organised to ensure monopoly rights.
However, the slave trade ended in 1833 when the 
British Parliament ended the abominable trade and 
promulgated laws which made slavery illegal. After 
the slave trade had been declared illegal, the 
Europeans decided to cajole many Nigerians and other 
Africans into the production of agricultural crops for 
export in place of slaves. Palm produce was the first 
export crop produced before cocoa which later became 
the dominant export crop in the nineteenth century and 
to date. Other crops that followed included cotton 
and rubber. In some sense, trading in these crops 
formed part of the traditional economy of Nigeria in
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the nineteenth century and the first half of this 
century. The production of these commodities in 
significant quantities for export represented a change 
in the pre-existing pattern of trade in Nigeria and 
indeed elsewhere in Africa. (12) Thus, we had a shift 
from a predominantly slave trading economy to trade in 
agricultural produce for export. However, the 
transition from slave trade to trade in agricultural 
produce marked the end of the first phase of 
imperialist expansion in Nigeria. The second phase 
started when the industrial revolution occurred in 
Britain, It was during the industrial revolution that 
the real interest in the Nigerian economy was 
accomplished. With the penetration into the interior 
of Nigeria, a process resisted by Nigerians, the dawn 
of a new phase of imperialism was hailed. This was 
the onset of the colonisation of Nigeria and other 
African countries. During the slave trade, Britain 
did not venture inland in search of slaves, but relied 
on coastal middlemen consisting of African chiefs, 
traders and warriors. After 1833, however, the 
British Government's campaign to abolish the slave
(12) See Berry S.S. in Cocoa in Western Nigeria. 1890 -1940, a Phd Thesis submitted to University of Michigan, 1967
trade gradually led to involvement in the internal 
affairs of African states. In Nigeria, the British 
intervened through direct military and political 
action, Lagos was conquered in 1852 and became a 
British colony in 1861, through negotiation ultimately 
backed by the threat of force for the protection of 
"legitimate commerce'. In 1890, the British finally 
left the coast and started inland to promote the new 
trade found in agricultural produce. The British 
administration of Nigeria began in 1893 and a formal 
protectorate was established in 1900. The
establishment of a formal protectorate marked the 
official colonisation of Nigeria. The colonial social 
policy was based on Joseph Chamberline's doctrine of 
the "Dual Mandate". This was outlined in his speech 
to the House of Commons in 1895, quoted in Williamson, 
(13)
His speech maintained that the duty of the Colonial 
government was to develop the resources of the colony 
for the social benefit of both indigenous peoples of 
the colonies and the rest of the world. To implement 
this policy, the Government re-emphasised the 
importance of trade and pledged its development. 
Trade would benefit the colony through
(13) See Williamson, in A Short History of the British Empire. 1922
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increased income in the hands of the colonial 
government who would spend it for the peoples' social 
welfare. The government argued that the rest of the 
world would benefit from the additional supply of 
colonial products and expanding markets for the 
products of the industrial countries.
In other words, the government was to encourage the 
export of agricultural produce from the colonies. The 
colonial products were mainly in the form of raw 
materials to feed the industries in the home countries 
of the Europeans. The industries were to process the 
raw materials into finished goods and the colonies 
were to serve as markets for finished goods. The 
colonial imperialist's objective, therefore, was to 
use the colonies as an agricultural estate to produce 
raw materials for European factories and thereby 
generate some purchasing power to enable the colonial 
people to buy the manufactured products of these same 
factories. To ensure that this happened, three 
dynamic agricultural policies were implemented by the 
colonial Government in Nigeria,
The first of these was the colonial land policies of 
1910 and 1917. These policies, which effectively 
reserved agricultural production for indigenous 
Nigerians, contrasted with colonial land policies in 
other parts of colonial Africa, where white settlers
11
were encouraged to settle and own lands. (14)
The second policy relates to biological research for 
export crops. This policy demonstrated an impressive 
foresight by the colonial imperialists in developing 
agricultural technology. This effort on the part of 
Britain paid some handsome returns in the 1950's and 
early 1960's in the form of hybrid cocoa trees, rubber 
plants, palm trees and other cash crops. As a result 
of these improvements, agricultural production for 
export increased and became the main source of revenue 
for the Nigerian economy, up till the mid-1960's. (15)
The third policy has a strong bearing on this study in 
that it culminated in government intervention in 
agricultural produce marketing. The policy was the 
result of the passage of the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act of 1945. This was a deliberate attempt on 
the part of the Imperial government to undertake 
social planning which replaced the laisser-faire- 
oriented development policy since colonisation in 
1900.
(14) See Amadi B.C., in The Development of Agricultural and Import Substitution in Nigeria, a Phd Thesis submitted to Howard University, Washington D.C., 1973, P.71(15) See Amadi, Op. cit. P.72
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The plan incorporated a sweeping reorganisation of the 
structure of produce marketing in the colonies by the 
introduction of marketing boards. (16) Before the 
introduction of statutory marketing boards, the 
purchase of Nigerian export crops was being carried 
out by private companies, mainly owned by the British. 
There was intense rivalry among firms competing to buy 
Nigerian produce. The system was strongly criticised 
on the grounds that it was disorderly. The Government 
claimed that intervention was necessary to ensure 
orderly marketing. The objective was also to promote 
security in the agricultural producing areas by 
maintaining stable prices within each season. The 
idea of price stabilisation was to provide a "buffer" 
between the producer and international market prices 
of each crop. The aim was to protect peasant 
producers from short terra fluctuations of unstable 
world prices and allow greater stability of income for 
the peasant. This policy may have been born out of 
good intentions on the part of the Imperialist 
government but no sooner had they been formed than the 
boards were used as an instrument of exploitation 
against the very peasants they were meant to protect. 
Professor P.T. Bauer was
(16) See Amadi, Ibid,
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probably the first person to alert the world to the 
exploitative practices of the marketing boards. In 
his study of West African trade in 1954, he discovered 
that the marketing boards in both Ghana and Nigeria 
had destabilised inter-seasonal producer prices of 
export crops, by paying peasant producers less than 
the market value of their produce. (17) Ten years' 
later. Professor G.K. Helliener carried out a similar 
study in Nigeria and concluded that over 100 million 
pounds had been accumulated by the marketing boards 
between 1954 and 1961. (18) The accumulated surplus
of the boards was the result of paying the peasants 
less than they realised from the actual sale of their 
produce over which they had the marketing monopoly.
The marketing boards marked a major change in the 
relation of peasant producers to the colonial state 
and capitalist accumulation. Prior to the Welfare 
Act, appropriation of peasant surplus labour was left 
in the hands of merchant capitalists who dominated the 
market for Nigerian export crops. After 1947, 
however, appropriation was now brought more directly 
under the control of state machinery through the 
marketing boards. The marketing cooperatives which
(17) See Bauer P.T. in West African Trade. 1954. (IB) See Helleiner G.K. in the Fiscal Role of the Marketing Boards in Nigeria. 1964,
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were organised to help members in the processing and 
marketing of produce were now compelled to serve as 
licenced buying agents (LBA) for the marketing boards. 
The boards allowed the marketing cooperatives to 
operate their licences on an annual basis. This 
served to regulate and control their influence in the 
produce market. (19)
The Cooperative Law had been passed over ten years 
before the inception of the statutory marketing 
boards. The functions of the marketing cooperatives 
were incorporated in the Law named the Nigerian 
Cooperative Ordinance, The ordinance was assented to 
in the name of the King of England on December 3, 
1935, and the regulations made thereunder came into 
force on 6 February, 1936. The prime objectives 
enshrined in this Law were to arrange for the sale of 
members' cocoa to the best advantage. They encouraged 
members to produce the highest grades of cocoa and to 
market them in the best condition, to promote a 
cooperative spirit among members and to advance loans 
to members. (20) All these aimed at advancing 
producers' social welfare.
(19) Beer C., in The Politics of Peasant Groups in Western Nigeria. 1976, P.31.(20) See Cooperative Societies Ordinance, No.39 of 1936.
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As the marketing cooperatives had no legal right to 
sell their members' produce direct to the market, 
members were encouraged to deliver their produce to 
the secretaries of each cooperative store. The 
secretaries received the consignments and issued 
receipts to members. In the case of cocoa produce of 
Western Nigeria, the deliveries were made to the 
cooperatives located in Ibadan, Ijebu, Ife, Abeokuta 
and Ilesha. Hitherto, the produce had been sold 
directly to the private foreign firms by tender.
After the establishment of statutory marketing boards, 
cooperatives were compelled by law to sell to the 
boards at fixed prices. (21) These prices, as stated 
earlier, were below the market price to allow the 
boards some surplus. The justification offered for 
the accumulation of trading surplus was that they 
could be used to pay infrastructural investments 
needed to promote industrial development and even to 
invest directly in industry. Obviously, the
imperialist government needed to raise taxes and 
export producers had to make a contribution to state 
revenue. However, the disproportionate burden which 
fell on the export producers motivated them to be 
aware of intense state exploitation and they organised 
themselves for resistance.
(21) Notes from Lecture delivered by Chief Laditan A.A. Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Ibadan on Friday 28, July, 1967.
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The role of cooperatives in organising members against 
government exploitation cannot be underestimated. The 
most organised resistance was by members of cocoa 
marketing cooperatives of former Western Nigeria. In 
the early 1940's cocoa cooperative societies were able 
to articulate peasant agitation against the low prices 
paid to members. The societies later encouraged 
members to form unions with the intention of 
organising hold ups until higher prices were paid. 
The Nigerian Farmers' Union was one of such unions 
formed and was very popular among cocoa producers in 
the Ibadan area, and during the period 1945 - 1950, it 
encompassed the entire cocoa producing area of Western 
Nigeria and spread to cover the Kola growing area of 
the south west.
The NFU, through their energetic leader Mr. Akeredolu 
Ale, was able to mobilise both cooperative and non- 
cooperative peasants against government exploitation. 
He stated through his numerous addresses to the 
peasants that,
"they the peasantry, were under-privileged, 
they were trampled under-foot, yet it was 
they who were the real producers of the 
real wealth of the society in which they 
lived," (22)
(22) Beer, op. cit. P.42
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He emphasised that they should not be resigned to 
their present position, for solutions were attainable 
through political and collective action. The 
political undertone of his addresses soon developed 
into anti-colonial feelings among members of his union 
in particular and the public in general. Given the 
nature of the colonial economy which engendered 
oppression and exploitation of the peasants through 
the marketing boards, the campaign soon turned into a 
nationalist struggle against the imperialist 
domination. Nationalist parties were demanding 
national autonomy. The attempt by the British 
Colonial Government to contain the nationalist 
struggle failed and independence was granted in 1960, 
The independence marked the end of the second era of 
imperialist expansion in Nigeria and the beginning of 
a new era of neo-colonisation.
The euphoria which greeted the arrival of independence 
from colonial oppression led to the illusion that the 
exploitation of the peasants had ended. On the 
contrary a new Nigerian ruling class had been born. 
The ruling class were members and leaders of the 
nationalist parties whose objectives were to 
Nigerianise colonial privileges with better jobs, 
housing, cars and immeasurable political powers 
without corresponding improvements in the condition of 
the peasants. Before independence, the ruling class
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in their respective party manifestos promised their 
supporters' modernisation of the whole society if 
elected into office. After independence, the revenue 
imperative became stronger as the new government 
needed funds to meet their promises to their 
supporters. Since agriculture was the leading sector, 
it was imperative that the marketing boards support 
the new government with funds by continuing the policy 
started under colonial rule, of underpaying the 
peasants to build surpluses.
The reaction of the peasants to the new government's 
policy was swift. As cocoa was the leading export 
crop handled by the marketing boards and as it was a 
commodity mostly produced in Western Nigeria, the 
peasant struggle against the government was much more 
organised and disruptive in Western Nigeria, The most 
decisive confrontation was the peasant resistance of 
1958 - 69 referred to earlier in this chapter. The 
cause of rebellion was clearly stated and against 
government tax extortion, police repression, abject 
poverty and the marginalisation of the peasantry. 
(23) .
In other parts of the country, peasants had also been 
resisting the low prices and surplus
(23) See Adeoye, T, Farmers Against Oppression. 1970
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accumulation by the marketing boards and the neglect 
of the rural majority in the allocation of social 
amenities by the government. The allocation of 
infrastructural facilities such as roads, electricity, 
water supply, health centres and schools were 
concentrated in the elitist areas. In the struggle 
that ensued, the socialist forces and other welfare 
groups in the country have persistently articulated 
the desperate plight of the peasants. The continued 
neglect of these pressures has culminated in the 
present stagnation of the country's agriculture which 
started in the early years of independence.
Even though the peasants witnessed intense 
exploitation during the colonial imperialist era, they 
produced enough to make agriculture the mainstay of 
the Nigerian economy before independence. The sector 
accounted for more than three quarters of the export 
earnings in the 1960's. In the early years of 
independence, about 70% of the country's labour force 
were employed in this sector. However, by 1966 it had 
declined to 55% due to the fact that many peasants had 
abandoned farming because of excessive government 
exploitation. (24) By the mid 1960's oil was 
discovered in commercial
(24) See Helleiner G.K., Government and Economic Growth in Nigeria. P.162
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quantities. When revenue started to flow from the oil 
sector, one would have expected the peasants to be 
relieved of the exploitative practices of the 
marketing boards since the government would no longer 
need to raise so much revenue through export taxation. 
Contrary to this expectation the government carried 
out only a very limited reform of the marketing 
board's system in 1973 and 1977 respectively. In 
spite of these reforms, there was a continuous and 
alarming decline of earnings from all exports. The 
reason was that most peasants had already refrained 
from investing in new tree crops or production 
equipment. Others had shifted production to crops 
outside the control of the marketing boards. In my 
previous study of the marketing boards system in 
Nigeria, evidence was presented which showed that the 
marketing boards' pricing policy was largely 
responsible for the decreasing earnings from 
agricultural exports in Nigeria. (25) In realisation 
of this fact, coupled with the need to boost export 
production in view of the declining oil revenues, the 
government abolished all marketing boards in 1986, 
The objective was to give export producers more 
control over the marketing of their own produce.
(25) See Icheku, V.N,, The Rise and Fall ofMarketing Boards in Nigeria. An Unpublished M.Phil Thesis, Brunei University, 1987
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In spite of this effort, recent studies have shown 
that agricultural production has continued to decline 
and that the answer has been to organise the peasants 
into group farming cooperatives sponsored by the 
Government. The organisation of the peasants into 
farming cooperatives as a means of increasing 
agricultural production has started to pay some 
dividends and many scholars and cooperators alike have 
suggested direct cooperative involvement in produce 
marketing as they are not likely to exploit their 
members like the marketing boards had done. (26) The 
main aim of this study is to document these policy 
changes, examine its effect on the cooperatives' 
ability to practise its principle of democratic 
control. Before going into this study in depth, we 
would like to first and foremost examine some related 
issues unique to the Nigerian society.
(26) See Sholake, V.O, Cooperative marketing and Input distribution in Nigeria. 1984
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CHAPTER 2
ECOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF NIGERIAN SOCIETY
The knowledge which this study intends to impart might 
not be completed without understanding ecological 
issues in Nigerian society. The analysis of ecology, 
is necessary to provide us with an understanding of 
Nigerian people, their population, environment, and 
other issues which have some bearing on this study.
In most sociological literature, ecology concerns the 
kind of relationships which take place between 
individuals and groups and the way these relationships 
influence one another, by particular special patterns 
and processes. It concerns social issues such as 
ethnicity, class, family, values and beliefs, 
economics, technology and other issues in so far as 
they serve to bring people together or keep them apart 
socially. Duncan identified five ecological elements 
which he described as: population, environment,
technology, organisation and social psychology. (27) 
These ecological factors are essentially important in 
the study of any society. This chapter, therefore.
(27) See Duncan, 0.D., Human Ecoloav and Population Studies. 1959, pp. 681-4
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will be devoted to their analysis. Before then, let 
us examine how the different people that live in 
Nigeria come together under one political 
administration,
2.1 The People of Nigeria
The present people of Nigeria consist of many 
different social groups, who arrived in the area at 
one time or another. It is possible to distinguish 
some of the people by their local histories, customs, 
traditions and languages. Such distinctions must, of 
course, be made with great care, since in almost all 
cases traditions have been complicated and interwoven 
with unreliable legends. The classification of people 
by linguistic groups is what most people in Nigeria 
mean by tribes and is regarded as the most effective 
method.
The Fulani, one of the largest groups who are now 
scattered in many parts of interior West Africa, are 
believed to be a people who entered Hausaland as 
wandering herdsmen in the thirteenth century. The 
Fulani people are tall, slim, light-skinned, fair- 
looking herdsmen and speak the original Fulani 
language.
The Hausa people as can be seen from Appendix I, are 
the largest linguistic social group who occupy most of 
the open grassland country of the North. They are
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pure Sudan negroes, usually dark in complexion. A 
subdivision into sections of Hausa people based upon 
their customs, has been attempted and of these the 
Katsinawa, the Kanawa and the Zazzagawa are some of 
the most important.
The Hausa and the Fulani are the chief people of the 
Northern Nigeria, In the South, the largest 
linguistic group are the Igbos and Yorubas,
The Igbos are pure Negroes like the Yorubas. The 
Igbos' saying "Igbo ama eze", which means "Igbo knows 
no king", epitomises their democratic nature. The 
Igbo live in the generally densely populated south­
east of Nigeria, in Onitsha, Owerri, Aba, Enugu, Ogoja 
and some part of Delta State.
The Yoruba, unlike the Igbo, live in large towns under 
"Oba" (crowned chief) most of whom were powerful in 
the precolonial days and are today still influential. 
Tradition traces their ancestry to Oduduwa who they 
believe migrated to Nigeria from Sudan and settled at 
Ife in the pre-historic days. At present time, the 
Yoruba, a large linguistic group, occupies the largest 
part of the forestlands in Abeokuta, Ijebu, Ibadan, 
Oyo, Ondo and Ilorin areas. Some of the major social 
groups of Yoruba are Egba, Oyo, Ijebu, Ekiti, Ijesha 
and Ilorin.
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other important people of the Southern Nigeria are Edo 
people who founded Benin Kingdom and now occupy part 
of the Edo State. The Edo people are well organised 
under the rulership of an "Oba" (crowned Chief) who is 
their king and governed politically by a State 
Government. The I jaw people live in swamp and
constant flood water which often threatens lives and 
property. They usually build their houses some feet 
above ground level and travel by canoe. The Ibibio, 
like the Igbo, never had any kingdom and unlike any 
other people of Nigeria, show many of the 
characteristics of the Bantu tribes of Central Africa,
Finally, in between the people of north and south 
Nigeria live the middle-belt people. These include 
the Tiv (of Munshi) and Nupe people who inhabit the 
Benue and Nigeria valleys respectively. Also in this 
grouping are the Igala and Idoma people of the 
southern part of the Benue State and southern part of 
Kwara State respectively.
Location alone does not account for the delimination 
of the boundaries of present-day Nigeria, and it will 
be useful to outline briefly how so many different 
people that make up the country were brought together 
under one political administration.
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The political history of Nigeria started when the 
Portuguese secured Papal Bulls which granted them 
monopoly rights of West African trade in 1451, 
Shortly after, the British merchants challenged the 
Portuguese monopoly rights and obtained a charter from 
King Charles II, which gave them the monopoly rights 
from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Cape of Good Hope 
in South Africa. After that the West African coasts 
became a centre for European trade and rivalry. The 
British Government funded many expeditions to open 
trade in the interior of Nigeria. Mongo Park made two 
journeys to explore the Niger, in 1796 and 1805 when 
he lost his life at Bussa, Later, people like
Clapperton, Lander, Bath and others traced the Niger 
to its mouth, to solve one problem of penetration, and 
made treaties with chiefs. In 1861, Lagos was ceded 
to the British and was first under the government of 
Sierra Leone and later, in 1874, under that of the 
Gold coast, from which it was detached in 1886 when it 
became the colony and protectorate of Lagos. The oil 
River Protectorate, which had been proclaimed in 1885, 
and enlarged under the new name of Niger Coast 
Protectorate in 1893, comprised the rest of the coast 
and had its capital at Calabar. A charter was also 
granted to the Royal Niger Company, which opened up 
the Niger River and undertook the government of the 
interior.
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In 1900, when the charter was revoked, the 
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria was proclaimed to 
take the place of the Royal Niger Company. The 
Protectorates of Southern Nigeria and Lagos were 
merged, and on 1st January, 1914, the colony and 
protectorate of Nigeria was established by the 
amalgamation of southern and northern Nigeria under 
the governorship of Lord Luggard,
However, by 1939 it was found desirable to divide the 
southern provinces into western and eastern provinces. 
In 1946 Regional Houses of Assembly were created at 
Ibadan for the Western region, at Enugu for the 
eastern region and at Kaduna for the northern region. 
The 1952 and 1954 constitutions gave powers to these 
regions, Nigeria became a Federation in 1954 and 
obtained her independence in 1960, In 1961 the 
Northern Cameroons elected to become a province of the 
northern region of Nigeria, but Southern Cameroons 
united with the Cameroon Republic, In 1963, Nigeria 
became a republic and in 1966 there was a military 
coup which toppled the elected government. In 1967 
the Military Government divided the country into 12 
states. By 1967 the eastern region tried to secede as 
Biafra. Subsequently, there was a bloody civil war 
which ended in 1970.
However, in 1977 another 7 states were carved out of
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the existing 12 increasing the number to a total of 19 
states. In 1987, following the recommendation of a 
political bureau set up by the military government of 
Babangida, a further two new states were created.
These are: Katsina state which was carved out of
Kaduna state. It has Katsina town as its capital, 
comprising of 7 local governments (districts) (LGA). 
The second state carved out of the former Cross River 
State is Akwa-Ibom state with Uyo as its capital town 
and comprises of ten local governments. In October, 
1991 an additional 12 new states were creating making 
a total of 31 states including the Federal Territory 
in Abuja, The 31 states and the Federal Territory are 
illustrated in Appendix II.
Each of the above states derives its powers from the 
Nigerian Constitution. Nigeria operates a federal 
constitution like the United States of America. A 
federal constitution makes provision for the 
establishment of a federal government and component 
states so that there are several states in one. 
Powers and functions are divided between the federal 
government and state governments with the result that 
the states are independent of each other and the 
federal government, and all the governments (federal 
and state) are not dependent on each other. They are 
in a coordinated relationship. Thus, the 30 states in
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Nigeria form one country and one general government in 
the capital, Abuja. Each of the 30 states has its own 
local government. None of the 30 states is dependent 
on another state or the general government. The 
general government (called federal government) and the 
state governments derive their power and authority 
from the constitution.
Constitutionally, the local governments are creatures 
of the Federal Government. The federal constitution 
precludes both the state and local government from 
foreign relations. They cannot exercise control over 
trade or similar external transactions. (28) The 
constitution empowers the federal government to 
collect and spend major taxes such as corporate income 
tax, excise, import and export duties. On the other 
hand, the state and local governments exercise 
jurisdiction for the collection of relatively less 
important taxes as purchase, entertainment, pool and 
betting taxes.
Since foreign trade is outside of the jurisdiction of 
state and local governments, the federal government is 
empowered to prescribe prices for export produce. 
Marketing institutions such as the marketing boards 
and cooperative organisations have been created as
(28) See Olaloku, F.A., Structure of Nigerian Nigerian Economy. 1979, p.204
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instruments for the implementation of the price 
policies. This issue is examined further in later 
chapters.
The proliferation of states and the federal 
constitution have been necessitated by the need to 
protect the minority groups of the country. Apart 
from the dominant social groups referred to in the 
earlier section, there are about 274 distinct ethnic 
groups. There is no other political arrangement that 
would satisfy the political and social aspiration of 
these groups. The federal constitution and the 
creation of states allow for much desired autonomy by 
these groups. Before the advent of British
colonialism, Nigeria existed as a cluster of tribal 
societies. It did not exist as a national entity 
before the arrival of the British, who had 
administered the northern and southern provinces more 
or less as separate and distinct territories, 
amalgamating them only in 1914. Since then, there has 
been the problem of disunity between them. The 
country's first constitution known as the Richardson 
constitution of 1945, tried to address the problem. 
In its own words, the main objective of the 
constitution was:
"to promote the unity of Nigeria, to
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provide adequately within that unit for 
the adverse elements which make up the 
country". (29)
Other constitutions since then have in one way or 
another tried to tackle the problem identified by the 
Richardson constitution. In 1954 the Lyttleton 
constitution, in an effort to tackle the problem, 
divided the country into regions, viz the western, 
eastern and northern regions and adopted a federal 
constitution. (30) Since Nigeria became a fully 
fledged federation, demands for the creation of more 
states especially by the minority groups within the 
three regions, have continued unabated.
It was not until 1963, following the republican 
constitution that the mid-western region was carved 
out of the western region. The political crisis which 
culminated in the military intervention of 1966 
prompted the creation of 12 states out of the existing 
four regions. The agitation for more states did not 
stop there and the Head of States,
(29) See Agbase. D., "A Nation of 250 Unequal Leas". Newswatch. 1985, p. 14(30) See Ibid,
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Murtala Muhammed had to create an additional seven 
states and the present administration created 12 new 
states which puts the total to 30. The government now 
believes that the 30 states should put a stop to 
demands for more states.
2.2 Population
Human ecology deals with a specific population and how 
its growth can produce changes in a society.
Nigeria is the most densely populated country on the 
continent of Africa. Unfortunately, there has been no 
accurate head count in recent times. The most 
acceptable and accurate head count was in 1963 which 
put the population at 55 million which was by far the 
largest in Africa. There was a head count in 1973 but 
figures were highly disputed and no one places 
reliance on it. However, the World Development Report 
of 1984 estimated the population to be 90.6 million. 
(31) This is a large population by African and World 
standards. Nigerian people constitute nearly one- 
fifth of the total population of the African 
continent.
Since 1986, there has been a rapid growth in the 
Nigerian population. Its rate of growth is one of
(31) See World Development Report, 1984.
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largest in Africa and has been a source of concern for 
economic planners. The census figures released on 
March 19, 1992 showed that the government has 88.45
million people to provide for. The figures also 
showed that the Nigerian population is growing at the 
rate of 2.1 per cent per annum and about 100 persons 
per square kilometre. (32) This growth rate could be 
problematic. Demographers who have studied the growth 
rate, estimated that the present population of 88.4 
million will double by the year 2000. These experts 
fear that if nothing is done to halve the prevailing 
growth rate, Nigeria could find herself in serious 
economic and social difficulties. The Government 
recommendation of four children to a couple (33), 
notwithstanding, the problems that face a Nigerian 
child with the present rate of population growth is 
that he/she is growing up in a country whose constant 
land mass is expected to accommodate more than double 
the present number of its inhabitants within the next 
decade.
(32) See West Africa. March 30, 1991 p. 529(33) See Ibid p. 530
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Professor À.J. Coale warned over 20 years' ago (1966) 
that some African populations, including Nigerian's, 
were in the phase of rapidly accelerating growth and 
were beginning to encounter a set of new problems well 
known to other developing countries with high rates of 
population growth. (34) In 1985 the World Bank Report 
showed that food production in sub-Saharan African 
countries grew by about 1.5% per annum between 1970 
and 1979 compared to 2% per annum in 1960 to 1970, 
The population growth in the 1970's was 2.5% per 
annum. In 1979 - 1982 food production increased by 
1.9% per annum so that there has therefore been à 
continued decline of food production per capita. The 
result would be a food crisis according to the report. 
(35)
In Nigeria, and elsewhere in Africa, social class and 
religious values are often supportive of large 
families which swell the population on the aggregate 
national level, It is an age long tradition to 
measure a man's wealth by the number of his wives and 
children. In most rural African communities, it is a 
religious belief that children are generally gifts 
from God and very few people will ever refuse such a 
gift from God.
(34) See Coale, A.J., Estimate of Fertilitv and Mortality in tropical Africa. 1968 p. 186.(35) See World Bank Staff working paper No.728, 1985, p.l.
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The issues of family and class are discussed in later 
sections. In the meantime, let us examine the 
environment as the second element of ecology.
2.3 Environment
Nigeria which is sometimes described as the giant of 
Africa, occupies a vast rich tract of land 923,768 
square kilometres. The country lies roughly between 
latitude 3 and 14 north of the equator.
The map at Appendix III, shows that Nigeria is 
situated almost in the centre of a curve made by the 
continent of Africa. The position in the curve makes 
it nearly equidistant from the extreme corners of the 
continent, so that it takes a relatively short time to 
travel by air to any part of Africa. Thus, Lagos, 
which is presently the capital city, is less then 4 
hours by air to any city in North Africa and it takes 
almost the same time to fly from Kano, the second city 
to Cairo and Addis Ababa. It is surrounded by three 
countries which can be reached by road. These 
countries are the Republic of Benin in the west, Niger 
Republic in the north, Cameroon in the east and the 
Atlantic ocean which bounds Nigeria to the south.
There is a wide range of climatic conditions in the 
country. Two seasons are discernables a rainy season 
which lasts from April to November when the prevailing
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monsoon winds blow from the south west and dry season 
which lasts from December to March, when the Harmattan 
blows from the north-east. With the exception of the 
plateau area of the country, most northern areas are 
very hot and dry throughout the year. The average 
temperature for most of the country is between 24 
degrees and 27 degrees C. In the eastern highlands 
and on the plateau areas, the average annual 
temperature is about 21 degrees C. In Lagos, the 
average annual low temperature is about 23 degrees C. 
In the extreme north, the average high and average low 
annual temperatures are 43 degrees C and 10 degrees C, 
respectively.
Observation of rainfall in Nigeria shows that both 
total rainfall and the periods of rain vary from year 
and area to area. However, the annual rainfall ranges 
from 50.8 cm in most areas in the north to 381 cms in 
most areas in the south. The ecological zones of the 
country follow these rainfall patterns. The various 
ecological zones and the influence of rainfall are the 
subject of the following section.
2.4 Ecological zones
The ecology of Nigeria can be divided into two zones 
namely, the high forest and savanna zones.
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The high forest zone is with modifications where the 
dry season is generally not more than four months long 
each year. This forest zone is divided into swamp and 
rain forest. The swamp forest covers the creek, the 
delta and the tidal waters of the coastal areas. The 
mangrove swamps of brackish waters on the coast are 
backed on the landward side by fresh water swamp 
forests which occupy the annually flooded area on 
river-banks and creeks. The soil here is blue-black 
mangrove clay and aluminium, usually swampy and 
unsuitable for agriculture, but mangrove trees provide 
pit-props, fuel and tannin. (36).
The savanna zone on the other hand includes grass 
plains interspaced with trees. The savanna forest in 
northern Nigeria is divided into Guinea, Sudan and 
Sahel. The Guinea Savanna is the highest forest? -it 
has the limited visibility, an outcome of closely 
packed grass and trees. The Savanna has shorter grass 
and medium sizes trees, usually acacias, gum and fan 
palms and shea butter trees. The loose, sandy soils 
which characterise this zone in Sokoto, Katsina and 
Kano areas are farmed for groundnuts and millet. On 
the loamy soils of Zaria area, guinea corn and cotton 
are more significant.
(36) See Ileoje, New Geography of Nigeria op. cit p. 4.(37) See Ileoje, op. cit.
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À good part of the Savanna is also grazed by the Cow 
Fulani of the north.
The Sahel Savanna which is in the farthest north of 
the country, has poorer grass and fewer and more 
drought-resistant woody plants. The vegetation of 
Sahel savanna should be distinguished from almost 
treeless grass in the most clayey and impervious parts 
of Bornu. (37)
Finally, the different ecological zones created 
different types of agricultural production. In the 
south, roots and tubers like cassava, yams and cocoa 
yam dominate the subsistence production but also 
cereal crops such as maize are grown in this region. 
The root crops almost extend as far north as to Sudan 
savanna. Since the early years of imperialist 
expansion in Nigeria, peasants have grown or reaped 
tree crops like cocoa, rubber, cotton or palm produce 
to obtain cash in addition to their "subsistence 
income". In the Sudan and Guinea savanna, cereals 
like millet and sorghum and pulses like cow peas are 
the main staples. These crops have extended south of 
the river Niger and its tributary the River Benue, In 
Guinea Savanna, the root crops of the forest and 
cereals of the savanna thus overlap. This region is 
often termed the middle
(37) See Illeoje, op. cit.
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belt. In the savanna, however, groundnuts and 
cotton are the dominant cash crops and a source of 
earning for many northern peasants.
2.5 Technology
The overall adjustment of a population on its 
environment is obviously conditioned by the 
availability of technology. The majority of the 
Nigerian population still derive their livelihood from 
agriculture because of the country's low level of 
technology.
Before the advent of colonialism, the indigenous 
people of Nigerian societies designed and operated 
their own techniques of production. After the 
imposition of Colonialism, whole industries and trade 
were destroyed and indigenous craft workers and 
artisans found no alternative employment and rather 
were forced into agricultural production to meet the 
needs of the imperialist. Colonialism blocked their 
transition to the sort of industrial revolution that 
happened in Britain. After the industrial revolution, 
many displaced craftsmen and artisans in Britain were 
encouraged and trained to take up more challenging 
technical and engineering jobs in the industries that 
transformed Britain. The industrial revolution which 
happened during the early part of colonial expansion 
in Nigeria did not transform Nigerian technology as it
40
had done in Britain. Instead, there was a deliberate 
colonial economic policy to discourage industrial 
growth which resulted in the abysmal backwardness of 
Nigerian technology. When colonial rule did prosper, 
there was no major attempt to encourage industrial 
development in the colonies. The motive was to make 
the colonies primary producers and serve as markets 
for manufactured goods from Britain. The consequence 
of the colonial policy, therefore, left Nigerian 
technology backward, the labour force illiterate and 
unskilled. The few technological innovations and 
techniques which were imported to support agricultural 
development policy and mineral exploration were 
effectively monopolised by the imperialists 
themselves. It follows that the feeble state of 
industry in colonial Nigeria implied an unskilled 
labour force of low specialisation and therefore, a 
low level of technological development.
Since independence, however, industry has been one of 
the fastest growing sectors of the Nigerian economy, 
being second only to the mining sector. As we shall 
see later, the development of industry has been at the 
expense of agriculture. Most of the domestic funds 
used in financing industry have come from the 
agricultural sectors. Marketing boards have been 
instrumental in the excessive taxation of the 
peasants' produce in order to finance industrial
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development.
In concluding this section, it must be noted that 
Nigeria is currently experiencing technological 
changes but at a much more gradual pace. The 
technological revolution has yet to arrive. Many 
people look forward to its arrival. The question, one 
might ask is, are we prepared for the changes 
associated with technological advancement? There is 
no doubt that technological developments will greatly 
affect the ecology of our cities and towns, not only 
with reference to business, industry and 
transportation, but also with reference to the 
distribution of people and housing problems,
2.6 Organisation
Organisation is a very important element of the 
ecological complex. To most sociologists,
organisation is crucial to the ecological complex 
because of its goal-directed and behaviour 
significance. The nature of human beings is such that 
they are interdependent creatures who must maintain a 
continuous interaction in order to get things done.
The division of labour which impinges upon development 
in every society demonstrates the need for social 
organisation. The importance of the division of 
labour is clearly brought out or demonstrated by the
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economic organisation of the modern society. Each 
individual member of the society is related to other 
individuals economically in the process of production, 
distribution, exchange and consumption. Colonisation 
in Nigeria has affected these processes.
In the early years before colonisation prospered, the 
conditions of existence in most Nigerian societies 
allowed for some division of labour. The men spent 
most of their time fighting and hunting, while the 
women looked after the home and children. When 
agricultural pursuits were prevalent, work on the land 
often devolved upon the women while the men regarded 
themselves as warriors and hunters. The aged were 
allowed to stay at home and look after children and 
livestock. Thus the division of labour in the 
community formation was based on gender and age.
However, specialisation of activities emerged around 
the thirteenth century with the growth of regional 
specialisation between northern and southern Nigeria. 
Specialised artisans in boat building, house 
construction, mat weaving, pottery, goldsmithing, 
blacksmithing and other crafts of many kinds developed 
as a result of a regional division of labour.
Regional specialisation led to the growth of internal 
trade between the north and south. The means of
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exchange was through barter. For example, pepper, 
kola nuts, yams and palm-oil were exchanged for meat, 
mats, cutlasses, hoes, leather and salt. When the 
early Europeans arrived in the fifteenth century, they 
met a flourishing trade in these economic goods which 
were later exchanged for the European guns, gin, 
mirrors, hats and other goods. Later this trade in 
simple goods was dislodged by the slave trade. 
Henceforth, this slave trade dominated the trade 
relationships between Nigerian societies and Britain.
However, when this slave trade was abolished, trade in 
agricultural produce was encouraged by European 
demand. Finally, it should be noted, that the 
division of labour and economic considerations are 
just part of social organisation.
Since we are constrained by time and space, we cannot 
discuss all the forms of social organisation and 
institutions. It will suffice to present some facts 
about the Nigerian family because of its essential 
role in any society.
2.6.1 Family
A widely accepted definition of the family is that by 
Burges, Locke and Thomas in their book The Family, 
the book defines the family as :
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"a group of persons united by ties or marriage, 
blood or adoption, constituting a single 
household interacting and communicating with each 
other in their respective social roles of husband 
and wife, mother and father, son and daughter, 
brother and sister and creating and maintaining 
a common culture". (38)
In any society, be it industrial or agrarian, the 
family in sociological terms appears in different 
forms. The conjugal family comprises the husband and 
his wife while the nuclear family represents husband, 
wife and their children. The composition of the 
extended family includes relatives beyond the nuclear 
family such as grandparents and brothers and sisters 
of the husband and his wife and their children.
The extended family is most common in agrarian
(38) Burges, E.W., Locke, H.J. and Thomas, The Family. 1971, pp. 6 - 7
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societies of Africa, South America and the Islamic 
world. In these societies, families mainly pursue
economic activities in agriculture. In most cases the 
family is essentially an agricultural economic 
institution. The family is often a self-sufficient 
and cooperative unit. According to Fairchild, the 
extended family is defined as :
"a group consisting of several related individual 
families especially those of a man and his sons 
or of woman and her daughters, residing in a 
single large dwelling or a cluster of small 
ones". (39)
One common feature of the extended family in Nigeria 
and other African societies before the coming of the 
Europeans, is that, it contained many generations, all 
united through themselves, living under one roof. 
Included were the oldest living male descendants and 
their wife or wives, their sons and their sons' wives 
and children, the unmarried daughters, all the married 
grandchildren and the wives of the married grandsons. 
The early extended family was a self-sufficient 
economic unit engaged in a subsistence economy. This 
arrangement allowed members to provide foodstuffs and 
household goods for living needs of the members of the 
extended family rather than large scale goods for the 
market. As the families developed into communities.
(39) Fair Child, H.P. Dictionary of Sociology and Related Sciences. 1966
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any surplus production was either used for obligatory 
gift-giving or exchange for other goods for family 
use. There was no deliberate attempt to produce 
surplus for economic gain. Some members of the 
extended family, especially women, engaged in the 
production of pots, mats, woven cloths, animal 
breeding and other activities for domestic and 
community consumption. The majority of male members 
of the extended family were engaged in subsistence 
farming and hunting. As farmers and hunters, their 
primary aim was to provide for the needs of the family 
and community rather than the outside or larger 
market.
The imperialist expansion in Nigeria and other African 
countries was the major factor responsible for 
changing the extended family to the nuclear type that 
was prevalent in Western Europe and North America. 
The introduction of cash crops in farming to Nigeria 
by Europeans meant that production had to change to 
meet the larger market demand. The production of cash 
crops for the outside market will be discussed in 
greater depth later.
At the same time, the limited process of 
industrialisation and urbanisation which came in the 
trail of imperialism, brought about changes in the 
nature of the traditional Nigerian extended family, as
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more and more people became geographically mobile and 
began to set up home away from their parents instead 
of continuing to reside in the same compound with 
their parents and other members of the family.
We can therefore conclude this section by emphasising 
that contact with Europeans weakened the structure of 
the traditional Nigerian extended family. It is now 
almost impossible to find extended families which 
still include three or more generations headed by a 
powerful and authoritarian elder. The collective 
dwelling of families in one compound has disappeared. 
Extended families in Nigeria traditionally had built 
a compound in a circular form, within which were 
adjacent houses for individual households which 
constitutes the extended family. New forms of 
residential arrangements have taken over from the 
traditional compounds. Individual members are no 
longer constrained by family land. They can migrate 
many miles away to set up homes. The dispersal 
notwithstanding, the average Nigerian is still tied in 
one way or the other to the extended family. Many 
urban workers in Nigeria still keep a close link with 
their extended family because they expect one day to 
return to their home amongst members of their extended 
family. Others maintain their allegiance to the 
extended family because they need the support of the 
members if they want to become chiefs. So, while a
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member is away from the extended family, he would 
continue to meet all the family obligations such as 
funeral expenses, marriage expenses and development 
dues.
In conclusion, it is clear from the above discussion 
of social organisation that the family, like every
other social institution, is organised around certain 
patterns of behaviour as a system of social
relationship which embody certain universal elements 
of common culture or values which satisfy the basic 
needs of the society. It is the cultural element 
which determines the nature of interpersonal and group 
relations involved in every form of social
organisation.
2.7 The Social-Psvcholoaical Element 
Man is a choice-making animal, His choice of 
association with individual groups or places
influences his position in the ecological structure of 
his society. According to Gist:
"preferences, values, attitudes and beliefs must 
be common to a significant number of individuals 
who act or are willing to act on them, in order 
to qualify as social-psychological elements in 
human ecology. (40)
(40) See Noel, P. and Sylvia, F,, Urban Society. 1967, p. 95
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In a stratified society like Nigeria, it is very 
easy to see the association of people not only on 
the basis of beliefs, values or preferences but also 
on wealth, power, occupation and ethnicity. In pre­
colonial Nigeria, stratification was based essentially 
on gender and age. In the present age, social 
stratification is based mainly on ethnicity and class. 
In this section, we shall focus our analysis on social 
class because its development underlies the structure 
of social inequality which emerged during colonial 
era. Before going into the subject of class let us 
first examine ethnicity as a means of social 
stratification in Nigeria.
2.7.1 Ethnicitv
Ethnicity is used by sociologists and social and 
anthropologists to denote membership of a distinct 
people possessing their own customary ways or culture. 
Ethnic communities have often been physically as well 
as culturally distinctive, and used frequently to be 
referred as races, suggesting that their cultural 
attributes were determined by their physical ones. It 
was partly to avoid this error that since the 1930's 
the designation of ethnic group has been more 
generally employed. (41)
An ethnic group often overlaps with a political
(41) See Michael Mann, Student Encyclopedia of Sociology. 1983.
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group. In Nigeria and indeed in most African 
Societies, politicians have always appealed to ethnic 
sentiments to justify political claims.
Ethnicity is important in Nigeria in the consideration 
of social stratification. Some Nigerian tribes have 
overwhelming political power over others through 
conquest or simple majority. In northern Nigeria, the 
Fulani have occupied dominant and superior positions 
over the Hausa, Gwari, Tiv, Nupe and other people. 
The total subservience of many ethnic groups to the 
Fulani in northern Nigeria can be traced to the
violent conquest of these groups during the Islamic
Holy War led by Uthman Dan Fodio around 1804. 
However, the political domination of other tribes by 
the Hausa, Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba is not religious 
but by simple majority. As we have explained in the 
early part of this chapter, the need to protect the 
minority ethnic groups from the domination of the 
majority groups was responsible for the federal 
structure of the Nigerian constitution.
Ethnic relationships in Nigeria take the form of sub­
ordinate and super-ordinate position in the 
hierarchial ordering of the society. A good example
is the relationship between the Osu and freemen of
eastern Nigeria. The relationship between them is 
that of sub-ordinate and super-ordinate.
One pattern of relationship among various ethnic
51
groups in Nigeria has arisen as a result of both war 
and trade. There have been both war and trade between 
the Hausa-Fulani in the North and the Yoruba in the 
West. Among the Yorubas themselves there has been a 
long history of conflicts which resulted in war among 
various tribal groups. The Nigerian civil war between 
the Ibos and other ethnic groups, is a good example of 
inter-tribal war fought along ethnic lines, (between 
1967 and 1970). It is interesting to note that the 
inter-tribal conflicts of yesteryears have influenced 
the voting patterns of today. Ethnic sentiment has 
its reflection in all aspects of Nigerian political 
life. Many political leaders of today perpetuate
ethnic sentiments for selfish and tribal feelings in 
an attempt to attract support from their own 
tribesmen.
Ethnic sentiment and tribal feeling spearheaded the 
effort to spread states all over Nigeria. The federal 
structure was a deliberate attempt to ensure that 
different ethnic groups are adequately catered for in 
the allocation of resources, the distribution of
patronage and political power. Political stability in 
Nigeria will depend on the delicate balancing of the 
interests of the ethnic groups.
In the past, ethnic considerations have resulted in
large scale civil upheavals in Nigeria, The
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mobilisation of the masses for political action based 
on ethnic lines has also involved the class dimension. 
Our following discussion seeks to show that there is 
a relationship between ethnicity and class underlying 
political action rooted in ethnic divisions in 
Nigeria.
After independence, the new Nigeria inherited from 
British colonial rule a federal structure based on 
three regions corresponded with three major ethnic 
groups, that is the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo and the 
Yoruba, Each region was controlled by a political 
party formed along ethnic line deriving political 
support from ethnic groups in the region.
In the struggle for political power at the regional 
and federal levels, ethnic divisions became 
politicised and Nigeria's first republic was destroyed 
by a military takeover when politics became fiercely 
polarized along ethnic lines.
The picture will be more clear when one considers the 
class forces which shaped the pattern of ethnic and 
political conflicts. In Nigeria and elsewhere in 
Africa, political office has been seen as a passport 
to wealth and status. Once power had been attained 
the dominant part use its political power to enhance 
the material wealth of its members and supporters.
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The major ethnic conflicts between Ibos and other 
tribes during Nigeria's first republic were thus 
rooted in the struggle for power and resources. (42)
2.7.2 Social Class in Nigeria
The concept of social class is employed in this work 
to denote a group of individuals who share a common 
position in the process of production especially with 
regards to the ownership of the means of production, 
where ownership includes both control and 
appropriation of surplus value by one class against 
another.
This concept of social class has its roots in Marxism. 
Lenin underlined the same point when he defined social 
classes as :
"large groups of people differing from each 
other by the place they occupy in the 
historically determined system of social 
production, by their relation (in some cases 
fixed and formulated in law) to the means of 
production, by their role in the social 
organisation of labour and consequently by the 
dimensions and mode of acquiring the share of 
social wealth of which they
(42) See Larry Diamond in Class. Ethnicitv andDemocratic state in Nigeria 1950 - 66. 1983 pp. 457 - 89.
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dispose". (43)
A study of pre-colonial history of Nigeria shows three 
modes of production with varying degrees of overlap. 
They correspond to the communal, slave and feudal 
modes of production, (44) At the beginning of the 
pre-colonial history of Nigeria, the social formations 
were characterised by the communal mode of production. 
The unit of social organisation was the clan while 
the unit of social production was the family, 
Nigerian societies at this stage were comprised of 
pastoralists in the north and hunter-agriculturalists 
in the south. Land and labour were the major means of 
production and were jointly owned by all social 
groups. These means of production in sociological 
terms were not privately owned but communally owned, 
(45) The relations of production corresponding to 
these productive forces were cooperative, rather than 
antagonistic. Mutual help, cooperative production and 
obligation to the group governed production relations. 
The community production was mainly undertaken to 
satisfy family need. Any surplus generated was used 
by individual family or in the reciprocity of gift
(43) See Lenin, V.I., Selected Works. 1976 p. 248(44) July, R.W. Pre-Colonial Africa, 1976(45) See Meek C.K., Land Law and Custom in the Colonies. 1946.
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giving which ensured social cohesion. (46) The 
distinctions between individual families were of 
little significance. The social organisation of the 
society was equalitarian and classless. Apart from 
the hereditary chiefs the leaders of the communities 
were elected and removed democratically.
The development of social class was associated with 
the development of the slave and feudal modes of 
production. At the opening of the colonial period, 
during the early first phase of imperialist expansion, 
Nigerian societies were passing through the higher 
stage of communalism characterised by the 
disintegration of the equalitarian societies and the 
emergence of the slave and feudal relationships of 
production. Under the slave formation, social classes 
emerged based on slaves themselves and freemen or 
slave owners. As we have explained in Chapter One, 
the slaves referred to are mainly domestic slaves as 
distinguished from European trans-Atlantic slaves. 
Some of the domestic slaves were freed or assimilated 
into the class of freemen. The social classes under 
the feudal mode consisted of landlords and tenants.
Social class under this formation was defined with 
respect to land. Class divisions were based on the
(46) See July, R.W. op, cit. 1946
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ownership of land. The chiefs and elders who were 
custodians of the community lands claimed ownership 
and became landlords while the slaves, women and 
peasants constituted the class of serfs. The slaves 
had the lowest social status.
However, by the seventeenth century, under the impact 
of imperialism and the introduction of export crops, 
these socio-economic patterns collapsed and the 
collective spirit declined. With the growth of 
commodity production, and the need for a colonial 
administrative apparatus, the first petty bourgeois 
class, peasantry and working class emerged in addition 
to the imperialist ruling class. (47)
The imperialist ruling class consisted of colonial 
governors, residents, district officers, senior civil 
servants, military and police officers, merchants and 
financiers. The imperialists ruling class monopolised 
political power, controlled the state apparatus and 
formulated economic policies. The petty bourgeoisie 
were mainly Nigerians serving the interests of the 
ruling class as clerks, teachers, local government 
administrators and agents of the merchant houses, 
licensed buying agents for the Marketing Boards and so 
on. Some members of the
(47) See Sklar, R.L., Nigerian Political Parties Power in African Nations. 1963
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petty bourgeoisie fell into the ranks of lawyers, 
doctors, engineers, land speculators and other 
professions. The leaders of the nationalist parties 
emerged from this latter class. The lowest class or 
working class consisting of peasants, shop floor 
workers, petty artisans, students and others. The 
working class and the petty bourgeoisie joined forces 
against the ruling class and intensified the 
nationalist struggle thorough the formation of 
political parties in the early post war years.
Independence was, however, granted in 1960. After 
independence, Nigeria was transformed from a colonial 
state to a neocolonial state. Political power was 
transferred from the colonial ruling class to 
Nigerians who were the leaders of the nationalist 
parties.
Independence produced changes in the class formation. 
The new classes that emerged included foreign 
bourgeoisie class and domestic petty bourgeoisie. The 
foreign bourgeoisie class were mainly British 
citizens, Americans, Syrians and Lebanese businessman 
using their financial muscle to influence Government 
policies. The domestic petty bourgeoisie were 
identified with the state bureaucracy, top decision­
makers in government, ministers, state governors, 
permanent secretaries, senior civil servants, Nigerian
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doctors and chairmen of private and public companies, 
top military officers during the military rule, 
commissioners and senior academic officers in the 
universities and polytechnics.
Under the petty bourgeoisie were the toiling masses of 
the Nigerian population. This class consists of 
peasants, shop floor workers, petty artisans, market 
women, pensioners and widows. This class consists of 
the worst exploited and dispossessed members of the 
Nigerian population. The exploitation of one class by 
another brings us to the concept of class struggle.
In some of the development literature, the discussion 
of class struggle in the development process hinges on 
the demonstration of the existence of social classes. 
Since we have been able to identify classes in 
Nigerian society, it is necessary to examine the 
nature of class struggle in the Nigerian development 
processes.
The colonial era was a period of intensified class 
struggle in Nigeria. Given the nature of the foreign 
domination of the Nigerian population, the struggle 
against it was nationalist. The nationalist movement 
was a class struggle because it was a struggle 
organised by members of Nigerian petty bourgeoisie and 
Nigerian working class against the foreign ruling
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class. The class of Nigerians formed themselves into 
political parties. Youth Movements and trade unions 
against the state power of the British bourgeoisie. 
There was mass recruitment from the peasantry who 
formed the Nigerian Farmers Union (NFU) and petty 
market women. (48)
Beyond the demand for political independence, the 
class struggle against the British ruling class was 
focused on the appropriation of national economic 
taxes and marketing boards' surpluses. The conflict 
over economic exploitation resulted in much strike 
action by the workers, including the famous Aba 
women's riot of 1929 and the Egba revolts of 1948.
Economic surpluses were mainly generated by the 
peasantry who suffered multiple taxation under 
colonial rule. The intensification of the class 
struggle forced the British ruling class to embark on 
economic planning in 1946 which meant that some part 
of the revenue realised from Nigeria was now ploughed 
back for the development of the country. (49) In 1947 
a great victory was scored by the
(48) See Coleman, J.S., Nigerian background to Nationalism.(49) See Helleiner, G.K., Peasant Agriculture in Nigeria. 1966
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nationalist struggle. The British ruling class was 
forced to institute a new constitution which created 
three regions with self-government in 1952. For the 
first time, Nigerians were given a share of state power 
with the British ruling class. However, the country 
was soon plunged into ethnic arid regional rivary. In 
1954 the Lyttleton Constitution ushered in a federal 
structure and in 1960 total independence was granted 
when the British ruling class handed political power 
to a new ruling class of Nigerians.
During the national struggle the slogan had been 
freedom, equality and fraternity. There was propaganda 
from the indigenous Nigerian ruling class who 
proclaimed they would develop the economy for the for 
the welfare of all Nigerians. Independence led to the 
illusion that class struggle had ended in favour of 
welfare, freedom and equality. After independence, the 
Nigerian ruling class Nigerianised all colonial 
privileges with better cars, homes, jobs and immense 
political powers without any corresponding improvement 
in the plight of the workers. The result was class 
struggle between the new ruling class and toiling mass 
of workers and peasants. The various agitation of the 
workers and instances of peasants' revolt were 
expressions of the class struggle. Labour agitation 
reached a peak in 1976 and led to the coercive 1976
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decree proscribing trade unions which engaged in 
industrial unrest. (50) The peasants on the other 
hand are the most passive and worst exploited class. 
The colonial marketing boards which were instrumental 
in peasant exploitation persisted from the 1940's to 
their abolition in 1986, After independence the new 
Nigerian Government continued the policy started under 
colonial rule of using the marketing boards to 
accumulate surpluses from peasant labour. These 
surpluses were used for elitist projects which did not 
benefit the peasants who bore the brunt of production. 
The most decisive opposition was staged in Western 
Nigeria in 1968 against Governments' marginalisation 
of the peasants. (51)
Finally, we have shown that the development of Nigeria 
produced significant changes in the class structure 
and in the class struggles. Our class analysis is 
intended to support the Marxist view that the
"history of all hitherto existing society is the 
history of class struggle". (52)
Generally speaking, class struggles are rooted in
(50) See "Trade Disputes" Published by Federal Ministry of information, 1976.(51) See Tafa Adeoye in "Farmers against OooressionG. 1970.(52) See Karl Marx and Engels F . in the Communist Manifesto. 1948, p. 9
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conflicts of material interest between the different 
classes. These conflicting economic interests arise 
from the different places occupied in social 
production, different relations to the means of 
production and different methods of sharing social 
wealth. Before reviewing the necessary literature 
which forms the conceptual framework of this study, we 
wish to emphasise that the issues studied in this 
chapter were intended to provide a background 
knowledge of Nigerian Society, The subjects examined 
distinguished Nigerian Society from other developing 
countries with similar history.
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CHAPTER 3
A REVIEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATIVE 
PRINCIPLES. IDEALS AND DEGENERATION
The success of this study depends to a considerable
extent on clarity of what the research sets out to
achieve. In selecting the issue of assessing the past 
policies of the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Cooperatives 
policy and its effect on Cooperatives' principle of 
democratic control, this research is formulated as 
follows :
1. to examine the Cocoa Marketing 
Cooperatives' policies for the 
period 1947 - 1967 and
deduce from the examination the
effect on the Cooperatives' ability to
practice the principle of democratic 
control over the period under study.
2. to examine the body of knowledge 
necessary for creating an understanding 
of the ideals and principles which 
enable Cooperatives to fulfil the 
basis of their formation, that is.
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the promotion of "Self help through 
mutual help" and discuss the methods 
used in evaluating documentary 
evidence used in this Study.
3.1 Conceptual Framework of Cooperative Principles 
Cooperatives in a sociological sense could mean the 
social organisation of people working together to 
achieve individual social welfare. Organisations 
which fall within the scope of this definition are 
generally regarded as cooperative societies. The 
cooperative movement, on the other hand, has often 
been considered as occasioned by the state of poverty 
generated for the greater proportion of the population 
by each strand of society civilisation. (53) This 
view suffered some limitations which stem from the 
fact that modern cooperatives are broader in terms of 
activities. Many of today's cooperatives have 
ventured into industries, mining, construction and 
other larger scale enterprises, drawing membership
(53) See Fay, C.R. in Digby, M., THE WORLD COOPERATIVE'MOVEMENT, 1960
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from a large spectrum of the population irrespective 
of economic status. Thus, not all cooperatives 
originated from the weaker members of the society. 
Another flaw of this idea is that it ignored the fact 
that cooperatives are formed as part of government 
policy especially in developing countries. The idea 
does not encompass the working of cooperatives in a 
less developed country like Nigeria. However, 
tradition rightly acknowledges the formation of the 
Rochdale Equitable Pioneers' Society as the starting 
point of the modern cooperative societies.
The Society started in 1844 with the aim of 
establishing a cooperative community and emancipating 
labour from capitalist exploitation. However, over 
time, their leadership became more and more involved 
with the expansion and operation of successful society 
and were diverted from the original ideas. The most 
important factor which contributed to this, was the 
decision of the early Pioneers to pay dividends on 
purchases from cooperative stores. Although this was 
probably a pragmatic device to attract more customers 
to the store, it represented a major break from the 
original idea. The surplus from trading was no longer 
entirely the community funds, but a proportion was 
given back to the individuals for their own benefit. 
This resulted in attracting members who were 
interested in immediate economic benefits but who did
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not necessarily believe in the society's original 
ideals.
This conflict between the original ideals of the 
movement and the pragmatism of many of the new members 
was evident in the Society's attempt to establish 
cooperative workshops. Inspired by their original 
ideals, in 18 54, a cotton mill was set up as a joint 
stock company with shareholdings open to workers and 
outside members. Workers were paid dividends and had 
some say in the direction of the company. The 
business was successful and in 1859 a decision was 
made to raise capital in order to build a new mill. 
In this regard new shareholders were attracted. The 
new shareholders objected to the bonus for workers, 
and the letter's influence diminished. By 1862, the 
cooperative was transformed into a capitalist firm 
owned and controlled by external shareholders. The 
transformation became a clear case of 'degeneration' 
of cooperatives into capitalist enterprises. The 
degeneration of cooperatives led to the establishment 
of International Cooperative Alliance in 1885, Since 
then the I,C,A, has been the custodian of the 
cooperative ideal and has been faced with 
contradictions and confusions in distinguishing 
between genuine cooperatives and other organisations. 
In the 1930's however, the 1,0,A, resolved the 
confusion by setting up a Committee charged with the
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responsibility of establishing universal principles 
for the cooperatives. The Committee submitted its 
report in 1937 and the recommended principles therein 
are the highlight of the following sections.
3.2 The Cooperative Principles
The Committee set up by the International Cooperative 
Alliance made the following remarks before submitting 
their recommendations. They remarked that the 
recommended principles are not associated arbitrarily 
or by chance. They form a system and are inseparable. 
They support and reinforce one another. They can and 
should be observed in the entirety by all 
cooperatives, whatever their objects and their area of 
operations, if they claim to belong to the 
Cooperative Movement.
The second remark is that, although the principles 
originated as rules governing the relations of the 
individual members of cooperatives with one another 
and with their societies, their application is not 
confined to primary societies. They should be loyally 
observed by secondary organisations also with such 
modifications as are necessary or desirable for 
institutions which represent the cooperation of 
cooperative societies rather than of individual 
persons. (54)
(54) See I.e.A., 1976, p. 33
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The principals recommended by the Committee are as 
follows I -
3.2.1 Membership of a cooperative society should
be voluntary and available without artificial 
restriction or any social, political or religious 
discrimination, to all persons who can make use of its 
services and are willing to accept the 
responsibilities of membership.
3.2.2 Cooperative societies are democratic
organisations. Their affairs should be administered 
by persons elected or appointed in a manner agreed by 
the members and accountable to them. Members of 
primary societies should enjoy equal rights of voting 
(one member, one vote) and participating in decisions 
affecting their societies. The administration of all 
societies should be conducted on a democratic basis.
3.2.3 Share capital should only receive a limited 
rate of interest, if any.
3.2.4 Surplus or savings, if any, arising out of 
the operations of a society belong to the members of 
that society and should be distributed in such a 
manner as would avoid one member gaining at the 
expense of others.
This may be done by decision of the members 
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as follows s
(a) By provision for development of the 
business of the cooperative;
(b) By provision of common services; or,
(c) By distribution among the members in 
proportion to their transaction with the 
Society.
3.2.5 All cooperative societies should make 
provision for the education of their members, officers 
and employees and of the general public, in the 
principles and techniques of cooperation, both 
economic and democratic.
3.2.6 All cooperative organisations, in order to
best serve the interests of their members and 
communities, should actively cooperate in every 
practical way with other cooperatives at local, 
national and international levels.
The Committee also states that it does not give any of 
the principles higher priority than the others. On 
the contrary, it states,
"If every principle denotes something 
essential, all possess equal authority and the 
essential substance of all must be equally 
observed to the full extent and in the manner 
that circumstances permit at any time and
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place". (55)
This study seeks to evaluate the second cooperative 
principle, that is, democratic control against the 
active role of Nigerian Governments in promoting 
cooperatives through marketing policies between the 
years 1947 and 1967.
3.3 The Cooperative Principle of Democratic Control 
As we noted in Section 3.2, all genuine Cooperative 
Societies should be democratically controlled. Their 
affairs should be administered by persons elected or 
appointed in a manner agreed by the members and 
accountable to them. Members of the Societies should 
enjoy equal voting rights. Every member should enjoy 
participation in decisions affecting their Society. 
With regard to this principle, the Committee appointed 
by the International Cooperatives Alliance stated that 
"The Cooperative Society, unlike a joint- 
stock Company, being primarily an 
association of human beings, the status of 
all its members should be equal and all should 
have equal opportunities of participating in 
decisions and expressing views on policy.
There is no way of ensuring this, except by 
giving each member one vote and one only.
It is a corollary of the principle of 
voluntary membership that the individual
(55) See I.e.A, op. cit. p. 10
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member should feel that he has real 
responsibility for his Society's good 
administration and achievements". (56)
The idea behind this principle is to enable the 
societies to fulfil the basis of their formation, i.e. 
the promotion of members' interests. This principle, 
to a certain extent, indicates who the owners of 
cooperative societies are. Members, as co-owners of 
cooperative organisations are given the right to 
determine for themselves what are their needs and thus 
provide the necessary guidelines in the formulation of 
the cooperatives' objectives and policies. It has to 
be stressed that cooperatives come into existence due 
to, ideally, the felt-need of the members.
The Cooperative Societies therefore are kept alive by 
the membership's constant support and adhesion. Thus, 
it is only logical for the membership as a whole to 
expect that those who are appointed or elected by them 
would be held accountable to them apart from enjoying 
their confidence.
The importance of this principle within the
Cooperative Movement has never been in doubt. This is
what makes cooperatives different from other economic
enterprise and justifies their being tested not merely
(56) See Statement in International Cooperative Alliance's report 1976, p.17
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for economic efficiency but also for their 
contribution to the moral and social values which 
elevate humanity as a whole.
However, effective implementation of the principle of 
democratic control would depend on the consensus among 
members, the growth and size of the organisation.
Consensus is an important element of any decision­
making process of any organisation. In order to 
facilitate decision-making, consensus among members 
is, therefore, essential. However, as the
organisation grows and membership size enlarges, 
consensus among members may become cumbersome, thereby 
working against the principle of participatory 
democracy.
Contrary to this view, Rothschild and Whitt in their 
study on several producer cooperatives in the United 
States which practised the principle of democratic 
control states that:
"Members of cooperatives generally do not 
view small size as a problem. Indeed, they 
often feel that it contains a number of 
advantages. Nevertheless, the limited size 
of such organisations may reduce their 
impact on the surrounding society and their 
value as demonstration of alternative
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organisational principles. Mainstream 
attitudes and conventional organisations 
value large size far more than people in 
cooperative organisations. All other things 
being equal, a large organisation will have 
more political clout than a small one. A 
cultural bias towards a large size also 
makes it relatively easy for sceptics to 
dismiss collectives and cooperatives as 
trivial organisations espousing principles 
that will never work in large organisations", 
(57)
In cooperative organisations, irrespective of size, 
realisation of the principle of democratic control is 
considered vital to the achievement of the 
organisation's goal. Even though the value of the 
principle of democratic control could not be denied, 
there are inherent pitfalls. First, is the inability 
to make decisions quickly enough. Second, is the 
high cost of dispersing information among members.
In support of the first point, Cornforth 
and his colleagues in their study of
(57) See Rothschild and Whitt, 1986, p. 95
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Workers Cooperatives, discovered in one of the cases 
studied, that the inability to decide between two 
equally strong candidates for one permanent job led to 
two weeks of interminable meetings among members, 
after which both candidates were taken on even though 
the organisation could only support one. In another 
case, Cornforth and his colleagues discovered a long 
delay in taking a decision requiring action by a 
certain deadline because of competing opinions among 
members. (58)
As for the second point relating to the dissemination
and dispersion of information, the cost is not merely
restricted to the resources required to spread the
information around, but is also very much related to
the time taken for meetings. To reduce this type of
cost, an organisational structure could be developed
where members with related ability and skills would be
given the authority to make decisions on behalf of the
organisation. What those who are involved in this
kind of structural organisation seem to overlook is
the fact that the process could lead to the formation
of the 'informal elites' within the organisation. The
existence of such an elite may be difficult to control
as the power wielded by those in the 'informal elites'
is not officially recognised. In support of this
view, Cornforth and his colleagues observed that:
(58) See Cornforth, Thomas, Lewis and Spear, 1988, p. 140
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"À more difficult issue was the feeling that 
the Cooperative was being run by an informal 
elite. The dominant group consisted of long 
serving members of the Cooperatives. Their 
dominance was built upon expertise and knowledge 
that they had built up over time 
and their close association with each other. 
Clearly knowledge and expertise are likely to 
be an important power base in any organisation",
(59)
The problem with regard to informal elites is 
summarised by Laundry and his colleagues as follows: 
"Informal elites are not accountable to 
anyone. Because power has no explicit 
basis, there are no straightforward 
mechanisms for removing their influence.
Unless you are part of the influential group, 
it is hard to know who has real power in an 
organisation run by informal elites". (60)
The inevitability of informal elites as cooperative 
organisations become more hierarchical could be used 
as argument against the ability of cooperatives
(59) See Cornforth, Thomas, Lewis and Spear, op. cit. p. 141(60) See Landry, Marley, Southwood And Wright, 1985, p.10
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to maintain a democratic principle. An absence of the 
democratic principle, indeed, any other cooperative 
principle would result in what is called 
'degeneration' in cooperative circles. Degeneration 
is said to result whereby a Cooperative Society fails 
to maintain the ideals and principles of cooperatives,
3.4 Degeneration
In Section 3 -1 history provided evidence which showed 
that the notable Rochdale Society of Equitable 
Pioneers experienced degeneration as the organisation 
became more hierarchical, thereby, unable to maintain 
democratic form of administration and management. In 
Section 3.2 we noted that informal elites are 
inevitable in a structured organisation. Degeneration 
often results when decision is concentrated in the 
hands of the few elites. The experience of the 
Rochdale Society of Equitable Society suggested that 
a cooperative organisation could degenerate into 
capitalist form of organisation where some or all the 
work force became excluded from ownership and the 
associated right of control. The process which 
degeneration assumes could be an initial period of 
direct democracy followed by a more bureaucratic phase
77
and a subsequent resurgence of representational 
democracy. (61). According to Cornforth and his 
colleagues, it is possible to distinguish between 
three stages of degeneration. These are what they 
termed constitutional, goal and organisational 
degenerations. (62)
3.4.1 Constitutional Degeneration
This form of degeneration results when a cooperative 
organisation evolves policies which allow open 
membership and lack of restrictions on share 
ownership. At this stage the cooperative objective 
has been replaced by economic interests. Membership 
is open to the public shareholders. The speculative 
tendencies of public share ownership could result in 
profit motivated investors eventually taking over the 
Cooperative Society,
This is against the first principle of cooperatives 
laid down by ICA, which states categorically that 
membership of cooperative organisations should be open 
only to those who can make use of the services it 
renders. One important consideration, which reflects 
fairly the normal practice of cooperative 
organisations, irrespective of type, is only those
(61) See Abell, P. in International Yearbook of Organisational Democracy. 1983(62) See Cornforth, Thomas, Lewis and Spear, op. cit. p. 113 - 114
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who could make appropriate use of a cooperative 
service should become members, and accordingly, 
membership of a cooperative consists of person with 
needs which its services can and do supply. In 
general terms, the essential consideration is that, 
if an individual has interests within some specific 
field of service for which the cooperative is formed, 
he should then be regarded as eligible for membership 
and, if he applies, be admitted, unless he is 
personally unacceptable on some obvious justifiable 
grounds.
The workers' right to membership should be based on 
their working in the cooperative organisation and not 
on shareholding. This ideal must be maintained in 
order to ensure democratic control of workers over 
their cooperative. It is clear therefore, that 
constitution degeneration occurs when the cooperative 
departs from the membership principle as recommended 
by the International Cooperative Alliance.
3.4.2 Goal Degeneration
Unlike constitutional degeneration, goal degeneration 
is caused by external forces. The external forces 
have their origin in the capitalist relations of 
production. This view is taken from marxist analysis 
by Mandel who argued that:
"Not only is self-management limited to the
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level of the factory, workshop or assembly 
line, an illusion from an economic viewpoint 
in that the workers cannot implement 
decisions against the operations of the market 
laws, but worse still, the decisions taken by 
workers became more and more restricted by
the decisions about profits....... the
fundamental principle underlying self­
management, which is the liberation of labour, 
whereby workers dominate the process of 
production..o i s  unrealisable in an economy 
which allows the survival of competitions".
(63)
In other words, it is not possible for an isolated 
cooperative to change the wider forces and relations 
of production that have developed under capitalism and 
would instead subject itself to the will of the wider 
system itself, especially in respect of maximising 
profits in order to sustain existence.
It is difficult for the cooperative to operate outside 
the wider capitalist relations of production. This is 
based on the assumption that under a capitalist system 
there exists only one
(63) See Mandel, E., 1975, p. 3
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form of capitalist organisation and a single style of 
management. Thus, in order to survive all
organisations that exist within the capitalist system 
must adopt the prevailing mode of organisation and the 
mono-style management. This assumption is not far 
from the Marxist explanation, that the pressure 
towards degeneration stems entirely from the wider 
capitalist relations of production. (64).
It is clear from the discussion, that goal 
degeneration results from the inability of workers to 
make decisions in their cooperative because they are 
dominated by the needs of the market apart from the 
necessity of making profits in order to survive. Goal 
degeneration is unavoidable as long as cooperatives 
have to operate within wider market economy. In other 
words, cooperatives will not be able to develop 
sufficiently within a Capitalist economy. (65) It is 
only a truly cooperative economy that would break the 
stranglehold of goal degeneration. Such economy is 
illusory, even in socialist states, cooperatives exist 
as a sub-system within a larger domineering ideology
(64) See Michol, T., in Studies in Capitalist Labour Process. 1980, p. 25.(65) See Jay, P., in Political Economy of Cooperation. 1980
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of state planners, Karl Marx himself had mixed views 
with regard to cooperatives. Although he recognised 
that cooperatives demonstrated the feasibility of 
putting into application certain aspects of a 
socialist mode of production, he also at the same time 
felt that within a capitalist system they were bound 
to incorporate part of the system into their 
operation. Goal degeneration is therefore, inevitable 
in any economic system, (66)
3.4.3 Organisation Degeneration
Many cooperatives are set up and remain small 
organisations. History has shown, however, that some 
small cooperatives eventually grow up into larger 
organisations as was the case with Rochdale Equitable 
Pioneers Society. We noted earlier that as the 
cooperatives grow into larger organisations and number 
of members increased, democratic control becomes 
cumbersome and costly as information has to be passed 
and decisions taken by a large number of members. 
Most cooperatives would resort to structuring their 
organisation in order to reduce the cost of democratic 
administration, A structured organisation could lead 
to the creation of very powerful leaders who would 
dominate the organisation
(66) See Marx, K. in The First International and After. Political Writing. Volume 3, 1974 And Horvat, B, in the Political Economy of Socialism. 1980
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resulting in degeneration.
Michels in his study of political organisations, noted 
that all democratic organisations will eventually 
succumb to the domination of the ruling elites. There 
are several factors which bring about this situation. 
Among the more important factors are those pertaining 
to psychological and organisational considerations. 
For the latter, the formation of elites are necessary 
because direct democracy is seen to be inefficient. 
As they grow larger, organisational size makes 
meetings and other forms of communication difficult. 
The difficulty of resolving disputes in collectives, 
the degree of technical specialisation which requires 
experts who because of their expertise automatically 
assumed greater power and authority, the difficulty 
in making quick decisions, and the need for a stable 
leader in order to preserve continuity of direction 
all combined to make ruling elites invitable. At the 
psychological level, Michels states that members of an 
organisation experience a need for a leader, but once 
in post, elected leaders tend to see the post as their 
own, and the skills they possess become a powerful 
centralising force. (67) In 1977, however, Michels' 
thesis was criticised on three grounds:
Firstly, direct democracy is used as the yardstick
(67) See Michels, R . , in Political Parties. 1949
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against which other forms of organisations are 
measured. As a result, any other form of democracy is 
judged to be oligarchic. Secondly, the assumption 
that leaders by virtue of their position will move 
into a different 'social world' to those that they 
lead. Finally, his work ignores the historical 
process that gave rise to the organisation that he is 
studying. (68).
It is possible to avoid organisational degeneration. 
There should be full members' participation in 
decision making as anything less would constitute 
degeneration. This may be difficult in large 
organisations but the cooperatives have set a high 
standard for themselves. Regular consultation is not 
the same as participatory democracy. Consultation 
requires that managers would need to consult the 
members, seeking for the opinions and may be 
influenced by their opinion. Because the managers may 
reject the proposal put forward by members thereby 
relying on their own initiative, consultation falls 
short of a truly democratic participation.
Finally, if organisational degeneration is to be 
avoided, in a large organisation, members should be
(68) Abrahamsson, B., in the Logic of Organisations. 1977
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allowed to participate in decision-making. They 
should be allowed access to and share of management 
information. There should be a guaranteed protection 
from reprisal if the employee voices criticisms. 
There should be an independent board of appeals to 
settle disputes between the managers and the managed. 
A participatory attitude and value should be 
maintained at all levels of management. These are the 
pre-requisites for a successful cooperative democratic 
enterprise, (69)
In concluding this section, the importance of 
cooperative education must be stressed. The
realisation of the democratic principle and indeed 
other cooperative principles would depend on the 
fulfilment of an educational function. The importance 
of education is recognised in all spheres of human 
endeavour. Education has a unique role in
cooperatives. The cooperative movement is not merely 
a socio-economic movement, but a human association of 
individuals who are cooperatively motivated. The 
movement, therefore, required the education of members 
in the business of cooperation. Cooperation and 
cooperative behaviour assumes a certain preparation on 
the part of the members of the cooperative
(69) See Abell, P. in Crouch, C. and Heller, F.A., Organisational Democracy and Political Processes. 1983
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organisation. If self help through mutual help is the 
essence of the cooperative movement, it is imperative 
that members should have knowledge of the principles 
that would successfully guarantee the mutual benefit 
of cooperation. The best guarantee the cooperative 
could offer is in the quality of its members which in 
turn depends on cooperative education. History has 
shown that the Rochdale Pioneers were not merely 
interested in enrolling members, but making good 
cooperators out of them. To achieve this objective, 
members were educated not only in the business of 
cooperation but also a wider understanding of good 
citizenship. In short, education became the very 
essence of the early cooperative movement. (71)
3.5 Degeneration And Problem of this Study 
As we noted earlier in this chapter, the principle of 
democratic management leaves decisions on important 
issues to cooperative members on the basis of one man 
one vote, irrespective of a member's capital 
contribution. Every member has an equal share in the 
control of the society by the use of his vote at the 
general meetings. In Nigeria, this principle was 
recognised and recommended by the former Registrar of 
Nigerian Cooperatives, E.I. Price, when he remarked
(71) See Cole, G,D,H. in the Life of Robert Owen One of the Forefathers Cooperation. 1925
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that:
"À member's influence and voice in a 
Cooperative Society depends neither on his 
wealth nor his political or social position, 
but on purely human virtues such as honesty, 
intelligence, diligence and tact". (72)
This principle and indeed other cooperative principles 
received greater attention during the Colonial rule. 
The Colonial Cooperatives' policies were based on 
these principles.
The Cooperatives' department's attitude was to 
authorise the registration of any Society which 
professed to operate in accordance with these 
principles. (73) The analysis of Marketing
Cooperatives in Nigeria during the period under study 
confirms that there was a political will on the part 
of Nigerian governments to implement the cooperative 
principles, The question which arises is to what 
extent these principles which had become a norm in 
theory have been fully implemented in Nigeria? No 
Study has ever been carried out which addresses this 
question. The much celebrated Adeyeye's Study of the 
Nigerian Cooperative Movement did
(72) See Price, E.I., Cooperation and the Cooperative Department. Ibadan, 1957, p. 2(73) See Cooperative Society's Ordinance, No. 39 of 1935, Lagos, p. 2
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not address the question. As stated in Chapter 1, 
Adeyeye sees cooperatives as any organisation which 
runs its business in accordance with cooperative 
principles but did not fully address the issue of 
implementation. The problem of this Study is, 
therefore, to examine how the democratic practices 
which would be considered to be the norm in the 
Western Countries were applied in the cooperative 
marketing of cocoa in Nigeria. To deal with the 
problem of this study, we propose to analyse available 
documentary evidence on the Cocoa Marketing 
Cooperatives' policy, 1947 - 1967 and deduce from the 
analysis the effect of certain aspects of the policy 
on the Cooperatives' principle of democratic control. 
Before going into this analysis in depth, we would 
like to attempt a review of some theroetical reasons 
why democratic control may be subverted in a 
developing country like Nigeria.
In the capitalist West, the theoretical argument for 
subversion of democratic control starts from the view 
that the capitalist relation of production not only 
consists of the relationship between the capitalist 
and the workers but also a relationship between 
private capitals which are market mediated and 
unplanned. The nature of these relationships makes it 
difficult for cooperatives to adopt their principle of 
democratic control as they have to conform. This
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Marxist view is based on the assumption that under a 
capitalist system, there is only one form of 
capitalist organisation and a single style of 
management. Thus, in order to survive, all
organisations that exist within the capitalist system 
must adopt the prevailing mode of organisations and 
the mono-style management. The idea of democratic 
control is therefore illusion from an economic point 
of view, in that the workers in any capitalist system 
cannot implement decisions against the operations of 
the market laws and the need to make profit. The 
principle of democratic control whereby members 
dominate the process of decision-making is 
unrealisable in an economy which is market and profit 
orientated- (74)
It could be noted from this analysis that subversion 
of democratic control in any capitalist society stems 
entirely from the wider capitalist relations of 
production. This is unavoidable as long as
cooperatives exist as a sub-system within a larger 
domineering ideology adopted by the government. As 
Mellor, Hannah and Sterling stated:
"Capitalism is a system of private ownership of 
property where the allocation of resources is 
determined by power in the market place. 
Cooperation as a philosophy presents a challenge
(74) See Mandel, E., op. cit.
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Ilto capitalism at each of its defining point
(75)
If cooperataives must respond to the pressure of the 
market and the motivation of profit and capital to 
survive in a capitalist system, can they operate 
without undermining their principle of democratic 
control? The experience of Mondragon has shown that 
cooperatives can successfully operate in a capitalist 
society. The success story of Mondragon Cooperatives 
in the Basque provinces of Spain has been told by 
Robert Oakshott in his study of Workers Cooperatives, 
(76)
The conditions which prompted the success of Mondragon 
Cooperatives are not present in Nigeria and indeed 
most developing countries. These conditions could be 
found in the cooperative laws in Europe and Africa. 
In Europe cooperative laws are largely for the purpose 
of establishing the legitimacy and securing the 
special features of cooperative organisations.
(75) See Mellor, Hannah, J., Sterling, J. in Workers Cooperatives in Theory and Practice. 1988, p. 66(76) See Oakfshott, R . , The Case for Workers Cooperatives. 1978
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The Spanish law and indeed most European laws do not 
encourage effective control of the Cooperatives by the 
State. Cooperative laws in Europe amounted to State 
recognition of existing cooperatives, after their 
practical value had been demonstrated, as an 
appropriate form of organisation to promote self-help 
and solidarity. Much as the Cooeprative has to 
operate and survive in the economies of the Capitalist 
West, the governments simply promulgate cooperative 
legislation to ensure that the principles of 
cooperation were embodied in legal rules, so that 
those who acted on the basis of the cooperative 
legislation did not find themselves in conflict with 
cooperative principles. Cooperative laws in the 
Capitalist West also incorporate guarantees to 
maintain the Cooperative's objectives, that is, the 
promotion of the members' interest. Evidence of this 
kind of laws can be found in the first laws on 
cooperatives, promulgated in 1852 in Britain and the 
Dutch Cooperatives' Association law of 1876.
These and many early European Cooperatives' laws were 
passed to reflect existing cooperative practices based 
on Rochdale ideas. Since then, nothing much has 
changed. Recent European laws like the Dutch Civil 
Code and Cooperative Act of 1976 had simply to 
regulate an associative form of enterprise, run for 
the benefit and on account of its members, and at
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their risk, to promote their material interests. This 
has not been the case in developing countries where 
there has been active State involvement in 
cooperatives' initiative and sponsorship.
The case for State involvement in cooperative affairs 
in developing countries stem from the view that the 
population is economically too weak and backward to be 
capable of developing effective cooperative 
organisation. Thus, cooperatives should be developed 
to promote the sort of development which took place in 
Western Europe, in bringing the socially and 
economically weakest elements of society into economic 
life and promoting the modernisation of traditional 
forms of commerce and production. To be able to 
fulfil these intentions, government must pass laws to 
enable cooperative associations appear as organisation 
designed to implement the principle of self-help, (77)
However, government involvement with cooperatives in 
developing countries can serve another end. The 
cooperatives can be established to serve as 
instruments for administration and implementation of 
economic plans. Where this is so. Cooperative laws
(77) See Munkner, "Corporative Law as Instrument of State Sponsorship of Cooperative Societies", 1973
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serve as a means of directing policies, exercising 
powers of supervision, reserving powers of control to 
the State and rights to Civil Servants over internal 
affairs and management of cooperative organisations. 
The law becomes a symbol of authority as was the case 
in India- Weeraraan discovered, that legislation in 
various Indian States runs counter to the most basic 
concepts underlying cooperative association. He 
concluded that:
"the reform of the law is the first step 
indicated for the establishment of a true 
cooperative movement". (78)
The experience of India typified the experience of 
other Third World Countries where cooperative 
development is brought into being by way of compulsory 
membership, obligatory supply, administrative control 
or physical control. The cooperative law required for 
this type of cooperative association is different from 
that needed to advance the principle of self-help, 
self-management and group action. In India, there has 
been persistent argument against Government regulation 
of the Cooperatives. As early as 1955 Kulkarni wrote: 
"...Cooperation has remained a policy of 
Government in India rather than a movement of the 
people...perpetuation of official control is a
(78) See Weeraman, Indian Cooperative Laws and Cooperative Principles. page viii
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negation of the principles of democracy on 
which the movement is based....Cooperation is 
merely a government policy and not a live 
movement". (79)
In spite of this statement. State control of 
cooperatives has steadily increased in India and most 
Third World Countries. In 1988, Peter Abell published 
his book on case studies from three Third World 
countries; Tanzania, Sri Lanka and Fiji. In each of 
the three countries studied, he discovered that 
governments play active role in promoting, maintaining 
and supervising the Cooperative Movement. (80) The 
experience of these countries is such that government 
lay down cooperative rules and compel compliance and 
also intervene on a day-to-day basis in the affairs of 
the movement. The experience of "Ujamaa" Cooprative 
movement in Tanzania is an ample case of cooperative 
organisations being turned into a State ideology. The 
transformation has turned the cooperative into an 
instrument for the administration and implementation 
of an economy planned and managed by the socialist 
government of NIyearere. Subversion in this case, stem
(79) See Kulkarni, Practice of Cooperation in India and Abroad. 1955, pp 177 - 182(80) See Abell, P., Establishing Support Svstem for Industrial Cooperatives. 1988
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entirely from State control. As Yash Ghai concluded: 
"The generally recognised principles of 
democracy, autonomy, initiative and self- 
reliance of members have been severely affected 
in the case of East African Cooperatives by the 
excessive powers entrusted to government, to 
the extent that it is sometimes not possible to 
speak of cooperative being anything more than 
a name", (81)
These case studies call to question the role of Third 
World governments in relation to cooperative 
societies. This role was clearly defined in 1949 by 
the Technical Meeting on Cooperative in India:
"The role of government in relation to 
Cooperative Societies should be one of 
actual helpfulness, intended to stimulate 
cooperative enterprise, to guide it and 
keep it on sound lines without either 
attempting to compel or to replace local 
initiative or self-help. Government should 
in addition promote conditions under which 
cooperatives will thrive and develop." (82)
Similar definition was made in 1971 by United States
(81) See Yashi Ghai, Cooperative Legislations in East Africa. 1970, pp. 39-61(82) See Food and Agriculture Organisation, Technical Meeting on Cooperatives in Asia and Far East held in Lucknow, 1949
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of American's Advisory Committee on Overseas 
Cooperative Development (an organisation which 
promotes cooperatives in developing countries). The 
Committee says :
"Government should begin as champion, continue 
as partner, and abide as friend. This is a 
general characterization of government policy in 
the countries where cooperatives have contributed 
much to the economic advancement of farmers", 
(83)
Seven years earlier, an international symposium on the 
dynamic relationships between government and 
cooperatives held in Tel Aviv in 1964 concluded as 
follows :
i) "Relations between government bodies and 
cooperatives should not be a one-way 
traffic from above, with the cooperatives 
being used by the authorities as an 
instrument for the imposition and 
implementation of government planning.
Many countries try too hard to realise 
political ends through cooperatives. 
Instead, there has to be 'an exchange 
of capacities and functions of opposed 
interests and advantages' between 
government and cooperatives. These
(83) See U.S. Advisory Committee on Overseas Cooperative Development, 1971
96
functional relationships need to be 
realised in a form such that, in the 
interests of the common good, a just 
balance can be achieved with regard 
to both functions and powers,
ii) The maintenance of an adequate measure 
of autonomy by the cooperatives is of 
great and positive value. An excess
of control and interference, or even of 
support, is harmful to the sound 
development of cooperation.
iii) In those cases in which cooperatives have 
come into being autonomously from below, a 
strengthening of the ties with government 
may be desirable to ensure greater 
correspondence between private and 
public interests," (84)
These comments and those reviewed earlier have shown 
that government intervention in the organisation and 
management of cooperatives in developing countries 
carries some risks. These risks could be viewed from 
the likelihood of those organisations coming totally 
under State control and carrying out task which 
conflicts with the interest of members. Cooperatives
(84) See Descroche, H., report on the proceedingsof International Symposium on the Relationship between government and cooperatives held in Tel Aviv, 1965
97
could be misused by government as a means of imposing 
specific policy objectives or extend political control 
over the rural population. Cooperatives may be 
transformed into a bureaucratic governmental 
institution rather than an organisation committed to 
members welfare.
Although, no cooperative is likely to survive unless 
it can remain commercially viable, the fundamental 
principles of cooperation demands the fulfilment of 
other criteria. These relate to the operation of a 
meaningful degree of democracy based on the principle 
of one member, one vote. The fundamental issue is 
that of control which ultimately rests with the equal 
voting power of the members as a whole. As our review 
has shown, the power of control rests with the 
Government of Third World Countries, Thus, subversion 
of the democratic principle in developing countries 
stem entirely from government cooperatives' policies. 
The problem of this study as stated earlier is to 
examine these policies and deduce from the 
examination, its effect on democratic control of Cocoa 
Marketing Cooperatives in Nigeria for the period under 
study. The methodology used for the examination is 
explained in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SCOPE OF RESEARCH AND METHODS OF INVESTIGATION
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, we have formulated the central problem 
that is to be examined, defined the aims the thesis 
hopes to achieve and formulated the objectives which 
guide the direction of the inquiry. To achieve those 
aims, this chapter sets out to define the scope of the 
study, discuss the main research techniques used in 
the selection of the research sample and deal with the 
major investigative methods applied in gathering vital 
data necessary in providing answers to questions 
specified by the central problem. This chapter also 
tries to justify the choice of the types and sizes of 
the samples selected for the study and methodology 
used in the collection, processing and analysis of 
data collected.
4.2 The Scope of Research Activities :
The problem of this research as outlined earlier, is 
to examine to what extent the Cooperative's principle 
of democratic control was applied in the cooperative 
marketing of cocoa in Nigeria between the years 1947 
and 1967. The main data collection for this research 
was carried out in Nigeria over a period of 28 weeks. 
Two visits were made. The first took place between
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the months of December, 1988 and March, 1989. The 
first ten weeks of this period were spent in the 
former Western Region, now Osun, Ogun, Oyo and Ondo 
States of Nigeria. This was because cocoa, which has 
since remained the Nigerian leading agricultural 
export, is produced in the above states. Almost all 
the cocoa marketing cooperatives in Nigeria were 
established in the area. The area has a long history 
of cooperative development and has provided a model 
adopted in other parts of the country.
The remaining three weeks of the thirteen weeks were 
spent between Kaduna and Enugu, the capital cities of 
former Northern and Eastern Nigeria. The visit 
enabled me to collect date on agricultural pricing and 
marketing policies over the period 1947 to 1967.
The second visit, however, availed me the opportunity 
of consulting a variety of data sources on the 
development of cocoa marketing cooperatives in 
Nigeria. Unlike the first visit, the second visit 
lasted approximately 15 weeks, between April and July, 
1990. This time around, my decision was to have a 
base established at a core area of cocoa marketing 
activity. My first choice was the Nigerian Institute 
for Social and Economic Research (N.I.S.E.R.) which is 
based at the University of Ibadan. The staff of the 
Institute provided me with general administrative and
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technical assistance. The base provided me with easy 
access to Federal Universities in Ibadan, Ife, Lagos 
and Benin City, These are some of the oldest 
Universities in the country. Their libraries are well 
stocked with historical materials on agriculture and 
cooperative policies in general. Besides these 
universities, the institute became a good base from 
which I could contact cooperative colleges and centres 
scattered all over the cocoa belt of Oyo, Osun, Ogun 
and Ondo States. To collect relevant data from these 
diverse sources, the following methods were used.
4.3 Research Methodology
A great many of the materials used in this study were 
collected through the application of desk research 
method. The method allowed a careful collection and 
analysis of statistics in the libraries of the Federal 
Universities, the Cooperative Department of the 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperative 
Federation of Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, National Library, Yaba, Federal Ministry 
of Information, Federal Ministry of Labour, the 
Cooperative Division and Cooperative Department of 
Oyo, Lagos, Ondo and Ogun States. Other materials 
include those housed in the National Archives 
headquarters, Ibadan, the Association of Nigerian 
Cooperative Exporters (A.N.C.E) in Ibadan, the Federal 
Agricultural Coordinating Unit (FACU), Ibadan, and the
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Central Bank of Nigeria, Lagos.
Another method used to collect materials for this 
study was field research. Data from the field work 
were derived from records of the Chief Registrar, 
Cocoa Marketing Cooperatives in Ibadan, minute books 
of the Cooperative Unions of the former Western Region 
in Ibadan, minute book of the Association of Nigeria 
Cocoa Export in Ibadan, the minute book of Illesha 
Farmers' Association, Cooperative annual report, 
report on the International Conference on the 
Marketing Board's System held at the Conference Centre 
of the University of Ibadan from 29th March to 3rd 
April, 1971, Federal Office of Statistics in Lagos 
which produced annual abstracts of statistics, 
Nigerian Digest of Statistics and other useful data on 
earnings from commodity trade in terms of quantity and 
price.
By means of field research, raw data were also culled 
from records of the Western Region's Commodity 
Marketing Boards' annual reports and the Cocoa 
Research institute of Nigerian, (CRIN) based in 
Ibadan. The field research method enabled us to dig 
deep into the record of the Cocoa Marketing Board and 
the substantial difference in the actual price of 
cocoa and producer prices. The price differential is 
further explained in a later section.
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other useful materials were also gathered by the use 
of field research include official correspondence 
contained in the following file numbers: CPC 225
Volo1 and CPC 223 Vol.II housed in Cooperative 
Division Office, Akure, Ondo State; 16/126, C.181,
C.362, C.565, 654C, lllF, 1025, 1027 and 36148/s.8 all 
deposited in the National Archive, Ibadan, Oyo State; 
and File numbers W.2628, W.2878, W.2184 and W.3132 
which are deposited with the Cooperative Department, 
Ibadan, Oyo State. (See Sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and
4.4.3 for detailed sources)
Further useful information collected during the field 
work were through oral interviews. Though this is a 
historical study, the use of information from oral 
evidence is indispensable. The primary objective of 
the cooperative is to serve the interests of its 
members. In Nigeria, cocoa marketing cooperatives 
were organised to promote members' interests. Members 
therefore are the best judge of what help they 
received from being a member of the cooperative. 
Having ascertained from preliminary studies that most 
members are illiterate, I decided that the best method 
of obtaining information from them was through oral 
interview (See Appendix iv). The objective was two 
fold: first, to gather information on the views of
individual members who have engaged in cocoa 
production in the last fifty years. Responses were
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invited to the question, whether or not they thought 
the development of cooperative marketing of cocoa had 
helped them. If so, how or if not why? The second 
primary reason for the oral interview relates to the 
fact that data have not yet been generated on the 
operation of the cocoa marketing cooperatives since 
the abolition of the Marketing Boards in 1986, Since 
there was paucity of information from written sources 
on the current operation of the cooperatives, 
officials of the Cooperative Department, Federal 
Ministry of Agriculture were interviewed. They 
provided useful oral evidence which supports the claim 
from Government sources that the cooperatives are now 
free to buy and export cocoa.
Our choice of research methods was made after due 
consideration of the following:
4.3.1 Research Sample
The process of narrowing the focus of an inquiry at 
various stages of the research can broadly be regarded 
as sampling. Sampling is both necessary and 
inevitable in this research and indeed any research 
because as Peil puts it:
"It is never possible to read all the 
literature applicable to the proposed research, 
including all the variables which might be 
relevant, to interview everyone who might
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provide useful information or to use all the 
data gathered in the final report. Thus, 
sampling takes place in the selection of 
research topic, the research site, the people 
to be studied, the concepts and variables which 
are used, the data which are collected and 
methods employed, and the relationships on 
which the analysis is focused". (85)
A researcher's time and infrastructural constraints 
often dictate what is included and what is omitted, 
but the principles of sampling provide guidance for 
making the most of the resources available. The 
importance of applying these principles is to allow 
each individual member of the target population an 
equal (non-zero) chance of being included in the final 
sample. This makes the sample fairly representative 
of the parent population, thus permitting the making 
of reasonably valid and reliable generalisations about 
the findings of the research with measurable amount of 
confidence. (86) There are many sampling techniques 
that may be used in selecting such an ideally 
representative sample such as cluster sampling, random 
sampling, stratified sampling, purposive sampling and
(85) See Peil, M . , Mitchell, K. and Rimmer D. Social Science Research Methods. London. 1982(86) See Husain, M. Agricultural Geography . New Delhi, 1979. Also Dixon, C. and Leach B. Sampling Methods for Geographical Research, Norwich, 1978
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systematic sampling. Each or a combination of 
sampling techniques is applied for different reasons. 
For the purpose of this study random sampling is 
applied. The choice of technique was prompted by the 
fact that it was not possible for us to cover all 
parts of the cocoa belt from which data for this study 
is required. The area is about 200 miles long and 50 
miles wide covering the entire land area of the 
Central Western Nigeria (See Appendix vii). 
Consequently, a sample of ten villages were selected 
out of the many villages in the cocoa belt. Twenty 
five cocoa farmers were also selected out of each 
village using simple random sampling. The pilot 
surveys undertaken in 1987 during my M.Phil degree 
research, showed that some of the retired Cooperative 
officials who were instrumental in cooperative 
decisions taken in the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's were 
living in the villages. To ensure that they were 
proportionally included in the sample, ten each were 
selected from each village from the cocoa producing 
area which had been selected using random sampling.
The data collected in these villages related to the 
resident population as at the time of my survey. 
There was no accurate and up to date village census. 
The information obtained on adult male population were 
from local tax and cooperative offices. The figures
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were estimates and subject to such large and 
indeterminable margins of error that one hesitates to 
cite them at all (see section 4.4). Thus, in Column 
2, Table 4.1, such estimates have been applied as 
guide.
TABLE 4.1
Distribution of Sample by Village and People
VillageName Estimate of farmers popula­tion in each Village
No. of farmers inter­viewed
No. of retiredOfficialsinterviewed
Sample used to select farmers & officials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ishoya 212 25 10 Random
Abanata 203 25 10 —do—
Okeigbo 225 25 10 -do-
Oro 201 25 10 —do—
Oretedo 207 25 10 -do-
Ifetedo 215 25 10 -do-
Omifon 220 25 10 -do-
Odigbo 212 25 10 -do-
Aroromi 305 25 10 -do-
Okenla 230 25 10 —do—
*Total Number of Cocoa Farmers Interviewed 250*Total Number of Retired Officials Interviewed 100
Sources Author's research data, 1990
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4.3.2 Data Collection
The collection of primary data from human beings as 
opposed to matter, involves contact with people and 
hence requires the application of social science 
investigative techniques. The conventional social 
science approach to investigation uses the standard 
survey techniques which normally pay careful attention 
to sampling and the use of structured questionnaires 
and adopt particular interviewing methods and coding 
procedures. (87) This study uses both conventional 
and informal or non-conventional methods of data 
collection because the main objective was to examine 
to what extent the cooperative principle of democratic 
control has been applied in the marketing of cocoa in 
Nigeria. The major research techniques used to gather 
the data which form the basis of this thesis, in 
addition to those already explained were questionnaire 
and observation.
4.3.3 The Questionnaire
Different types of questionnaires were designed and 
used in collecting primary data regarding the effect 
of cocoa marketing policies on the ability of the 
cooperatives to practice their principle of democratic 
control.
(87) See Harvey, D.W. "Locational Change in theKentish Hop Industry and the analysis of land- use patterns", in Transactions of Institute of British Geographers. London, 1963
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The first questionnaire (Appendix IV) was administered 
to 250 peasant cocoa producers, most of 
whom sell their cocoa through a local cooperative 
society. The 1987 pilot survey revealed that a 
considerable proportion of the target population could 
not read or write, and that some of those who could 
read and write might, for obvious reasons, be 
reluctant to fill the questionnaire, or were prone to 
ignore them as an unnecessary nuisance, or might only 
halfheartedly apply themselves in filling out the 
questionnaires accurately. Postal services in most 
areas were unreliable and in some villages almost non­
existent. The issue of mail questionnaires was 
therefore out of the question. Instead, two local 
assistants were hired and in the company of the author
interviews were conducted with the farmers in a "face
to face" situation. The method of collecting data as 
the interview occurs paid off as it reduced the 
problem of illiteracy among the sample, overcame 
possible reluctance to fill out the questionnaires and 
also eliminated resistance to answer certain 
questions. The approach also paid off as it enabled
supplementary questions to be asked to obtain
additional information, to explain answers and to 
check that the respondents were not making up their 
responses,
It should be noted that all the peasants selected from
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the sample cooperated with us for the research. The 
reason was that I spent some weeks lodging with my 
assistants who were local people and before the 
interview commenced we had made necessary 
acquaintances with our respondents. The interview 
atmosphere was cordial and friendly. Another reason 
for their cooperation was that most of the peasants 
did not know that this was a piece of academic 
research. They showed interest in the research 
because they expected that this author would pass on 
their farming requirements and problems to the 
authorities in the city, and then return with some 
solution to their plight.
The second questionnaire (see Appendix V) was 
administered to the 100 retired marketing officials 
selected from the ten villages covered by this 
research. Unlike the peasants, the retired officials 
are mainly people who could read and write. The 
questionnaires were handed over to them and two weeks 
was allowed for their completion. On our return after 
two weeks only 60 per cent questionnaires had been 
completed. The other 40 per cent wanted some 
clarification on certain questions. All
questionnaires were however completed and collected 
after three weeks except for four "drop-outs". The 
drop-outs had to be replaced; the substitutes 
responded within one week.
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The second questionnaire covered questions that dealt 
with largely similar aspects as those dealt with by 
the first questionnaire. However, data collected at
this second stage were important for comparative
purposes with those provided by the peasant farmers. 
This helped to check the accuracy of certain
statistics and claims given by the farmers because 
most of them had no records to support their claims on 
their past output.
The third and last questionnaire (see Appendix VI) was 
administered to three senior officials of the Federal 
Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperative Department,
Lagos. These were Mr. Roy Kershaw, Chief Technical 
Adviser, Dr. G. Tedla, I.L.O. Research Expert, and Mr. 
V. Sholanke, Assistant Registrar of Cooperatives. 
These officials are presently engaged with the new 
cooperative policies on price and marketing systems. 
Unlike Questionnaires 1 and 2, the questionnaires were 
individually given out to them and collected on the 
fifth working day. The questions set. in the 
questionnaire were intended to investigate official 
views on the past and present cocoa marketing 
cooperative policies. The information acquired from 
the three senior officers of the Cooperative 
J>epartment provided an interesting comparative insight 
into a new marketing strategy named, "market 
transparency". This idea will be explained later.
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4.3.4 Informal or Unstructured Interview and Discussions
Formal or structured questionnaires, as discussed 
above, tend to reduce the amount of personal contact 
with the interviews and flexibility in research, and 
hence constrained data collection to pre-determined 
dimensions. Consequently, some writers have suggested 
and recommended the use of observations, listening and 
recording, and asking questions. (88) This permits an 
objective identification of the respondents' views, a 
point which is stressed by Richards when he warns, 
"That unless there is ample opportunity for 
respondents to specify the dimensionalities and 
make the interconnections inherent in their 
knowledge of their 'Universe' clear, their 
responses, taken at face value, and as provoked 
by the contingencies of a tightly structured 
questionnaire interview, will unwittingly 
mislead rather than inform". (89)
Unstructured interviews and discussions, sometimes in 
groups were therefore considered a very effective
(88) See Whye, A. Guidelines for Field Studies inEnvironmental Perception, Paris, 1977,(89) See Richards P. Geography is a bottle ofHeineken Lager Beer. How to be the most boring person in development planning and still get vour facts wrong. University of Sussex, 1978.
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method of collecting data, not only from the peasant 
farmers and those who work with them, but also from 
Government Ministers who did not have time for the 
questionnaire type of investigation. This technique 
was used on occasions where respondents could not read 
or write and on one occasion where the respondent 
could not locate his reading glasses. The information 
gathered was first recorded as field notes in the 
author's research note book but later used to fill out 
the individual's questionnaire.
4.3.5 Data Collection by Observation 
Observation in the sense of its application in this 
study simply means the accurate watching and noting of 
events or phenomena which are relevant to this study, 
as they occur. However, in considering observation as 
a technique of research in social science, the term is 
often used in a much broader sense where it involves 
the study of a behaviourial process by becoming part 
of that process, Moser and Kalton stated that:
"Observation can fairly be called the classic 
method of scientific enquiry. This accumulated 
knowledge of biologists, physicists, 
astronomers and other natural scientists is 
built upon centuries of systematic observation, 
much of it are phenomena in their natural
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surroundings rather than in their laboratory".
(90)
Participant observation is also useful in collecting 
data about the behaviourial characteristics of a 
community because it prevents the target population 
from making up answers in order to impress the 
researcher which sometimes occurs in a formal 
interview situation. The observer has the opportunity 
of personal physical involvement in the activities of 
the community to be studied.
Throughout three months of the field work, the author 
and his assistants lived and spent time among the 
peasants in all the ten villages used in the sample. 
During the period the author participated in the 
process of harvesting and preparing cocoa beans for 
the market. The participation and observation availed 
the author the opportunity of asking questions and 
discussing with the farmers about why many farms are 
under-developed and cocoa trees allowed to dry up and 
die. Much valued information was gathered through 
this method.
(90) See Moser C.A, and Kalton G. Survev Methods in Social Investigation. London, 1971
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4.3.6 Data Analysis
By the nature of this study and some of the techniques 
used to gather information, many of the data gathered 
are not variable data which can be mathematically 
manipulated. Not all pieces of research information 
are expected to contain variable data. As Moser and 
Kalton noted:
"Analysis of any survey material does not 
necessarily have to be statistically based". (9L)
In principle, we noted that the aim of every 
cooperative organisation is to advance members' 
prosperity and economic opportunities. Thus, data 
were collected and analysed. The result showed that 
the ten villages varied widely in prosperity and 
economic opportunities, even when they are close 
neighbours. The Government's cooperatives' marketing 
policy on the other hand is identical in each case.
The variety in prosperity and economic opportunities 
is illustrated in the following tables.
(91) See Moser and Kalton, op. cit. 1971
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TABLE 4.2
Characteristics of the Villages Studied
Village Samplesize AgeofFarmer 
(Avge)
Familysize
(Avge)
NumberofWives 
(Avge)
Expenditure on Hired Labour (Naira per Annum)(Avge)
Ishoya 25 55. 6 14.1 3 500Abanata 25 58.5 15.8 4 450Okeigbo 25 54,1 16.1 4 380Oro 25 57.2 13.9 3 280Oretedo 25 48.7 14.9 3 580Ifetedo 25 51.2 9.9 2 308Omifon 25 49.8 12.7 2 280Odigbo 25 55.1 9.8 2 408Aroromi 25 58,2 14.2 3 300Okenla 25 50.9 12.9 3 380
Source: Based on interviews with 250 Cocoa farmersin the ten villages.
Note: Number of wives include Mistresseswho contribute to the farm work as a member of the household. The average age of the farmers outlined in Column 3 of this table, serves as a guide as the farmers had no birth certificates to support their age claims.
These villages as explained earlier are located in the 
heart of cocoa belt of former Western Nigeria, now 
Oyo, Osun, Ondo and Ogun States. The villages have 
received a disproportionate amount of attention from 
the Government. Only a few of the villages have a 
primary school, secondary school and hospitals. A 
string of small shops providing goods and services, 
such as tailoring, hairdressing, bicycle repairs, have 
established themselves in most of the villages.
In spite of the conspicuous commercial activités, the
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great majority of household heads in the area derived 
their income from cocoa farming. The average 
household of 13 persons, including women and children 
in all the villages studied, owned an average of 20 
acres of cocoa farm. The result is that there is 
intensive labour use in times of harvest and less 
labour is hired to supplement the family labour, as 
shown in the low expenditure on hired labour 
illustrated on Table 4.3,
The agricultural potential of the area is immense. 
Not only does it have almost unlimited land available, 
it also has a share of the fertile rain forest which 
is essentially good for cocoa cultivation. The 
prosperity of individual farmers depended on both his 
initial access to land, labour and capital and on his 
skill in putting these resources to productive use.
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TABLE 4.3
Area Cultivated by 250 Cocoa Farmers in Ten Villages
Villages Acres FarmedLess 1 1-10 10-20 More than 20
Ishoyo 2 3 19 12Abanata 1 2 20Okeigbo 2 2 19 21Oro 1 4 19 1Oretedo 2 2 20 i9Ifetedo 1 3 19Omifon 2 3 19 iOdigbo 2 2 20 iIAroromi 3 3 18 9Okenla 2 2 19 L
Source: Based on Interviews with 250 Cocoa Farmersfrom ten villages.
By reason of their joint efforts and pooling of
resources together, cooperators especially in the
western societies have been able to advance
individual prosperity. The inequality among members
of the Nigerian cocoa marketing cooperatives in the
area under study reflects several decades of corrupt
enrichment by cooperative leaders. Evidence was given
before the Idown-Caxton Commission of Inquiry into the
Ibadan Marketing Cooperative Society. An employee of
one of the marketing societies admitted that at least
one third of the total amount owed by the cooperatives
were the sums of money owed by the leaders of the
cooperative societies. During the hearing, a Senior
Assistant Registrar of Cooperatives, one Mr. C.M.
Kubeyeinji, told the Commission that in 1959, 41 of
the cooperative marketing societies in the Ibadan area
alone were affected by the fraudulent practices
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involving society leaders. The commission also 
detected a case in which the leaders of primary 
marketing societies at the village level collected 
substantial sums of money as advance payment for cocoa 
to be delivered to the marketing unions. On getting 
to the village, a portion of the money was shared 
between the presidents and secretaries of the village 
societies. To cover the fraud, the Commission 
discovered that the same amount was cleverly debited 
to the societies' accounts without members detecting 
the fraud. Some leaders were also indicted of 
illegally drawing money from their society's account 
for private use. (92)
The farmers contended that their leaders had allowed 
personal interests to outweigh the principle upon 
which their society was based. The story of 
embezzlement, mismanagement and fraudulent conversion 
by cooperative leaders was generally told by all 
farmers giving evidence during the hearing of Caxton 
Commission of Inquiry. When the Commission submitted 
its report it was critical of leaders and blamed them 
for the failure of cooperatives to achieve their 
objective of promoting members' prosperity. (93).
(92) See Caxton-Idowu Commission of Inquiry into the Ibadan Cooperative Produce Marketing Union Ltd., op. cit.(93) See Caxton-Idowu, Ibid, p.36
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The resultant apathy towards the cooperative principle 
of democratic control prompted the Cooperative 
Congress of Western Nigeria in 1952 to deplore the bad 
management and dishonest practices of union leaders 
and call for a return to a more democratic approach to 
the cooperative administration. (94) In 1960, the 
Commission appointed by the Registrar in charge of 
cooperative societies in the former Western Region to 
recommend measures for accelerating a membership drive 
also called on leaders to face up to their 
responsibility to their cooperatives and maintain the 
principles of cooperatives. (95)
The essential ingredient for success in a venture like 
the marketing cooperative is understanding on the part 
of the members. To effectively participate and share 
in the responsibilities of their societies, the 
members, particularly their leaders, must have basic 
understanding of their responsibilities. 
Unfortunately, such understanding has been seriously 
lacking amongst members. This is because majority of 
the farmers who form the bulk of the cooperative 
membership are illiterates. À majority of these 
farmers in our sample are illiterates
(94) See C.U.W.N., The Cooperative Congress of Western Nigeria, Ibadan, 1952, p. 28(95) See Cooperative Department, Report on the Committee on Cooperative Membership Drive, Ibadan, 1961
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with the exception of a few who could read and write 
in the mother tongue. This leads us to conclude that 
the biggest factor inhibiting the progress of
cooperative marketing in Nigeria is a lack of
membership education. A great deal of the faults 
identified with the management of the societies is due 
to ignorance of democratic procedure on the part of 
both the members and their leaders.
The question of ignorance on the part of cooperative 
members has to be tackled. Commenting on the issue of 
a lack of trained cooperators, Ekuma-Nkama, the first 
Nigerian Registrar of Cooperative Societies, in 1966 
described the time as "trying" as he had to woo young 
untrained clerks from other Government departments to 
work as supervisory staff. (96) It is absolutely 
important that members should learn cooperative 
principles because the movement's principles of
democratic management require that the responsibility 
for the general affairs of the societies should be 
shouldered by every member and not left to a few. 
This view was emphasised by a former Government 
Minister in charge of Cooperative Societies, late Oba 
C.D. Akran, when he reminded members during a Congress 
of the Cooperative Movement in 1954 that:
(96) See Adeyeye: S.O., The Cooperative Movementin Nigeria, op cit. p. 144
121
"all your bye-laws categorically stated that 
the ultimate authority in all matters relating to 
the general administration of the societies shall 
be the general bodies of the members". (97)
Our views on the importance of cooperative education 
was also consistent with the finding of Caxton-Idowu's 
Commission of Inquiry. In the Commission's own words,
"It is regrettable that no serious thought 
has been given to the question of 
Cooperative training". (98)
The Commission, therefore, recommended that steps 
should be taken to ensure the spread of cooperative 
education amongst members. Unfortunately, only few 
training schemes were organised and very few members 
benefitted from it. The evidence gathered from the 
interviews with retired cooperative marketing 
officials showed that only about one-fifth of the 
members benefitted from these schemes. The remaining 
four-fifths of the ex-officials had no cooperative 
training. The only qualification that saw them 
through their job was the primary school leaving
(97) See C.U.W.N,, Report of the 1954 Cooperative Congress of Western Nigerian, op, cit. p. 27(98) See Caxton-Idowu Commission, op, cit. p.8
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certificate with no cooperative management experience 
before their recruitment.
Our finding is vindicated by the recent effort of the 
Federal Government of Nigeria to encourage cooperative 
education by increasing the facilities and programmes 
at Cooperative Institutes at Ibadan, Enugu and Kaduna, 
During my research tour of duty I personally observed 
many efforts by the Federal Government to give these 
institutions a face lift aimed at providing education 
and training for all levels of cooperative management. 
These efforts are in the form of new classes, and more 
management teachers and a new syllabus on Cooperative 
Management. This was in addition to the Scholarship 
Scheme recently organised for cooperative training in 
Western Europe, United States of America, Canada, 
India, Russia, Pakistan and other places.
Unfortunately, none of this overseas training included 
an educational tour of other African countries where 
cooperatives have made an outstanding contribution to 
their economic development. Such countries include 
Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Gambia, Ivory coast. 
Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe and other countries where 
cooperatives have been used successfully to improve 
the welfare of their farmers. Evidence abounds in the 
literate and local media outlining the success of 
cooperatives in these countries. Gambia cooperatives
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were among the most successful in West Africa with an 
average membership of 1,000 in any primary society 
compared to less than 50 members in the primary
societies in Nigeria which has a larger rural 
population. (99)
Another factor which undermined the cooperative's 
principle of democratic control is excessive 
Government control. Many of the farmers in our sample 
see cooperatives in Nigeria as another arm of the 
Government. The evidence gathered from the three
groups interviewed, that is, the farmer, active and 
retired cooperative officials, shows that cooperative 
organisation in Nigeria is completely under the 
control of the government through the Cooperative 
Department, which forms part of the Federal Ministry 
of Agriculture, There is no known cooperative 
organisation that is not registered and supervised by 
either the State or the Federal Registrar of
Cooperatives. This meant that the decision of the 
Government was therefore responsible for defining the 
environment within which cooperatives existed and
operated. By Government decision is meant not only 
the basic policy statements made by legislators and 
ministers, but also myriad rules, guidelines, customs 
and procedures initiated and made by the Department of
(99) See the report on the Dailv times of Nigeria. 1st March, 1977
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Cooperatives which is responsible for the 
implementation of ground policy abstractions of the 
Federal Government.
The relationship between the marketing cooperatives 
and the Government basically involves buying members' 
cocoa on behalf of the Cocoa Marketing Board 
established by the Government in 1947 with monopoly 
over the marketing of Nigerian cocoa. In return for 
buying cocoa from their members and non-members alike, 
the cooperatives received purchasing loans and a 
commission on all cocoa delivered to the Cocoa 
Marketing Board for grading, packaging and export. 
(100)
This functional relationship between the cooperative
marketing societies and Government made the
cooperatives' principle of democratic control
irrelevant. The principle is concerned with the
cooperative pooling its resources together, taking
democratic decisions about its utilisation and
distributing its proceeds in the form of bonuses and
dividends. None of these is a feature of the
cooperatives studied here. It is true that all
cooperative members bought shares when they joined,
but they had never received any return on it and it
(100) Interview with Sholanke Victor, AssistantRegistrar at Cooperative Department, Victoria Island, Lagos, 1990
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was regarded as a membership fee paid to the 
Government,
We found very little scope for democratic decision 
making partly because of the corrupt practices of 
leaders and administrators, but mainly due to the 
authoritative nature of the government's control, 
which supplied most of the cooperatives' funds and 
made all the important decisions.
This view was taken after evidence from the 250 
farmers were analysed to assess responsibility for 
decision-making which relate to cocoa production and 
marketing. We must stress, however, that the results 
are based on the responses of the interviewees, not on 
a study of decision-making in general terras.
Table 4.4
DECISION-MAKING, ALL 250 FARMERS?COCOA PRODUCTION AND MARKETING
Type of Decision Made by
Govt. % Farmers %
Which crops to grow 130 52 120 48Employing labour 50 20 200 80Buying Fertilizer 128 51 122 49Planting pattern 40 16 210 84Marketing Cocoa Crops 220 88 30 12Selling non-Cocoa Crops 10 4 240 96Asking for Credit 40 16 210 84
Sources Research data, 1990Notes All percentages have been rounded off
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TABLE 4.5
COMPARISON OF RESPONSIBILITY BY AREA OF DECISION­MAKING
Decisions Dominated Decisions Dominated byby Government % Farmers %
Marketing Cocoa Crop 88 Selling non-CocoaWhich Crop to grow 52 Crop 96Buying Fertiliser 51 Asking for Credit 84Employing Labour 20 Planting Pattern 84Asking for Credit 16 Employing Labour 80Planting Patterns 16 Buying Fertiliser 49Selling non-cocoa Which Crop to grow 48crops 4 Marketing Cocoa Crop 12
Source Based on Table 4.4
127
From Table 4.4 it can be observed that decision-making 
responsibility varied markedly from one type of 
decision to another. Table 4.5 lists and compares in 
order of frequency the areas where government or 
farmers dominated and where decision-making was close 
to match.
From the Tables, we can make the folowing 
observations: Government generally exercised firm
control over the marketing of cocoa from all the 
villages in our sample. Government also have strong 
influence over the decisions on which crop to grow and 
fertiliser supplies. Other matters remained the 
farmers area of responsibility. Overall, government 
is dominant in deciding on matters relating to cocoa 
production and marketing. The farmers made decisions 
on their own more often when it came to asking for 
credit, employing hired labour and selling non-cocoa 
crops. There thus, appeared to be a fairly clear 
division of decision-making responsibility between the 
government and the farmers. The farmers decided on 
matters involving significant cash outlays, while the 
government decided on cocoa production and marketing. 
There was no joint decision-making responsibility 
between the government and the farmers.
Similar questions were put to the 100 ex-cocoa 
marketing officials, but more on policy related
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issues
Table 4.6
POLICY-MAKING, ALL 100 EX-COCOA MARKETING OFFICIALS COCOA MARKETING AND PRODUCTION
Type of Policy Made by
Govt. % Coop. %
Cocoa Marketing 90 90 10 10Cocoa Prices 98 98 2 2Production andProductivity 65 65 35 35Input Supplies 75 75 25 25Organisation of Farmers 67 67 33 33Cocoa Farming Patterns 52 52 48 48Cocoa Research andDevelopment 98 98 2 2Extension Services 97 97 3 3Provision of Credit 64 64 46 46
Sources Research Data, 1990
Table 4,7
COMPARISON OF RESPONSIBILITY BY AREA OF POLICY­MAKING
Policy Dominated by Government Policy Dominated by Cooperatives
Cocoa prices 98 Cocoa Farming Patterns 48Research and Provision of Credit 46Development 98 Production andExtension Services 97 Productivity 45Cocoa Marketing 90 Organisation ofInput Supplies 75 Farmers 43Organisation of Input Supplies 25Farmers 67 Cocoa Marketing 10Production and Extension Services 3Productivity 65 Research andProvision of Credit 64 Development 2Cocoa Farming Patterns 52 Cocoa Prices 2
Source: Based on Table 4,6
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This analysis shows that government dominated policy 
making in all areas, effectively, controlling the 
cooperatives. These policy issues have been selected 
for analysis, amongst the vast array of evidences 
generated from the interview. This is because of 
their strong bearing on the problem of this study 
which centres on who controls the Cocoa Marketing 
Cooperatives in Nigeria, the government or the 
cooperators themselves? The nature of this control 
and its effect on the democratic principles of the 
Cooperatives will be examined in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 5
A REVIEW OF HISTORICAL AND DOCUMENTARY ANALYSTS
As most part of this Study was undertaken through desk 
research, the problems which arose were those relating 
to the use of documents as a data source in social 
research. The use of documents in any social research 
does pose some problems. The extent to which it is 
so, has been chronicled by other writers. (101) Thus, 
we are not concerned with the general framework of 
using documents in social research. Our concern in 
this section is to consider the specific problems of 
evaluating and interpreting the documents used in this 
study. We shall begin this task with a consideration 
of the sources of our documents. The sources could be 
broadly classified as follows:
5.1 Cooperatives' Agencies
Most of the documents from Cooperative agencies are in 
the form of Annual Reports, Cooperative Year Book, 
Minute Books, Files, Articles and speeches. These 
materials are housed in National Archives headquarters 
in the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic 
Research's library, Ibadan. Other sources include 
Cooperative Colleges and Centres scattered all over 
the former Western Nigeria, now Osun, Ogun, Oyo and
(101) See Platt, J. in "Evidence and Proof inDocumentary Research", 1981 and Scott, J. in a Matter of Record. 1990
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Ondo States. The library in Ibadan Cooperative 
College is by far the richest and well stocked in very 
rich materials on the cooperative movement in general.
5.2 Government Agencies
The material consulted from both Federal and State 
government sources are:
Cooperative Department's policy on 
Cooperatives' Production, Marketing and 
Training, 1947 - 1967.
Cooperative Department's Annual Account,
1953 - 1967.
Cooperative Department's Consolidated Annual 
Account, 1953 - 1964.
Cooperative Department's Report on the 
Committee on Cooperative Membership Drive,
1961.
Cooperative Department's Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Ibadan 
Cooperative Produce Marketing Union Ltd,,
1963.
Report on Cooperative Mission to Nigeria
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by Lambert and Schearer, 1950.
Report of the Commission on the Marketing 
of West African Cocoa, Cmd. 5845, 1938.
Report on Cocoa Control in West Africa,
1939 - 1943 and Statement on Future 
Policy, Cmd 6554, 1944.
Statement on Future Marketing of West 
African Cocoa, Cmd. 6950, 1946.
Strickland Report on the Introduction of 
Cooperative Societies into Nigeria, 1934.
Report on the Cooperative Movement in 
Western Nigeria, 1954 - 1957.
These documents are housed in Cooperative Department's 
library, Lagos, Nigerian Institute of Social and 
Economic Research's library, Ibadan, and Cooperative 
College, Ibadan.
The Annual Abstract of Statistics, the Trade Reports 
1949 - 1968, Nigerian External Trade, Digest Series 
1934 “ 1949 are published and held at the Federal
Office of Statistics, Lagos. Other documents such as 
Cooperative Ordinance, 1935, Cooperative laws,
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regulations and amendments, 1935 - 1968 are also
published and housed at the Federal Office of 
Statistics, Lagos.
The documents from Foreign Government and 
international bodies include:
British Governments report on Commonwealth Conference 
on Agricultural Cooperation 1952 and 1965, These two 
documents are housed in British Library, London,
The reports on Cooperative Thrift, Credit and 
Marketing in Economically Under-Developed Countries, 
1960, reports on the Training Centre for Cooperative 
Personnel in Africa South of the Sahara, 1960 and the 
reports of Technical Meeting on Cooperatives in Asia 
and Far East, 1949, were published and housed by the 
Food and Agricultural Organisation, Rome. These 
documents were received through Inter-Library loan.
The report on International Cooperatives, Vol. 5, 1949 
- 1957, reports on statistics of Affiliated
Organisation, 1959 - 1962 and recommendation on
Cooperative Principles are published and housed by the 
International Cooperative Alliance, London.
The reports on the Role of Cooperatives in the 
Economic and Social Development of Developing
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Countries, 1964, and report on African Labour Survey 
were published and housed at the Office of the 
International Labour Organisation, Geneva. These 
documents were also received through Inter-Library 
loan.
The reports on rural progress through Cooperatives, 
1954, Economic Development in Under-Developed 
Countries, 1954 and Development of Nigeria, 1961, were 
published by United Nations Organisation, New York. 
These reports are part of those received through 
Inter-Library loan.
Other documents from Government sources include: 
Progress Report on the Development of Western Nigeria, 
1947 - 1966, Cooperative Policies of Western Nigeria, 
1954 - 1968, Cooperative Education and Training in 
Western Region, 1965. These documents are housed in 
Cooperative Deaprtment's Office in Lagos, Departmnt 
of Agriculture Annual Reports, 1932 - 1957. Nigerian 
Cocoa Marketing Board, Annual Report, 1947 - 1968. 
Nigerian Palm Produce Marketing Board, Annual Report, 
1947 - 1968. Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board
Ordinance, Session Paper No. 3 3 of 1947. The Federal 
Ministry Trade, Report on the First All Nigerian 
Cooperative Seminar, Ibadan, December, 1962,
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5.3 Private Agencies
Materials from this source are mainly in the form of 
books, journals, unpublished dissertations, media 
reports and speeches. These materials are available 
at the university libraries in Nigeria and England 
where this research was carried out. The materials 
can also be found in Cooperative Department of Federal 
Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperative Federation of 
Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
National Library, Yaba and Cooperative Centres and 
Colleges scattered all over the former Western 
Nigeria, For more information on documents from these 
sources, see the bibliography section of this report. 
Having discussed the sources of our documents, we will 
now go on and consider how the documents were 
produced.
The Cooperative Ordinance of 1935 allowed cooperative 
undertakings to be organised as quasi-government 
cooperation with maximum formality by registering with 
the Registrar of Cooperatives, The ordinance 
established what was, in effect, a less formalised 
Constitution of Public Corporation with a board made 
up of secretaries and cooperative leaders at primary 
level, A number of these primary marketing socieities 
joined together to form cooperative marketing unions 
at a secondary level. At the apex level is the 
Association of Nigerian Cooperative Exporters. The
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Registrar of Cooperatives is a Civil Servant appointed 
by the Government to oversee and maintain control over 
the Cooperative operations at all the three levels 
enumerated above.
The Cooperative Ordinance and the subsequent control 
of the state through the Registrar of Cooperatives 
allowed the government total control of cooperative 
organisations in Nigeria. This study identified 
several points in which the application of the 
Cooperative Ordinance to practical politics was 
contrary to indigenous usage and the trend in 
Cooperative development in Western Countries. For 
example, it forced on small, socially integrated 
groups an elaborate system of formal organisation. 
The Ordinance subjected the Nigerian cooperatives to 
the central control of a registrar who was able to 
make the existence of each cooperative dependent upon 
the meticulous observation of all formal regulations.
Finally, the Cooperative Law took away from the 
cooperatives the chance of organising the export of 
their products themselves, and it reduced them into 
mere licence buying agents. The cooperatives were 
thus degraded. Once instruments of self-help, they
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had become an instrument of colonial economic policy.
(102).
In 1952, when regional governments achieved internal 
self-government (Lagos and the Western region from 
where formal cooperation started), the existing law 
and administrative processes were retained with the 
belief that it was an effective means of improving the 
cooperative movement. This belief is reflected in a 
government declaration at that time:
"There is general agreement that the 
cooperative methods are the most suitable 
for satisfying the population". (103)
The dominant role of the State in organising and 
control of the cooperatives in Nigeria created 
dependence which hinders self-help through mutual help 
which is the universal aim of cooperatives. 
Naturally, the State pursues its own interests when 
promoting cooperatives. These interests often hinder 
and burden the aims of the cooperatives.
(102) See Trappe, P. In Daraachi, Social Change and Economic Development in Nigeria. Hans Deiter, Seibel, Praeger, 1973,(103) See Damachi, Ibid, p. 43
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All official records are produced in a particular 
administrative context involving daily routines which 
are established to meet the need of the organisation 
in question. (104) Since all cocoa marketing 
cooperatives in Nigeria are set up and managed by the 
State, their records are produced to reflect 
government interest as against that of members. These 
records are the product of formulation and 
implementation of governments' policies on cocoa 
marketing.
The documents used in this study which are produced 
generally without reference to any government 
requirements, include published reference books, 
private journals and media reports. The production of 
documents from this source are influenced by their 
authors or controllers. Individual authors or 
controllers of media houses often act on the basis of 
perceived political or financial interest of 
themselves or of external bodies. In a developing 
country like Nigeria, such influence is common® Most 
politicians either own or control one media/publishing 
house or the other.
The National Television Authority, Daily Times of 
Nigeria and a host of other media houses are owned by 
the Federal Government of Nigeria and controlled
(104) See Scott, J. op. cit. p. 83
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by men appointed by the Government. The Concord Group 
of Newspapers, Daily Tribune, Daily Sketch, Punch, 
Guardian and a host of other newspapers and Magazines 
are either owned by politicians or the State 
government. Almost all the 30 states in the 
Federation own their own radio stations. Thus, 
distortions are common, especially where editors and 
journalists depend on the politicians who may pass on 
false information to the reporters, intending to 
promote their own careers, to defend their interests 
or simply to dramatise the events in which they are 
involved and so give them greater public significance. 
The problem of distortion raised the question of 
authenticity and credibility which will be discussed 
in the next Section.
5.4 The quality Control Criteria
So far, we have outlined our sources of documents for 
this study. We have also tried to show that the 
production of the documents was shaped by the 
requirements of the organisation producing them. The 
problem which may arise with any document is that 
individual organisation which produces it could have 
acted on the basis of political or financial 
considerations. Such considerations could result in 
considerable distortion in documents. In any social 
research, documentary products of this nature are 
assessed through quality control criteria which are
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discussed in this section.
The overriding aim of evaluating evidence from 
documentary sources rests upon the argument that it 
makes sense to use historical records in social 
research only when the researcher is sensitive to
their conditions of production and stqrage. 
Otherwise, the researcher may not be aware of the
problem of quality control that is inherent in such
documents. (105) Along this line of argument, we
adapted quality control criteria used by researchers 
to meet the tough requirements of social research.
The main problems we confronted using historical 
evidence for this study are as follows:
i) How to establish the representativeness,
genuineness and originality of evidence 
gathered,
ii) how to establish whether the data are 
gathered free from error and distortion, and
iii) how to establish the true meaning of words 
and terms used in the Cocoa industry.
Since social historical data are constructed with a 
scientific, theoretically informed intent, social 
researchers must take great care to ensure quality, 
validity and reliability of evidence from which data 
is constructed. In other words, the foundation of
(105) See Scott, J. op. cit. p. 96
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scientific research is the quality of the evidence 
from which data is constructed. The assessment of the 
quality of evidence is therefore important in any 
social research. There are four sets of criteria used 
for this assessment:
5.4.1) Authenticity; This criteri a  is used to check 
the genuineness and 
originality of documents used 
in social research.
5.4.2) Credibility: This criteria is used to check 
for errors and distortions on 
documents from which data is 
derived.
5.4,3) Representativeness : This criteria is used
as a check against the 
typicality or
untypicality of evidence from 
which data is constructed.
5.4,4) Meaning: This criteria ensures that 
evidence gathered is clear 
and comprehensible. (106)
(106) See Scott, J. op. cit. p.6
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In applying these four criteria of authenticity, 
credibility, representativeness and meaning, we 
observed that we could not apply one criteria in 
isolation of the others. They are inter-dependent 
with each other with the result that we could not 
adequately apply one criterion without simultaneously 
invoking the conclusion derived from applying the 
other three. The criteria therefore, were not applied 
in a rigid and formalised manner. (107) The critria 
were systematically and subtly applied at every point 
in this study.
5.5 The Application of the Quality Control Criteria to this Studv
In social research, documents can be used as resources 
or as topics. The use of documents as resources, for 
example, may involve the use of official records on 
road accidents as reference to generate data on trends 
of death resulting from car accidents over a specific 
number of years or areas. A social researcher using 
documents as a resource would therefore, tend to 
appraise the quality of the documents in terms of 
their value in constructing valid descriptive 
statements about the things to which they refer. In 
other words, the social researcher is concerned with
(107) See Ibid. p. 35
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what the documents denote about his subject of study. 
If the document is used as topics, on the other hand, 
the social researcher's interest is limited to the 
nature of the documents themselves. The documents 
are treated as the object of sociological analysis. 
The ultimate aim is to elucidate the social processes 
through which they are produced in order to explain 
the cirumstances under which they were produced, the 
nature and content of the document and perhaps some 
information about their authors. (108)
Documents were used in this study as resources. Hence 
our concern was limited to the descriptive value of 
documents consulted about the effect of cocoa 
marketing policy, 1947 - 67, on the cooperatives'
principle of democratic control. The documents used 
for this study as noted earlier were obtained from 
diverse government sources. Published reference books 
were also used extensively. We made references to 
well over 200 books, journals and reports. The 
documentary sources raise the question of 
authenticity, credibility, representativeness and 
meaning. The documents used in this study were thus 
assessed against these criteria. À typical example, 
is the evidence gathered on the number of cocoa 
farmers in our sample.
(108) See Scott, J, op. cit. pp. 36 - 38
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The census figures in Nigeria have been known to be 
manipulated by officials. The census enumerators in 
Nigeria adopted a procedure of compiling the census 
figures from the original household schedules. 
Because of the high illiteracy in the rural 
population, the enumerators themselves had frequently 
to fill in the household schedules themselves and 
convert the answers they have helped to fill into 
standard responses. Once the schedules had been 
copied into enumerators' books, the books are edited 
by the census registrar and his clerks to ensure 
consistency of responses. Much as the assessment of 
the registrar undoubtedly reduced the chances of error 
in the writing of the enumerators' books, the practice 
is open to abuse and throws into question the 
authenticity of the original schedule. We took great 
care in applying census figures. There was
substantial regional variation in the methods used to 
obtain basic census data. In many instances, the 
results were based upon the rather questionable 
technique of "informed administrative" estimates as 
opposed to an actual head count. (109)
Two censuses were taken over the period under study. 
They are the Censuses of 1953 and 1963. The 1953
(109) See Chukuka Okonjo, "Preliminary Estimate of 1962 Mid-Year Population of Nigeria", in J. C. Cadwell and C. Okonjo, The Population of Tropical Africa. London 1978, p. 78
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census reported a total population of 30.4 million. 
The 1963 census reported a total population of 55.6 
million. This means that additional 25 million people 
were added to the 1953 census which amount to an 
incredible growth rate of 2.5 milion people per year 
or an average of 8 per cent per year. This does 
little to credit the authenticiy of the 1963 census 
figures. One explanation advanced for the differences 
between the 1953 and 1963 censuses was that the 
population was undercounted in 1953. There were -
reports that entire villages were not enumerated. 
There were also reports of the discovery of hundreds 
of hitherto unrecorded villages . Since we have
neither the manpower nor the finance to carry out a 
head count in the cocoa villages in our sample, an 
estimated figure of cOcoa farmers in the villages 
housed in local cooperative societies and local tax 
offices were gathered and tabulated as follows:
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TABLE 5.8
ESTIMATED POPULATION OF COCOA FARMERS IM OUR VILLAGE SAMPLE
Village CooperativeSource Tax Office Source MeanValue
Ishoya 210 214 212
Abanata 200 206 203
Okeigbo 235 215 225
Oro 150 252 201
Oretedo 190 224 207
Ifetedo 200 230 215
Onifon 200 240 220
Odigbo 224 200 212
Aroromi 315 295 305
Okenla 270 190 230
source : Research data, 1990
These two sources showed wide variations and were 
already most unreliable. Since the figures showed 
such wide margins of variation, an average would 
strike a compromise. The average values are much 
closer than individual estimates. Since these 
documents could not pass the test of any of our 
criteria, we were compelled to use them as guides, as 
opposed to authentic, credible and representative 
population documents. ( See Column 3, table 4.1 page 
107).
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Another example occurred when we were confronted with 
the problem of evaluating evidence generated from the 
interviews. At first, we could not arrive at an 
understanding of the meaning and significance of 
certain responses from an open ended question. Some 
responses were either given or written in languages, 
terms or phraseology unfamiliar to this author. Our 
problem was compounded by the very fact that most of 
the 250 cocoa farmers in our samples are illiterates 
in English, They could not read, write or speak in 
English. The only means of communication was in their 
local language "Yoruba", This author's knowledge of 
the local language is restricted.
Since it is my duty as a social researcher to decipher 
the meaning of the documents into a more familiar and 
generally understandable ones (110), my two assistants 
who were graduates of Yoruba language at the 
University of Ibadan were given the task of helping 
the farmers to complete my questionnaires which were 
written in English, They were also instrumental to 
the meaning derived from statements laden with Yoruba 
proverbs. Without their assistance it would have been 
very difficult to translate Yoruba language into 
English linguistic forms necessary to complete the 
questionnaires and give meanings to the
(110) See Scott, J. op. cit. p. 28
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subsequent evidence.
Most of the questionnaires returned by the 100 ex­
officials of the cocoa marketing cooperatives, 
contained many of the terms and phrases used in cocoa 
trade. The terms and phrases were compiled, examined 
and translated into linguistic forms used in every day 
life (See Appendix X).
The evidence from the 250 cocoa farmers was in 
agreement with the evidence gathered at both Nigerian 
Institute of Social and Economic Reseearch, Ibadan and 
Federal Office of Statistics in Lagos, that the farmer 
did not receive stable prices for their cocoa over the 
period under study. The farmers were aware that a 
realistic producer price and income stabilisation was 
essential in any effort aimed at increasing cocoa 
productivity. Such a policy, they argued, would 
include the development of new acceptable incentive 
measures, the stimulation and encouragement of group 
farming and marketing cooperatives organized and 
supervised by the farmers themselves with the 
Government providing the necessary favourable 
environment. These views were commonly expressed in 
the evidence gathered from the farmers and documentary 
evidence consulted at the Nigerian Institute for 
Social and Economic Research, Ibadan.
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TABLE 5.9
PRICES PAID/TON TO COCOA PRODUCERS IN NIGERIAfPounds = TON)
Year Cocoa
1948 77.0049 120.0050 100.0051 120.0052 170.0053 170.0054 170.0055 200.0056 200.0057 150.0058 150.0059 150.0060 160.0061 112.0062 100.0063 105.0064 110.0065 120.0066 65.0067 90.00
Average
1948-51 117.401953-57 178.001958-62 134.401963-67 98.00
Source: Research data, 1990
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TABLE 5.10
Year to Year Percentage Change in Prices Paid to Cocoa Producers. 1948 to 1967
Year Percentage Change in PricesPaid to Cocoa Farmers
1948-49 +55.81949-50 -16.71950-51 +20.01951-52 +41.71952-53 0.01953-54 0.01954-55 +17.61955-56 0.01956-57 -25.01957-58 0.01958-59 0.01959-60 + 6.71960-61 -30.01961-62 -10.71962-63 + 5.01963-64 + 4.81964—65 + 9.11965-66 -45.81966-67 + 38 . 5
Sources Compiled from Table 3.1
The above data was constructed from documentary 
evidence gathered from the records of the Nigerian 
Institute for Social and Economic Research, Ibadan and 
the Department of Cooperatives in Lagos. These are 
authentic sources of cooperative information in 
Nigeria. The credibility of the documents were
established when we compared them with the raw data 
housed at the Federal Office of Statistics, The 
comparison shows no variation hence we concluded that
151
the evidence was both authentic and credible.
The conclusion reached from this analysis is that the 
government adopted an inconsistent price policy. The 
long term consequences of such policy is obvious.
In a country such as Nigeria, where peasants can 
easily shift between crops, activities and occupation, 
it will not be surprising to see output of these 
commodities decline under the pressure of the 
government inconsistent pricing policy.
Earlier studies on production response in Nigerian 
Agriculture established that positive supply 
elasticity existed among export producers in Nigeria. 
(Ill) By "positive supply elasticity" we mean that 
the supply of Nigerian agricultural commodities would 
respond to changes in price, if "all things remained 
constant". Therefore, given that a positive supply 
elasticity existed among Nigerian export producers, 
the effect of the government policy was likely to be 
domestic reduction in export production. The data
(111) Oni, S.A., "Production Response in NigerianAgriculture", Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies. March, 1969, pp. 81 - 91.
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needed to support this theoretical view were 
constructed from two authentic documents, that is, the 
Annual Abstract of Statistics, published by the 
Federal Office of Statistics and the Revenue from 
External Trade, published by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria- Both reports were published in 1970.
TABLE Soil
Nigerian Export in Percentage Values 1946-70
Commodity 1946 1950 1960 1965 1970
Cocoa 15.4 21.1 21.7 15.9 15-0
Groundnuts 22.9 16.9 13 .5 14.1 4.9
Groundnut Oil — 0.3 3.1 3.7 2.6
Palm Kernels 16.9 18.5 15.4 9.9 2.5
Palm Oil 8 , 3 13.4 8.2 5.1 0.2
Rubber 5.5 3.1 8.4 4.1 2.0
Timber 1.4 2.7 4.1 2.3 0.7
Cotton 2.2 3.3 3.7 1,2 1.5
Bananas 0.2 1.9 1.5 - -
Other Export 27.2 18.8 20.4 43.7 70.6
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100
Sources Federal office of Statistics, AnnualAbstract of Statistics and the Revenue of External Trade, Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report, 1970.
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The credibility of the documents were established 
after the raw data compiled by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria was compared to the raw trade figures 
published by the Federal Office of Statistics without 
variation.
The analysis of the figures show that Nigerian 
agricultural export was on the decline over the years 
under study. Other exports which include petroleum, 
columbite. Tin ore. Tin metal and others grew steadily 
from 27,2 per cent in 1946 to a dramatic level of 70.6 
in 1970. The picture became clearer when we 
constructed time series data from the Central Bank 
annual report for the period 1960-1980.
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TABLE 5.12
Agricultural and Petroleum Exports 1960/80. Quantity f in 1 OOP tonnes and in million barrels). Value in million pounds and percentage Share of Total Exports
Agricultural Exports Petroleum Exports
Quantity Value Share Quantity Value Shareof Exp. of Exp.
1960 1,218.0 251.0 75.8 5.2 8.8 2.71965 1,506.0 289.0 54.9 81.9 136.2 25.91970 779.1 253.4 28.6 324.5 510.0 57.61971 785.4 232.8 18.0 451.7 953.0 73,71972 629.0 155.0 10.0 541.2 1,176.2 82.01973 718.5 224.5 9.9 594-1 1,893.5 83.11974 494.7 254,1 4.4 607.3 5,365.7 92.61975 417.7 216.1 4.4 538.7 4,563.1 92.71976 529,8 261.0 3.9 604.2 6,321.7 93.71977 391.2 364.9 4.8 741.4 7,072.8 92.71978 285.8 408.4 6.7 604.0 5,401.6 89.11979 305.5 459.8 4.2 803.4 10,166.8 93.81980 240.1 337.7 2.4 729.5 13,523.0 96.1
Sources Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Reports, 1972 - 1980.
The analysis shows that the phenomenal rise in 
petroleum earnings is matched by the dramatic decline 
in the relative share of the agricultural export 
commodities as illustrated in Table 5.12 These 
empirical evidences support the theoretical views that 
government policy could hurt agricultural growth. We 
also noted in chapter 4 that government intervention 
in agricultural marketing involves certain risks which 
could result in cooperatives being charged with
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inappropriate tasks, which conflict with the interest 
of their members. To examine whether this was so, 
documentary evidence was gathered from the record of 
Cooperative Department and our findings are recorded 
in Chapter 6.
The records consulted on the development of cocoa 
marketing cooperatives in Nigeria were the outcome of 
the formulation and implementation of government 
policy on the production and marketing of Nigerian 
cocoa. The earliest systematic records of the cocoa 
marketing cooperatives date from 1922 when the 
Colonial Government formed cocoa fermentaries which 
was later transformed into marketing societies. 
Henceforth, records on the amount of cocoa produced 
and sold including appointments of cocoa marketing 
cooperative officials began to be kept on a routine 
basis. These activities became formalised in 1935 
following the passage of the Cooperative Ordinance. 
However, by 1947, the Cocoa Marketing Boards Ordinance 
was passed which created a Statutory Marketing Board 
with monopoly powers over the marketing of Nigerian 
Cocoa. The Cocoa Marketing Cooperatives remained 
licenced buying agents to the Marketing Board until 
1986 when government abolished all statutory marketing 
bodies. These laws and the recorded activities of the 
Cocoa Marketing Cooperatives provided useful documents 
from which most of our data were constructed.
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The distinction between sources of documents, were not 
sharply marked. For example, the framework of 
cooperative law established by the government 
culminated in the system of cooperative activities. 
These activities form part of the official 
administrative documents on cooperative marketing 
policy available in the archives and private documents 
contained in books, speeches and reports, etc.
The role of the State in the production of 
cooperatives' records is clear and well pronounced. 
The formalisation of the cooperatives in 1935 
following the passage of the Cooperative Ordinance, 
allowed cooperative undertakings in Nigeria to have a 
legal existence. The legal status made it imperative 
that the cooperatives should have their own working 
records such as personnel records, annual reports, 
membership records, minutes of meetings, copies of 
correspondence and routine financial records.
These records form part of the vast array of 
administrative documents used in this study. The 
authenticity of the administrative documents were 
established when our comparison with the original 
documents housed at the Federal Office of Statistics 
shows no variation from those consulted at Cooperative 
Department and other sources. The need to check for 
errors and distortions in our documents raised the
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problem of credibility. In a developing country like 
Nigeria, official corruption has often led to 
documents being distorted. Most of the financial 
records of the Ibadan Cooperative Produce Marketing 
Union needed to establish how much their members were 
paid for cocoa delivered to the Marketing Board were 
found to be either missing or distorted. The Idowu 
Commission of Inquiry in 1964 later found members of 
this union guilty of corruption. We were not 
handicapped, however, as we constructed an authentic 
and credible version of both missing and distorted 
documents by comparing the statistical information on 
domestic price of cocoa, 1947 - 1968, housed at the 
Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research in 
Ibadan against those held by the Federal Office of 
Statistics in Lagos, who were responsible for 
compiling trade figures as transactions occurred. The 
data showed no variation except for minor mistakes in 
calculating percentages found in the documents sourced 
at the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic 
Research. Other documents which were copies of the 
original documents housed at the Federal Office of 
Statistics were checked for copying errors such as 
obscuring stains, smudge, smears or generally blurred 
pages. The original documents housed at the Federal 
Office of Statistics were equally checked for general 
typographical errors. All errors were identified and 
corrected.
158
The errors and distortions in our documents sourced 
from published books and journal were identified 
through the same method of comparison. For example, 
wide variations occurred when we tried to compare 
documents from three sources:
i) Food and Agricultural Organisation, Rome, 
in their report on Agriculture in Nigeria, 
1966,
ii) Kilby Peter in his Study of 
Industrialisation in the Nigerian Open 
Economy. 1945 - 1966. published by 
Cambridge University Press, 1969 and
iii) Berg E.G. Nigeria. Senegal and Congo: 
Project Level Demand. Supply and Exports 
of Oilseen Product with Implications for 
U.S. Exports to E.E.C. Published by the 
Department of Agricultural Economics of 
the University of Alberta, Canada, 1967.
The evidence on Palm Produce from the former Eastern 
Nigeria, now Abia, Rivers, Imo, Enugu, Anambra, Akwa 
Ibom, Rivers and Cross River States, for 1963 from
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these sources showed wide variations, see Table 5.13.
TABLE 5.13
Estimates of Palm Oil Production in 1963 
(Production in Iona Tons bv Three Regions)
East West North Total
B.C. Berg 285,000 128,000 25,000 438,000
Peter Kilby 256,000 69,000 22,000 347,000
F.À.O. 289,000 184,000 35,000 498,000
Source: Research data and also from Olayide andOlatunbosun, op. cit. p. 20.
The Table shows a wide variation in the estimates.
The production range in the West is wider and more
unreliable than any other part of the country. The
East ranges from 256,000 to 289,000 tons, while the
Northern region ranges from as low as 22,000 to g5,000
tons. Since there is no sound reason for rejecting or
accepting the estimates, like those of Olayide and
Olatunbosun, an average would strike a good
compromise. Thus, an average of 127,000 tons is
obtained for palm oil for the Western region, 277,000
tons for the Eastern region and an average of 24,000
tons for the Northern region. These estimates did not
give us the production trend needed for this analysis.
However, the data collected on palm oil illustrated on 
Table 5.11 gave some indication of production trends
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in value terms.
Having assured ourselves of the meaning, authenticity 
and credibility of our documents, we were left with 
the problem of representativeness of the documents. 
The problems of representativeness arose with the need 
to establish whether the documents gathered were
representative of all the relevant parts of the 
documents. The issue of representativeness in
documentary research involves survival and availbility 
of the documents in question. In other words, for any 
document to be available for researchers' use, it must 
survive through adequate storage. However, no 
document can survive indefinitely. A safely deposited 
document could atrophy through the physical process of 
aging in the absence of preservation.
The survival of most papers currently in use depended 
on appropriate storage conditions of temperature and 
humidity, otherwise, the document could be
transofrmed into forms easily "digestible by rodents 
and insects. Documents which are protected from this
fact may, even so, be destroyed by accident". (112) 
Many of the vital materials needed from the former 
Eastern Nigeria, now Enugu, Anambra, Abia, Imo, Cross 
River, Rivers and Akwa Ibom states were not available
(112) See Scott, J. op. cit. p. 25
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because their archival documents on the early 
development of the Eastern regional cooperative 
societies established before 1967 were destroyed i
Iduring the Civil War 1967-1970. Our problems were 
compounded by our inability to trace employees and 
officials of the Eastern region's cooperative 
societies for the purpose of collecting oral evidence 
in the absence of written records. Their addresses 
were not available either. The few addresses that 
were received were not traceable.
However, there are surviving documents on the Eastern 
region's cooperative societies generally. These 
documents are housed in the National Archive, Ibadan.
These documents passed the test of authenticity, 
credibility and representativeness when compared with 
the original document housed by the Federal Office of 
Statistics, Lagos. Another problem of
representativeness was raised when we noted that the 
original documents were written by the Federal Office 
of Statistics. This is a department serving the 
interests of the government. Because the documents 
were written from an official standpoint, they could 
not have represented the interests of the groups 
concerned with our subject of study. We assume 
therefore, that agreements from documentary sources do 
not necessarily reflect the cocoa producers' own 
contribution.
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Most of the cocoa farmers who commanded the majority 
of marketing cooperatives' membership are illiterates 
and have no records which could have been used to 
compare data from the documentary sources. However, 
we took a sample of 250 cocoa farmers and 100 ex­
officials involved in cocoa marketing policies to 
generate evidence upon which documentary evidence was 
compared. We were impressed by the agreement on the 
evidence from these three varied sources.
Perhaps most scholars would have performed much better 
in their research but for some impediment. There is 
often an insufficient level of cooperation from the 
public in terms of providing information and documents 
that could assist the scholar in his study. Our 
experience was that about ten per cent of the active 
officials we met were not very cooperative. It is 
either that these officials were not fully aware that 
they had an important role to play in making available 
information that could be of academic interest or they 
did not trust me sufficiently to want to avail me such 
information. A small number of the officials were 
generally afraid of exposure, disgrace, or possible 
prosecution and would go to any length to frustrate 
the effort of any researcher who tried to open their 
"can of worms".
Some of these officials preferred to hide under the
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cover of the law which inhibits certain investigations 
into official practices and the abuse of power. Some 
of such laws in Nigeria are under the Official Secrets 
Act, Contempt of Court Hammer, Defamation act and
Sedition Act, These laws have the conspiratorial 
effect of stopping any researcher from getting certain 
information from some government officials. In fact, 
I was denied access to some government files because 
of these laws. I was not, however, handicapped
because whatever I was denied in one department, I 
received from another. Many researchers may not be so 
lucky. They may not be able to get all the facts 
because they are buried too deeply. No researcher can 
compel people who do not want to speak. He cannot 
order them to cooperate on any investigation if they 
do not want to cooperate with him, because he does not 
have a court order. In Nigeria, if he forcefully 
obtains classified information, he can be charged with 
violation of the Official Secrets Act. He cannot 
intimidate sources and compel officials to speak out 
against any action. In these ways many researchers 
are handicapped. We have been able to overcome this
problem amongst others with the knowledge and
application of the sociological quality control 
criteria. Thus, the problems of inaccesibility, 
distortion and non-availability had no serious effect 
on the major finding of this study.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE RESEARCH FINDINGS
If one takes an overall view of the Nigerian economy, 
an immediate conclusion which can be reached is that 
it is predominantly agricultural.
Throughout the period of colonial administration, 
agriculture remained the mainstay of the Nigerian 
economy with about 70 per cent of the country's labour 
force employed in the sector. Its contribution to GDP 
was about 70 per cent. After independence in 1960, 
however, its contribution to the country's labour 
force employed in it dropped to about 54 per cent and 
its contribution to GDP had declined to 55 per cent by 
1970. (113)
Today, as in the past, the development of Nigeria 
remains partly dependent upon increasing the 
productivity of the agricultural sector. The 
importance of agriculture could be seen through the 
exportation of principal primary commodities which 
will increase the nation's foreign exchange earnings, 
and could also be used to finance a variety of
(113) See Federal Republic of Nigeria, SecondNational Development Plan, 1970, op. cit. p 103
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development projects aimed at economic growth and the 
modernisation of the whole society.
The cooperatives as a movement of people are expected 
to contribute to the national economic development. 
In conditions of great need and urgency which 
characterised conditions in Nigeria and indeed most 
developing countries, cooperatives are not expected to 
operate without due regard for national goals or 
contrary to general economic planning. This is an 
objective all cooperative members will, of course, 
readily agree with. Good cooperatives have many 
facets, social, eduational and cultural as well as 
economic which could serve the interest of the people 
at the local level. It can be used as a means of 
interpreting and applying development policies and 
providing feedback to the national planning bodies. 
Thus providing a means through which large numbers of 
people can be represented in economic planning. A 
good cooperative can also serve as a kind of economic 
transformer between national government and local 
communities in remote, scattered and marginal areas 
that might be passed by development programmes.
In short, the cooperative movement all over the world
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has no objection to assuming development role (114). 
What cooperators object to is the kind of situation in 
the Third world where the movement is being used and 
manipulated by politicians who have no responsibility 
to members of the cooperatives and the principles upon 
which the movement is based, as has been the case in 
India where government formulated policies which allow 
civil servants control over the cooperatives.
"Official control is a negation of the principle
of democracy on which the movement is based."
(115)
As our historical evidence will show, like the India 
government, Nigerian governments also formulated 
cooperative policies which gave the Cooperative 
Department power over cooperative affeirs. The extent 
to which the policies negated the principle of 
democratic control has been the problem of this study. 
Thus, our objective is to examine the cocoa marketing 
Cooperatives policies and deduce from such 
examinations the effect of the policies on the 
cooperatives democratic control over the period of our 
study.
(114) Stettner, L. "Cooperation and Egalitarianism in Developing Countries", Review of International Cooperation. Vol. 66, No.6, 1973(115) See Kulkarni, op. cit. pp. 177 - 182
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6.1 Cocoa Marketing Cooperatives Policies. 1947 - 67 : Historic Background
The origin of the modern cooperative movement in
Nigeria could be traced to the passage of the Colonial
Cooperative Ordinance in 1935. (116) Prior to the
formal colonisation of Nigeria there were no organised
cooperative marketing ativities. This does not mean
that cooperative activity generally is alien to
Nigerians. Before the contact with the Europeans,
most Nigerians lived a community life. The
communities survived on the basis of mutual help.
Everyone was his brother's keeper. The spirit of
oneness was of cultural value among those early
Nigerians. There were many kinds of mutual aids
institutions which pervaded all aspects of the
economic, social, cultural, religious and political
life of the people.
The most prevalent of these traditional mutual aid 
institutions are contribution society and labour 
cooperatives- The Contribution Society is essentially 
a voluntary organisation of people who agreed to 
contribute a certain amount, in most cases a fixed 
amount, at regular intervals, usually monthly, and 
given to individual members on a rotational basis. It
(116) See Cooperative Ordinance, op. cit. 1935
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is a sure source of credit which members can resort to 
in times of major expenditure such as burial 
ceremonies, weddings, naming ceremonies, hiring 
labour, and so on. It is very popular and practised 
by all Nigerian tribes. Each Nigerian tribe has a 
name for it. The Igbo called it Susu, the Hausa named 
it Adashi, the Yoruba termed it Esusu and Ashu by the 
Ishan, The popularity has survived in spite of the 
introduction of modern banking.
The Labour Cooperative, on the other hand, is 
essentially a team of needy people lending their 
collective labour to members in turn. In times of 
bush clearing, planting or harvesting, when a farmer 
often realises that his labour and that of his family 
is no longer enough to meet the challenge of his farm, 
he calls on friends, age groups or members of the 
community. He is obliged to help in turn and provide 
entertainment while they are working for him.
This form of cooperative effort is also very popular 
among many Nigerian tribes. It is known in Yoruba as 
Aro, Gaya in Hausa, Egbe in Nupe and other terms by 
different Nigerian ethnic groups.
In Adeyeye's paper concerned with these early 
traditional cooperative groups, he concluded that 'one 
cannot regard the Nigerian Cooperative Movement as a
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gift from the colonial Government'. (117)
This paper and his other writings on the Nigerian 
Cooperative Movement in general represent excellent 
historical masterpieces. The main limitation of his 
work is that he tends to base his conclusions on a 
general overview of the cooperative movement in 
Nigeria. This present study tends to capitalise on 
this limitation by specifically studying the 
development of marketing cooperatives in isolation 
from other forms of cooperative societies. A review 
of archival materials on the development of Nigerian 
marketing cooperatives dates its origin from the early 
effort of the colonial administration
(117) See Adeyeye, S.O., Cooperative Movement in Nigeria, oo. cit.
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to organise all fermenting societies and other 
farmers' associations into marketing societies in 
1926. (118) Before looking into the social motives
for encouraging such societies by the colonial 
administration, we wish to argue, contrary to 
Adeyeye's view, that cooperative marketing in Nigeria 
had its origin in the colonial administration. To 
substantiate this claim, let us briefly examine the 
pre-colonial history of Nigeria which Adeyeye referred 
to in his study of early cooperative societies. At 
the beginning of the pre-colonial history of Nigeria, 
the social formation was characterised by a communal 
mode of production. Land and labour were the main 
means of production. These means of production were 
not private property but owned jointly by the 
community. The relations of production corresponding 
to these productive forces, that is, land and labour, 
were cooperative rather than antagonistic. Mutual 
help cooperative production and obligation to the 
group governed production relations. (119)
The social structure was egalitarian. The egalitarian 
ideology meant that any surplus generated was 
appropriated by each family or utilised in obligatory
(118) See Beer, C. in The Politics of Peasant Groups in Western Nigeria. 1976, p. 20(119) Onimode, B., Imperialism and Underdevelopment of Nigeria. Zed Press, 1982, p. 11
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gift giving, which largely resulted in communal 
consumptions. (120) In other words, members of the 
community produced just enough to meet family needs. 
Agricultural production was limited to food crops. 
Production for the purpose of exchange started in the 
early years of European contact with West Africans. 
This period dates back from 1451 when the Portuguese 
secured Papal Bulls which granted them monopoly rights 
to trade along the West African Coast, (121) However, 
the British challenged the Portuguese in 1553 with 
Captain Wyndham's expedition to the Bight of Benin. 
In 1588 Queen Elizabeth I granted a charter to the 
first English-African Company, By 1662, the Company 
of Royal Adventurers of England trading in Africa was 
also granted a charter by King Charles II, with 
monopoly rights from the Strait of Gibraltar to the 
Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. This Company later 
sold out to the Royal African Company. (122) 
Throughout this period the Europeans sought African 
commodities such as ivory, gold, diamond, spices,
(120) Onimode, op, cit. p. 17(121) Crowder, M . , The Storv of Nigeria. Faber & Faber, London, 1978, Chapter 4.(122) Davies, F.G., The Royal African Company. Longmans, London, Chapter 11
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hides and skin, palm oil and pepper. These 
commodities were not exchanged for money but bartered 
with the European gin, cloth, mirrors, needles and 
thread, caps, hats and old soldiers' boots. Another 
item which later joined the list of African 
commodities was Africans themselves. The regular 
trade in Africans as merchandise started with the 
granting of monopoly trading right to the British 
Company of Royal Adventurers. By the early eighteenth 
century the company had become a leading slave trader, 
the position it maintained until the abolition of the 
slave trade in 1833. The slave trade became 
unprofitable following the development of legitimate 
trade in raw materials required by European factories 
after the Industrial Revolution, Slavery also 
restricted African demand for British manufactured 
goods through de-population and was mainly abolished 
for these reasons. (123)
The production of cash crops for export brought about 
the introduction of money as a means of exchange. 
This was accomplished in the early years following the 
abolition of the slave trade. The British imposed the 
formal colonisation of Lagos in 1861 and thereafter 
the whole country was colonised probably to ensure the 
supply of raw materials and a
(123) William, E., Capitalism and Slaverv. Deutsch, London, 1972
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market for British goods. During this period many 
Nigerians were encouraged with monetary incentives to 
produce cash crops which were bought initially by the 
British merchant firms through Nigerian middlemen and 
later by Government agencies. Before 1922 Nigerian 
produce, especially cocoa, was judged to be of low 
quality from the point of view of the European and 
American users. The poor quality was attributed to 
ignorance on the part of the producers. The method of 
preparing the crops for the market was entirely blamed 
for the poor quality. Since the supply of raw 
materials was of prime importance to the Colonial 
Government, the agricultural department needed to act 
to ensure that the best quality was obtained from the 
colonies. The first step taken was to instruct the 
peasants in the process of fermenting and drying cocoa 
and to provide extra monetary incentives for quality 
crops,
One senior colonial official, named Brown, stated 
that:
"It was solely with the object of bringing 
about a general improvement in the quality of 
the crop that societies run on semi­
cooperative lines were started by the 
Agricultural Department in 1922. The immediate 
purpose was to teach the producers how to prepare 
good quality cocoa and ensure that having
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produced such cocoa they secured extra 
remuneration in the shape of a premium for 
it," (124)
Accordingly, the Colonial Government established 
drying houses known as fermentaries. Many peasant 
producers were encouraged to bring their fresh cocoa 
to the fermentaries for drying and grading. The cocoa 
was brought into the fermentaries by individual 
peasants in parcels and a receipt was issued by the 
Agricultural Department to the peasants for the 
quality of cocoa received. Monetary payments were 
made out to the producers after drying, grading and 
sales made by tender to European trading firms. It was 
the trading firm who would normally arrange for the 
export to Britain and other Western countries. By 
1926 the Colonial Government expressed satisfaction 
with the improvement in the quality of cocoa from the 
fermentaries and decided to expand its activities to 
include marketing.
(124) Brown, D.H., "The Development of Cooperative Cocoa Marketing in Nigeria”, The West African Agricultural Conference. Lagos, 1938 p. 159
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In the same year, the Government executed its 
objective by converting all the fermentaries and 
existing farmers' unions into marketing societies 
under the supervision of the Agricultural Department.
(125)
The farmers' unions were formed earlier to protect the 
peasants from intense exploitation by both foreign 
buying firms and the African petty bourgeoisie who 
acted as their agents. The African middlemen were 
accused of underpaying the farmers while their 
principals (European buying firms) were accused of 
making excessive profits from the sale of the produce 
in Liverpool and New York. The first union organised 
for the economic salvation of the peasants was the 
Agege Planters' Union (APU) founded in July 5, 1907.
(126) The objectives and activities of the union were 
very popular among the entire cocoa producing area of 
the former Western Region and by 1916 similar unions 
were formed in Ibadan and Abeokuta, known as the 
Ibadan Agricultural Society and the Agba Farmers' 
Union. The organisations soon crystalised into a 
major body agitating against the monopoly of the
(125) Annual Report, Agricultural Dept., Lagos, 1928p. 10.(126) The report on the interview between J.K. Coker and R.E. Donnet, Provincial Forest Officer and Henry, Director of Agriculture, 16 June 1909, National Archives Headquarters, Ibadan.
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produce market by European firms and the exploitation 
of the peasants by the African middlemen. The Union 
accused the Colonial Government of allowing the wealth 
of the peasants to be taken away from them. The 
general feelings of members of these unions were 
summarised in 1920 when they asked:
"What do we propose to do to safeguard our 
commercial interests in the face of the rapid 
encroachments of foreign commercial houses 
swarming our coastal and hinterlands, 
establishing business houses and relations 
with inter-produce sellers? Shall we continue 
to remain inactive and allow the wealth of our 
country to slip from our hands?" (127)
Instead of the Government responding to the Unions' 
demand, which was to dispense all intermediaries, that 
is African middlemen and European buying firms, they 
decreed that the new marketing societies would sell 
their produce collectively to the European firms.
Thus, instead of making the new societies independent 
exporters, the Government organised them to dislodge 
the services of African middlemen but
(127) Coker Papers, Hughes to Coker, 4 March, 1920, quoted in Beer C., op. cit. p. 20
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made sure that the existing marketing system dominated 
by the European buying firms was retained. There was 
no serious attempt on the part of the new societies to 
break the monopoly of the European firms supported by 
the Colonial Government- It was only in the Gold 
Coast that one Wilfred Tete-Ansa made some attempt to 
unite all the peasants into a cooperative body and 
provide an alternative marketing system to that 
offered by the European firms. His organisation, the 
West African Cooperative Producers Ltd., was 
registered in Nigeria in 1928. Its growth in Nigeria 
was limited relative to his enormous success in the 
Gold Coast, Tete-Ansa won about thirty-seven
contracts to market produce from peasant groups in 
Nigeria. However, thirty-one out of the thirty-seven 
groups were middlemen or sub-buyers for the European 
firms. With such large numbers of middlemen and sub­
buyers to the European firms, it seems clear that 
Tete-Ansa's organisation was not completely dedicated 
to the cause of the peasants and by 1930 the 
organisation had completely collapsed. (128)
6.1.1 The Cooperative Ordinance of 1935
The collapse of Tete-Ansa's organisation, the monopoly
of the produce trade by European firms and
the continuous exploitation of the peasants by the
(128) See Beer, op. cit. p. 21
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African petty bourgeoisie or the so-called middlemen, 
meant anger and frustration for the peasants. They 
sent many protests to the Government through their 
leaders. One of the key demands of the peasants was 
the establishment of Cooperative Marketing Societies 
which must be recognised by law. This request was not 
met until 1934 when the Government decided to address 
the cooperative issue by inviting C.F, Strickland to 
tour Nigeria and report on the possibility of 
organising the peasants into bodies incorporating 
cooperative principles. Strickland had been a former 
Registrar of Cooperatives in India, He had always 
held strong views on the value of cooperative models 
to African administration. He once claimed that: 
"Cooperatives would be of great value to 
African peasants enabling them to grow up 
socially and economically till they can 
face the modern world without disaster, and 
the villages welcome the foreign traders or 
teachers without fear of dissolution," (129)
While Mr, Strickland believed that cooperatives would 
advance African peasants socially and
(129) Strickland, C.F., The Cooperative Movement in Africa, Journal of Roval Societv of Arts, LXXXXII, 1934, p. 739
179
economically, he did not see anything wrong with the 
exploitation of their labour by European traders and 
their agents. Rather, he felt that cooperatives would 
create an atmosphere of a friendly relationship 
between the peasants and the exploitative European 
traders.
In his recommendations, he retained the existing 
market system dominated by European traders, but 
proposed the creation of a truly peasant society which 
should exclude the African middlemen. The method was 
to encourage the peasants to form small societies in 
their own communities. He was convinced that the 
peasants would find it easier to trust members of 
their own community and that their interests would be 
better represented on a community level than was 
possible in a larger society covering a wider area. 
He recommended that the rules and regulations of the 
societies should be made simple and few in number. 
Members paid only a small entrance fee and a levy to 
cover running expenses at the rate of 6 pence per cwt. 
of cocoa sold. He recommended some credit facilities 
to be approved for members. On every one pound 
borrowed, an interest rate of three pence was to be 
paid while the principal sum could be settled during 
the ensuing cocoa season, (130)
(130) Brown, op. cit. p. 163
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Strickland recommended the establishment of societies 
strictly on cooperative lines. He argued that for 
such societies to be truly cooperative and comparable 
to international standards, they must be regulated by 
the Government and that their development should be 
backed by law. He therefore included in his report to 
the Imperial Government a suggested draft Cooperative 
Societies Ordinance similar to those found in other 
British Colonies and Dominions. His model ordinance 
was passed into law in 1935.
The Ordinance and the regulations which followed in 
1936 have formed the basis of cooperative development 
in Nigeria ever since. The Ordinance created a 
secretariat with executive powers over cooperative 
societies. Major E.F.G. Haig was appointed Registrar 
and empowered to take over the supervision of all 
cocoa marketing societies under the Department of 
Agriculture, After the completion of the hand over, 
the Agricultural Department continued to foster the 
growth of newly formed societies. The Department 
provided temporary instructors whose duty was to carry 
out fermenting demonstrations where necessary, arrange 
sales and keep records until such time as the new 
society was capable of managing itself. Besides these 
functions, the Department maintained a laissez-faire 
attitude with respect to the produce trade. The 
activities of the firms involved with produce buying
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were left unchecked. The nonchalant attitude of the 
Department meant that the cocoa producers were further 
exploited by the European firms. The high profit 
margins meant that the firms had to compete amongst 
themselves for increased market share. The
competition was so intense that many firms had to pay 
unduly high commission to the middlemen to win their 
favour. Even though excessive commission was paid to 
the middlemen, cocoa producers received unduly low 
prices.
The system was therefore criticised as an abuse. 
Centrally, this conception was the image of the 
middlemen as the source of abuse and disorder in the 
marketing system. (131) The Association of West 
African Merchants (AWAM) formed to protect the 
interest of the European firms introduced market 
sharing arrangements amongst its members. The 
arrangement was very unpopular amongst the peasants 
who thought that the new arrangement meant further 
exploitation. Its announcement in 1937 prompted a 
strike by cocoa producers in Nigeria and the Gold
131) Icheku, V.N., The Rise and Fall of Marketing Boards in Nigeria, an M. Phil, thesis, submitted to Brunei University, 1987, p. 24
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Coast (now Ghana). The last thing the Imperial 
Government wanted to see was a strike that would cut 
off the supply of cocoa to their home factories. 
Their reaction therefore was swift. The strike
generally known as "the cocoa hold-up", prompted the 
Imperial Government to set up a Commission of Inquiry, 
known as the Nowell Commission, The aim of the 
Commission was to look into the dispute and more 
generally, into the marketing of West African export 
crops, (132)
When the Commission submitted its report, it was 
critical of the existing arrangements and the degree 
of peasant exploitation. The report contended that 
the existing market system was defective and should be 
corrected by an ambitious association of all producers 
on a statutory basis for the marketing of all West 
African produce. The Commission set out what steps 
the Imperial Government needed to take in order to 
remove the deficiencies of the existing marketing 
system,
One of the suggested steps was that Government support 
should be given to measures which allowed the 
cooperatives to export directly, rather than
(132 Commission of Inquiry into the marketing of West Africa, Nowell Commission, Colonial Office, London 1938,
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through the European private firms.
Although Nowell's proposals could not be implemented 
due to the commencement of the Second World War, they 
were influential in the subsequent formulation of 
official policy on the development of cooperative 
marketing in particular and the export trade in 
general.
6.1.2 The Cooperative and Wartime Control 
After the outbreak of the Second World War, the 
formulation of Government policies was on the role the 
cooperatives should be allowed to play in the wartime 
controlled marketing scheme. The wartime control was 
originally only concerned with cocoa, but was extended 
to cover other export crops in 1942. The Imperial 
Government instituted wartime controls in order to 
secure export crops for Britain and her allies. 
Before the war, Germany had been a major user of raw 
materials from West Africa. Thus, during the war, the 
Imperial Government took necessary steps to deny them 
supplies. The loss of Germany as an important market, 
and the low demand from many British factories due to 
the war, meant that the overall demand for Nigerian 
and other West African produce would fall. The 
Imperial Government had to step in to prevent the 
collapse of local prices. One of the mechanics of 
such control was the undertaking by the Imperial
184
government to purchase all West African export crops 
at fixed prices. (133) To the peasants, the 
government control of the export trade and the 
imposition of fixed prices for their crops were seen 
as exploitation. This was because the price 
government obtained for the crops in Liverpool and 
other European markets were far higher than the fixed 
price the peasants received. The period threfore 
marked an era of direct government involvement in the 
exploitation of the peasant producers. More
significantly, cooperative development was cut short 
at this stage since the new scheme required all 
marketing societies to act as agents to the Control 
Board, (134)
The Nigerian Colonial Government was very concerned 
about this new development. This concern was 
expressed in a cablegram sent to the Colonial 
Secretary by the Nigerian Governor, Sir Bernard 
Bourdillon. In this message, the Governor expressed
(133) See Statement of the Secretary of State for Colonies, 13 November, 1939, File CSO 26, 36148/8-8, pp. 1-2(134) See Beer, c. op, cit.
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great concern and stated that:
"The future absence of competitive buying for 
export entailed by the wartime controls would 
seriously destroy the development of the 
Cooperative marketing Societies for which this 
Government had been committed earlier in the 
year." (135)
In the past, the Colonial Government, through the 
various fermentaries established in all the cocoa 
producing areas, had been able to improve the quality 
of Nigerian cocoa above average and had recommended 
higher prices. Under the Control Scheme, all West 
African cocoa was treated in general and bought at 
fixed prices.
Though Bourdillon accepted defeat, he maintained his 
position long enough to send another cable on the 15th 
February, 1940. He made his position clear in the 
following terras:
"For some years past we have been preaching 
to cocoa farmers the doctrine that the 
cooperative movement provides this one hope of 
salvation and that the steady increase in that 
movement is the best possible way of obtaining
(135) Governor, Nigeria Secretary of State for the Colonies, 14 November, 1939, File CSO 26, 36148/S II, Vol. 1, p. 29
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better prices for cocoa. If we are now 
compelled to tell him that, as a result of a 
scheme for which His Majesty's Government are 
entirely responsible, we must discourage the 
formation of new societies or the growth of old 
ones, what conclusion can be drawn except that 
either the movement is not all we have 
represented it to be, or that our desire to 
secure him the best possible price for his 
produce is not as keen as it was." (136)
The above quotation, although very long, demonstrated 
the concern of some members of the Nigerian 
Imperialist ruling class over the plight of Nigerian 
peasants. The development of Cooperatives was seen as 
a means of protecting the peasants from the intense 
exploitation of the buying firms and their agents, 
with the passive support of the Imperial Government. 
The idea of the cooperative as a means of salvation to 
the peasants was shared by both Nigerian Government 
and peasants themselves.
It could be recalled that the initial objective of 
forming the farmers into societies was for the sole
(136) Governor, Nigeria Secretary of State for the Colonies, 15 February, 1940, File CSO 26, 3648, Vol. 1, p. 94 also quoted in Beer op, cit., p. 27
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aim of improving the quality of cocoa. Excessive 
exploitation of the peasants by the European traders 
(bourgeoisie) and their African middlemen (petty 
bourgeoisie) prompted the peasants to formally request 
direct marketing of their produce on purely 
cooperative lines. The Imperial Government did not 
find this request attractive until 1934, when 
Strickland was sent to Nigeria to study whether or not 
the establishment of marketing cooperatives was in the 
best interest of the British,
Strickland, as expected, recommended a reorganisation 
of pre-existing societies with underlying cooperative 
principles, without changing the market structure, 
which allowed the exploitation of the peasants by the 
bourgeoisie and their petty bourgeoisie. It was only 
after the cocoa 'hold-up' in 1937 that the Government 
responded by appointing the Nowell Commission to look 
into the marketing of West African produce. The 
Nowell Commission had acknowledged the exploitation of 
the peasants in the marketing of their produce through 
cooperative societies. The Wartime Control Schemes 
completely ignored Nowell's proposal. The alternative 
proposal put forward by AWAM was accepted by the 
Imperial Government. Instead of allowing direct 
export by the cooperatives, the proposal allowed firms 
to pay some premium to the cooperative societies 
partly paying for the services performed by the
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societies and for high quality cocoa. The
cooperatives argued against their position as sub­
buyer and contended that they could not operate on 
such a bonus system because members of AWAM were the 
real beneficiaries through inaccurate weighing of 
cocoa and the charging of exorbitant rates of interest 
on advances made to their members. In 1942, the AWAM 
decided to discontinue the bonus scheme. The Imperial 
Government, on being approached, refused to support 
the cooperatives by not granting their request for 
export licences.
The Government of Nigeria, however, continued to put 
pressure on the Imperial Government until 1944, when 
the Ibadan and Ife societies were granted export 
licences. The Nigerian Government's objective in
allowing direct export by the cooperatives was to
expose them to competition, while at the same time 
making their potential returns greater. By 1944, this 
effort had paid some dividend in the form of an 
increased cocoa price and a subsequent high premium 
for Grade I cocoa. The emergence of the Cooperative 
Union in the export trade gave them a good bargaining 
position. They used their position to negotiate for
high produce prices and increased premiums for high 
quality cocoa.
Following this development, some members of the
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Nigerian Government decided that the financial support 
given to the Cooperative Union should be withdrawn. 
Haig, who was still the Registrar of the Cooperative 
Department, refused to accept such a decision on the 
pretext that it would amount to a breach of faith with 
the farmers who trusted him. Haig was one of the 
honest members of the British ruling class, who showed 
sympathy with the plight of Nigerian peasants. He was 
antagonistic towards the Imperialist policy of 
exploiting African peasants. His criticisms earned 
him distrust among the bourgeois members of the 
Imperialist ruling class and members of AWAM, For 
example, in 1945, one of the firms involved in the 
export trade and a member of AWAM, the United African 
Company (UAC), made allegations against him, which 
were later proved to be false. UAC alleged that Haig 
incited peasants at a meeting in Ile-Ife against the 
European traders, describing them as the enemies of 
the peasants. (137)
The allegation notwithstanding, Haig's personal 
influence on the direct involvement of cooperatives in 
produce marketing was immense, His continued pressure 
resulted in export licences being granted to more 
cooperative societies. Increased
(137) Secretary AWAM to Chief Secretary ofGovernment 11 December, 1945, File CSO 26, 36148/S 183, p. 22
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involvement of the cooperatives in produce marketing 
resulted in the creation of the Association of 
Nigerian Cooperative Exporters (ANCE) in 1945 to deal 
with the complex problem of exporting.
6.1.3 The Cooperative And Cocoa Marketing Board 
After the Second World War, the Labour Government, 
which was in power in Britain, favoured Cooperative 
development. The British Cooperative movement being 
an integral part of the Labour Party, the development 
of cooperatives in the colonies was seen by the 
British Government as one practical way in which 
socialism could be fostered in those colonial 
territories. It was stated by the British Government 
that:
"It remains the intention of His Majesty's 
Government to press on, by the encouragement 
of Cooperative practice among the producers", 
(138)
However, in another Command Paper, His Imperial 
Majesty communicated to the Colonial administration in 
Nigeria his intention to:
(138) See Statement on the future Marketing of West African Cocoa, cmd 6950, Colonial Office, London, 1945, p. 4, para. 9
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"Establish as from the beginning of 1945-46 
cocoa session, organisations empowered by law 
to purchase the total production of cocoa, to 
prescribe the prices to be paid to the 
producers, and to be responsible for the 
disposal of the cocoa." (139)
The Command Paper removed the old system whereby 
expatriate marketing firms were classified group 'A', 
while their African counterparts, including the 
Cooperatives, were classified as group The
Cooperatives in group 'B', which had hitherto acted as 
agents to 'A/, were now placed on equal footing. Both 
the Cooperatives and the expatriate firms were 
now appointed Licenced Buying Agents (LBA) to the 
Cocoa Marketing Board, The Paper also enjoined the 
Colonial Government in Nigeria and Cocoa Board to 
assist and cooperate with the Cooperatives in 
fulfilling their new role as Licenced Buying Agents. 
(140)
The new system brought about some changes on the part 
of the Cooperatives The movement became structured 
with the entire organisation linked together in a 
pyramidal way. At the base were
(139) See Command Paper, Cmd. 6554, Colonial Office, London, 1946, Introductory Page.(140) See Command Paper, Cmd. 6554, op. cit.
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the primary societies, followed up the ladder by their 
federations of marketing Unions and then the 
Association of the Nigerian Cooperative Exporters at 
the top. This structure will be discussed in greater 
detail later.
The Association of Nigerian Cooperative Exporters 
(ANCE), formed immediately after the war primarily for 
financing the export of cocoa, was now assigned to the 
Marketing Board as sole buying agent representing the 
interests of the marketing cooperatives. In other 
words, the Cooperatives ceased to market their own 
cocoa. Instead, they were integrated into the 
structure of the Cocoa Marketing Board as Licenced 
Buying Agents. The new scheme did not allow 
cooperatives any influence. They were issued an 
annual licence which served to regularise and control 
their influence, as the Board had the legal right to 
revoke or refuse the renewal of the licences. In 
return, the Cocoa Marketing Board would generate a 
stabilisation fund for cocoa, while prices tended to 
fluctuate from one season to the next, thereby causing 
uncertainty and risks for cocoa producers. (141) The 
price stabilisation policy is the most aspect of Cocoa 
Marketing Board's function that suffered greatest 
criticism. In 1971 an International Conference was
(141) See Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board's Ordinance, 1947, Section 17
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held on the Marketing Board's system in Nigeria.
(142) Several conclusions were drawn from the 
discussion and debates at the conference. The first 
was that organised marketing of export crops, 
particularly for the stabilisation of producer prices, 
is essential in the economic and social conditions of 
primary producing countries, especially in those areas 
where production is in the hands of small scale 
producers. The second was that the level of producer 
prices may be an important factor in increasing 
agricultural productivity. The third was that the 
promotion of effective agricultural extension and 
rehabilitation programmes may be just as crucial to 
the expansion of output as the level of producer 
prices. The fourth was that, while the marketing 
board surpluses for long-term economic development may 
be of significant benefit, directly and indirectly, to 
agricultural producers, it is nevertheless desirable 
that the objective of short-term stabilisation of 
producer prices and long-term economic development 
should not be confused. (143)
The most important conclusion that can be drawn from 
these findings is the role of price as a means of
(142) See Marketing Board's System, International Conference held in Ibadan, NISER, 1971.(143) See International Conference on Marketing Boards System in Nigeria, op, cit.
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increasing agricultural productivity. In Nigerian 
agriculture, there has been direct Government 
involvement in agricultural pricing through the 
marketing boards.
Government intervention with the marketing board's
policy was meant to foster growth of agricultural 
productivity and promote the prosperity of producers. 
The course of action adopted by the marketing board in 
fulfilment of the objectives showed a clear deviation 
from the stated objectives. By the 1960's cocoa had 
become the major agricultural export for Nigeria and 
evidence collected for its marketing shows that the 
Government of the Western Region where cocoa 
production is dominant began consciously to take
advantage of the Cocoa Marketing Board as a source of 
funds for general economic development and financing 
political activities. The region's 1955-60
development plan announced a final abandonment of the
formulae for the distribution of the Cocoa Marketing 
Board's surpluses. The plan offered a strong defence 
of the Cocoa Board's right to contribute to economic 
development and urged for 20 million pounds in loans 
and grants to come from the Board for use during the 
plan period. This was about two-thirds of the total 
capital and recurrent revenues anticipated for the 
plan period. The development plan of 1960-65 called 
for a further contribution of 21 million pounds from
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the Board over the course of the five years plan 
period. To support these development plans, between 
1947 and 1954, 39% of potential producers' income was 
withheld by the Government through the Cocoa Marketing 
Board as surpluses. However, the total withdrawal in 
the subsequent period (1955-61) was 26%. The drop in 
total withdrawal was not because producers were paid 
more, but because of the slump in the world commodity 
market. The period marked the end of the cocoa boom. 
The cocoa price which had risen year by year, started 
to decline. 1961 was a remarkable year in that the 
price stabilisation of the Cocoa Board was put to the 
test. If the Cocoa Board had applied its policy of 
price stabilisation, it should have paid cocoa 
producers more than what they would have received on 
the basis of falling world prices. Rather, the Board 
abandoned its policy and continued to pile up 
surpluses instead of using the surpluses which it had 
piled up previously to increase the prices the farmers 
were receiving. The result of the Marketing Board's 
policy was that the prices paid to cocoa producers 
actually declined in line with the decline in export 
prices. The only compensation by the Cocoa Marketing 
Board was that they withdrew less from the producers 
so that the prices they received did not fall as 
steeply as the export prices were falling in the world 
market. (144)
(144) See Helleiner, G.K,, "The Fiscal Role of Marketing Boards in Nigeria", 1964 p. 586
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Government policy, irrespective of the declining 
income of cocoa producers, showed further deviation 
from their objective. As Helleiner noted:
"A major innovation in the 1955-62 period was 
the increasing use of Marketing Board's funds 
for purposes of equity in Nigerian Private 
Companies. It is this area in which the 
greatest possibilities for misuse of funds have 
been located,” (145)
The grants were channelled through the Development and 
Finance Corporation which were established to promote 
private companies. The bulk of the money went into 
the financing of banks and real estate which were 
owned by those with political power and patronage. 
Other parts of the funds were spent on questionable 
projects such as the 6.7 million dollars spent on 
preventing expatriate domination in real estate 
business and further 3.1 million dollars spent to 
assist well established indigenous banks, so that they 
might assist in the development of the private sector.
The impropriety of these investments, prompted the 
Federal Government of Nigeria, in 1962, to set up a
(145) See Helleiner G.K., Ibid,
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commission of inquiry into the affairs of certain 
statutory corporations in Western Nigeria. The 
commission was headed, by Mr. Coker a senior civil 
servant and when he submitted his report,it contained 
accusations of gross improprieties and carelessness 
against the Western Nigerian Development Corporation, 
(146) The Coker report presented a disappointing 
record of misuse and mis-allocation of funds 
accumulated by the Cocoa Marketing Boards.
However, some change in objectives occurred explicitly 
in the first Nigerian National Development Plan of 
1962. The primary objective of the plan was rapid 
economic development. The agricultural sector was 
still the leading sector of the economy, contributing 
at least 65% of the gross national product. By its 
very nature, however, the Government believed that the 
agricultural sector could only register a modest 
growth rate. During the plan period, agriculture was 
growing at 4.5% per annum. In view of the slow growth 
rate as perceived by the Government, industrialisation 
was regarded as crucial, if satisfactory growth rates 
were to be achieved for the economy as a whole.
(146) See Report of Coker Commission, Vol. 1, p 65, 1962.
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The policies aimed at accelerating the growth of 
manufacturing in Nigeria consisted of giving 
incentives to manufacturers in the form of tax 
holidays and accelerated depreciation. Companies that 
were undertaking the manufacture of new products could 
apply for Pioneer Certificates which granted tax 
relief for three to five years depending upon the 
amount of capital invested. It has been estimated 
that between 1955 and 1968, 179 Pioneer Certificates 
were issued, though only 101 of them were effectively 
used. Similar incentives existed for small companies 
with less than N20,000 (twenty thousand naira) income 
per annum. High tariffs were placed on competing 
imports, but firms were exempted from paying import 
duty on raw materials. Many other incentives were 
provided to encourage industrial development. 
Nigerians came to be a classic case of Import 
Substituting Industrialisation (ISI). The industries 
that benefitted were textiles, motor vehicles 
assembly, furniture, glass products, radio and 
television industries. The Government considered 
these schemes as essential if industrial objectives 
were to be achieved. (147)
(147) Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report andStatement of Accounts for the year ending 31.12.75.
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In pursuit of the import substitution 
industrialisation strategy, highest priorities were 
accorded to industry and infrastructures. The 
sectoral allocation of planned capital expenditure 
reflected these priorities.
TABLE 6.14
PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAMMES BY SECTOR. 1955 - 1968 
MILLION AT ESTIMATED RATE OF 1 DOLLAR = M2.00
1955 ~ 60 1962 ~ 68
Sectors Million % Million %(Pounds) (Pounds)
1. Primary products 37.7 5.7 183.5 13.62. Trade & Industry 20.8 3,2 180.6 13 .43. Transport &Communication 264.6 43 ,1 347.6 25.74. Other EconomicInvestments 35.2 5.3 203.5 15.15. Education 47.8 7.2 139.5 10.36 . Health 27.8 4.2 34 . 2 2.57. Water 37.0 5.6 48.5 3.68. Other SocialInvestments 45.6 7.0 100.8 7.59. Administration 93.4 14.1 98,1 7.210. Rest 30.2 4.6 7.8 0,6
Total 660.2 100.0 1351.4 100,0
Sources First Nigerian National Development Plan 1962 “ 68.
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The table shows the proportion of planned capital 
expenditure earmarked for trade and industry in 
1962 ~ 68 plan which was 13.4%, as against 13.6%
allocated to agriculture, fishery, quarrying, 
forestry, and mining (primary production). This level 
of expenditure could be considered too low in a 
country in which agriculture was the greatest source 
of income. Also, due to the high priority accorded to 
industry, there was an increase in the share of 
resources allocated to infrastructure under "other 
economic investments", from 5.3% in 1955 -60 programme 
to 15.1% in 1962 “ 68 plan period. In contrast to the 
boost given to the industrial sector in capital 
allocation, the relative share of administration was 
reduced by nearly half while that of social service 
sector was kept at roughly its 1955 - 60 level. Thus, 
in the priorities established in the 1962 - 68 plan, 
capital expenditure conformed to the objective of the 
industrialisation and modernisation policy.
The first National Development Plan 1962 - 68
therefore represented both a continuation and a shift 
away from the original aim to which the Marketing 
Boards were mandated by law to apply their reserves. 
The planned total capital expenditure was 1351.4 
million pounds. In order to achieve the planned 
expenditure, the Marketing Boards were required to 
support the plan with their reserves. This prompted
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William Mott to write in 1963, that:
"Nigeria's economic growth would have been 
retarded or delayed without the Marketing 
Boards' reserves, for it was these reserves 
that financed the basic infrastructure that 
paved the way for industrial and agricultural 
development in the sixties." (148)
So high were the hopes of the Marketing Boards'
reserves, that in the plan, a contribution of 13 
million pounds, approximately 6.5 million dollars, was 
expected from them annually. The ability of the
Boards to contribute, however, depended on two 
factors, the existing reserves and on the yearly flow 
of surpluses into the reserves. It could be recalled 
that since the middle of the 1950's, adverse 
development in the world commodity markets had 
depressed prices and drastically reduced the expected 
flow in the reserves which had been previously
depleted. The upshot was that in 1964, only the token 
sum of one million pounds was contributed to capital 
projects from the Marketing Boards' reserves, and
nothing was contributed in
(148) See William P. Mott, 1963, p. 142.
202
1965 and 1966. (149) Thus, not only was this source of 
financing capital expenditure showing a bleak 
prospect, but the farmers' incomes had been declining 
since the mid-1950's.
The revenue accruing to the Marketing Boards depended 
on the world prices of the export commodities and the 
producer prices which the Marketing Boards paid. The 
World Market prices continued to fall and 1963 marked 
a turning point in the importance of the agricultural 
sector as a source of revenue, in the sense that the 
Marketing Board surpluses ceased.
This coincided with the early years of political 
independence when the new Governments embarked on 
industrial projects which depleted the accumulated 
reserves of the Marketing Boards. In fact, the 
financial position of the Marketing Boards 
deteriorated to such an extent that they had to resort 
to short term loans from the lending institutions in 
order to purchase produce from the farmers and pay 
commissions to the Licenses Buying Agents. In 1962, 
an amount of 26 million pounds was loaned to the 
Northern Nigerian Marketing Board,
(129) Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement of Account, 1966
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and by 1966 a total amount of 60 million pounds had 
been given out as credits to the Marketing Boards. In 
addition to the credit obtained from this source, the 
Boards also borrowed extensively from the Federal 
Government. (150)
Throughout the remaining part of the sixties, the 
agricultural sector ceased to be an important source 
of Government revenue. It must, however, be noted 
that export duties and produce taxes were still being 
imposed on these commodities. Throughout the period, 
the revenue from these two sources was less than 1% of 
total Government revenue. However, the picture was 
changed dramatically by the rising importance of oil. 
In 1965 petroleum's share of total exports already 
amounted to about 25.4%, rising to 57.6% in 1970. In 
1974, following the quadrupling of oil prices, the 
share of oil in total exports rose to 92.6%. (151)
The phenomenal rise in petroleum earnings is matched 
by the dramatic decline in the relative share of the 
agricultural export commodities as illustrated in 
Table 5,12. The Table shows that agricultural share 
of total export declined from 75.8 per cent in 1960
(150) See Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report,(151) See C.B.N., Ibid
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to a minimum of 2,4 per cent in 1980, Petroleum 
exports moved in the opposite direction from a level 
of 2.7% of total export value in 1960 to a level of 
more than 95% in 1980. It is pertinent at this 
juncture to explain briefly the reason for the 
relative decline of agricultural commodities on the 
Nigerian export list. Many economists believe that 
the only problem of agriculture in Nigeria and 
elsewhere in Africa, is lack of modern farming 
techniques. Therefore, what is said to be needed for 
agricultural development are improved farming 
techniques with proper and adequate use of such inputs 
as fertilisers, pesticides, improved seed, water, 
storage facilities and a better transport system. 
However, if new farming techniques are to be adopted 
by large numbers of farmers, they need to be willing 
and able to use them. Therefore, in addition to 
effective public investment for the development of 
rural infrastructure, there was the need for proper 
institutional and agricultural policies to encourage 
farmers to adopt innovations. Through the extension 
services, farmers were informed of new farming 
techniques and encouraged to adopt them. It is 
important to note, however, that the response of 
farmers to such innovations and their willingness to 
invest, depended on the rewards which they expected 
from such ventures.
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Adequate and better marketing facilities and 
reasonably attractive and stable incomes are necessary 
in order to make such rewards attractive. The 
availability of inputs and credits is also essential 
to ensure that the adoption of new techniques by 
farmers is not frustrated by a lack of input and 
finance. These elements constitute an integrated 
programme of agricultural development. As highlighted 
above, after independence, the Marketing Boards 
continued with the policy started under colonial rule 
of extracting surpluses from the farmers who produced 
commodities for export. Through the Marketing Boards, 
the Government controlled agricultural prices paid to 
the farmer and levied duties on exports. The farmers 
were often only paid half of the world market prices 
for their produce, while the rest accrued to the 
Government. (152) During the second half of the 
1960's, when revenue from oil started to flow, 
producers' prices were slightly increased to improve 
productivity, but by that time it was too late to 
improve the situation. This was because some of the 
farmers had migrated to the cities for wage labour 
while others refrained from investing in new trees or 
productive equipment. Cocoa, which was an important 
export crop, faced a
(152) See Olayide, S.O. and Prof. D. Olatunbosun in Trend and Prospects of Nigeria's Agricultural Exports. 1975, p. 77,
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general decline due to the fact that half of the cocoa 
trees by the mid-sixties were too old and had probably 
reached the end of their productive lives. The 
farmers were not willing to invest in new trees 
because the price policy of the Marketing Boards had 
long killed the incentive to do so. While the 
stagnated world prices in the 1960's and traditional 
system of cultivation in Nigeria were partly 
responsible for the decline of agricultural 
production, the conservative Marketing Board's price 
policies may have contributed immensely to the 
deterioration of cocoa exports.
By 1966 however, the civil War had started. The Civil 
War created an unusual condition within the economy. 
In order to deal with the new situation, the 
Government required funds. In this connection, the 
already existing pressure on the Government for 
increased revenue became much more pronounced. The 
problem was compounded by further falls in export 
earnings caused by the Marketing Boards' price policy. 
Potentially, the oil revenue which started to flow 
during the war, could have been of great benefit to 
export producers since the Government would no longer 
have needed to raise revenue through export taxation. 
Accordingly, it could have reduced the ever-widening 
gap between the world prices and producer prices.
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TABLE 6.15
Sectoral Distribution of Economie Activities And Performance In Nigeria
Sector Annual Real Growth Rate Per Cent
Composition of GDP Per Cent
1960-70 1970-77 1960 1970 1977
AgricultureMining -0.5 -0.5 54.0 37.1 22.7(Petroleum) 32,7 8.1 5.2 30.1 37.1Manu f acturing 12.8 13,4 2.8 5,2 7.0Public Admin. 4.8 24.6 2.3 3.3 7.7Others 1.0 7.5 36,7
100%
24.3
100%
25.5
100%
Sources World Bank. World Tables. 2nd Edition, 1980,
The first indication that oil revenues were not 
evenly distributed throughout the economy emerges when 
growth is desegregated on a sectoral basis as 
illustrated on Table The sectoral data
indicates that both during the import substitution and 
oil boom development period, agriculture declined. 
However, this observation must be qualified by the 
very poor quality of macro-level agricultural data 
that is available. Hence, there must be some doubt 
that absolute, as opposed to relative, decline 
occurred. Whilst these absolute figures may be 
subject to wide margins of error, especially the 
figures relating to agriculture, where a large part of 
output is for self-consumption and therefore where it 
is exceptionally difficult to estimate the level of 
output, there can be no doubt at all that the
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agricultural sector has declined relative to the 
mining sector. Given the increasing oil revenues, one 
might have expected that the boom might have 
benefitted the farmers. The oil money supposedly 
eliminated the need to finance development through the 
taxation of agriculture. It might, therefore, have 
reversed the earlier factors which had caused a 
deterioration in the income of farmers.
By 1968, however, the low price paid by the Marketing 
Boards had created a depressing psychological effect 
on the minds of cocoa producers. They saw themselves 
exploited and oppressed by a Government which refused 
to pay fair prices for their cocoa. Agitation soon 
turned into riot. The farmers attacked staff and 
assets of the Government. The violence stopped only 
when the Government appeased the farmers by accepting 
their demands and increased cocoa prices to 250 pounds 
per ton from about 120 pounds per ton. (153). By 
1986, however, the Cocoa Marketing Board was abolished 
for the negative effect its operations had on 
increasing cocoa productivity.
(153) See William, G., in Nigerian Economy and Society. 1976, p. 153.
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6.2 The Cocoa Marketing Policy and the Application of _____ Cooperatives' Principle of Democratic Control
The first attempt to examine the effects of the cocoa 
marketing policy on the cooperatives' ability to 
practlcetheir principle of democratic control for the 
period under study was made by interviewing the active 
officials of the Cooperative Department who were 
recommended to me by a senior executive officer at the 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture. When I got to their 
office at Victoria Island in Lagos and was introduced 
as a research student, I readily secured the 
cooperation of the staff of the entire department 
engaged in cooperative pricing and marketing policies.
Although, the questionnaire administered to the active 
officials were meant to address specific issues of 
past cooperative marketing practices, the material 
generated enabled us to reach several conclusions as 
to policy changes after 1967. The active officials 
declined to answer questions relating to the effects 
of the Government's cocoa marketing policies but 
contended that the Government was aware of the 
negative effects of the policies, hence the reforms of 
1973, 1977 and subsequent abolition of the Cocoa
Marketing Board in 1986.
When we further press the officials with the question
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as to what constitutes negative effect of the policy, 
they vehemently refused to comment. As it has been 
the problem of this study to establish the effect of 
the cocoa marketing policy on the cooperative 
principle of democratic control, we were compelled to 
examine the overall policy for the period under study. 
As we have noted from the historical analysis in 
section 6.1.2, the colonial government established the 
Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board in 1947. The overall 
cocoa marketing policy was to promote the economic 
welfare of cocoa producers through price 
stabilisation. The role of the Cocoa Marketing Board 
was to implement the government's cocoa marketing 
policy. To assess the extent to which Cocoa Marketing 
Board implemented the objective of price 
stabilisation, time series data were collected and 
analysed over the period under study. For example, to 
test whether or not the Cocoa Marketing Board had been 
instrumental to the attainment of price stability, it 
was necessary to test the price paid to cocoa 
producers by the Marketing Board against world price 
for the period 1947 to 1967.
The producer price is the price paid to the cocoa 
producers while the world price represents the price 
marketing boards receive by selling cocoa in the world 
market. Since most of the farmers interviewed did not 
know or have any information about the world price in
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any given year, reliance was placed on data calculated 
from the primary data reported in the Annual Abstract 
of Statistics, published by the Federal Office of 
Statistics.
TABLE 6,16
Commodity
Price 1948 - 67 Dounds = TON
1963-671948-52 1953-57 1958-62
Cocoa 59.2 70.0 65.9 64.3
Palm Oil 61.8 62.0 52.1 44.4
Palm Kernel 60.9 59.2 53.3 50.2
Groundnut 35,1 47.8 62.3 67.8
Source; Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1967
The above table shows, over the period 1948 - 67, that 
producers of all the four commodities under marketing 
boards' control received less than the world price for 
their produce. The table shows that cocoa producers 
have suffered least, while the producers of palm oil, 
palm kernels, and groundnuts have suffered most in 
terms of the percentage of their potential earnings 
which were siphoned away from them as a result of 
highly significant differences between world prices 
and producer prices.
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Besides the official low prices, the farmers were not 
paid stable prices for the period under study. The 
picture is clearer when we review the data presented 
in Table 6-17,
TABLE 6.17
Number of Times Cocoa Prices were Changed Reduced and Unchanged. 1948 - 1967
1
1948-67 Cocoa Palm Oil Palm Oil Ground-Nut
No. of Times Prices were Raised 9 4 5 8
No. of Times Prices were Reduced 5 4 4 6
No. of Times Prices Remained Unchanged 5 11 10 5
Source: Compiled from Table 5.10
The above table has been constructed using the data on 
Table 5.10. It shows that cocoa prices were raised 9 
times, 5 times they were reduced and 5 times the price 
remained unchanged. What is said of cocoa applies to 
other commodities under the other marketing boards.
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The analysis of the number of times producer prices 
were raised, reduced or kept constant, showed that the 
marketing boards failed to carry out their function 
of price stabilisation.
The disincentive effect of price destabilisation in 
the long run is well recognised by the farmers 
themselves. Almost all the farmers interviewed argued 
that since it could take up to five years for any 
investment in cocoa farming to yield an income, a 
stable price was necessary for investment planning. 
In the absence of a stable price, they can shift 
investment to other crops, activities or occupations. 
Over eighty per cent of them actually shifted 
investment into food crops given the rising food 
prices in the sixties and seventies.
Although, the farmers' claim could not be supported by 
empirical data, the theory of elasticity of 
agricultural supply tells us that any changes in the 
price of an agricultural commodity would cause more 
than a proportionate change in supply. In other 
words, agricultural supply responds positively to 
changes in price; hence the elasticity of supply
which characterised the industry. Given that positive 
supply elasticity exists among Nigerian export 
producers, the overall effect of the Marketing Boards' 
pricing policy could result in decreasing earnings
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from export production.
AS part of the above cocoa marketing policy, the 
marketing cooperatives adopted a three tier structure, 
the structure replaced that of colonial system which 
allowed cooperatives to sell members cocoa by tender. 
The system started in 1922 in an effort by the 
colonial government to establish cocoa houses called 
fermentaries. The Government initiative consolidated 
as well as formalised the farmers' efforts for team 
work in cocoa farming as it encouraged them to jointly 
supply their produce. By 1928 the cocoa fermenting 
societies had been transformed into marketing 
societies to facilitate the marketing of their 
members' cocoa and ensure that they realised greater 
revenue from their efforts. However, by 1935 the 
Cooperative Ordinance was passed into law thereby 
formalising the cooperative movement in Nigeria. 
Until 1947 the cooperatives marketed their produce by 
tender. The establishment of cocoa marketing boards 
in 1947 heralded an increased disposition on the part 
of government to intervene permanently in cocoa 
marketing. We have established in this study that 
since 1947 the policy of the Nigerian Government 
towards cooperative marketing has never been 
consistent. It has rather been altered with the 
changing faces in the country's leadership. An 
initial objective of the marketing cooperatives was to
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control the market for members' produce. The colonial 
government, however, frustrated this initial effort by 
insisting that cooperatives must sell their cocoa by 
tender to expatriate firms who would then arrange for 
all exports from Nigeria before the establishment of 
statutory cocoa marketing boards in 1947. As our 
study has shown, the board was charged with the sole 
responsibility for fixing prices payable to producers, 
determining purchasing arrangements, issuing licences 
to cooperatives and other licenced buying agents and 
maintaining the necessary executive machinery for the 
purchasing, shipping and selling of all cocoa 
purchased for export. These were manifestly providing 
them with monopoly powers. Such powers meant in 
economic terms that the Cocoa Marketing Board became 
a single buyer in a multi-sellers' market. With such 
monopoly powers, the marketing boards were able to 
influence domestic prices for cocoa at the expense of 
the producers.
The justification put forward by the government for 
allowing the continued existence of the board with its 
monopoly powers, was to promote security in the 
producing areas by maintaining a stable producer price 
within each season and as far as possible over a 
longer period of years. The idea of price 
stabilisation was to provide a buffer between the 
producer and the international market price which
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would protect cocoa producers against short term 
fluctuations in world prices and allow a greater 
stability of income. The government argued that the 
existing arrangement whereby cocoa was purchased for 
export by private entrepreneurs trading independently 
and on behalf of their own account did not and indeed, 
could not, provide any substantial security for the 
cocoa producers. Furthermore, the government
contended that prices in the world market fluctuated 
and caused risks and uncertainty to the private 
buyers. The price fluctuation also produced hardship 
for the peasants. Planning ahead for the harvest 
becomes very hard if future prices were not known. 
The marketing board was therefore seen as providing a 
safeguard for the interests of the peasant cocoa 
producers. However, as our evidence suggested, this 
objective was not met over the period under study. 
(See Table 5.10 and 6.16). Rather, the cooperatives 
were forced into the position of licence buying agents 
to the Board, thereby serving as instruments for 
carrying out the Board's policies. The cooperatives 
did not give up the struggle to be independent in the 
face of intimidation by the Marketing Board, By 1951 
the struggle had started to pay dividends. A new 
constitution called the Macpherson Constitution, which 
created three regions, viz Western, Eastern and 
Northern regions, was introduced. The development of 
cooperatives now became the responsibility of each
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region.
As cocoa was the leading export crop for Nigeria and 
a product essentially of the Western region, the 
Action Group party (AGP) which was the party in 
government for the region, became the main actor in 
the various efforts to promote cooperative marketing 
in Nigeria. It took the lead in formulating 
legislative models which were subsequently adapted in 
other regions. In September, 1953, the region passed 
legislation which gave the Registrar of the 
Cooperative Department powers to foster the growth of 
cooperative societies in the region. The regional 
government also endorsed the recommendation of the 
Nowell Commission regarding cocoa marketing 
cooperatives. In their policy statements, they 
pledged to promote the growth of cooperative societies 
with the ultimate aim of controlling the export of 
cocoa produced in the region.
In 1954, the adoption of the federal constitution 
meant that each region was not only autonomous of the 
Federal Government, but also independent of other 
regions. The regional autonomy resulted in the 
régionalisation of both cooperatives and marketing 
boards. Our study discovered that the dramatic change 
in the political arrangements added further impetus to 
the Western Regional government's effort to promote
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cooperative development and that within a few years of 
régionalisation, marketing cooperatives were well 
planted in Western Nigeria.
These development efforts notwithstanding, we 
discovered that the Cocoa Marketing Board continued to 
dominate the export trade. They enjoyed a regional 
monopoly of price fixing for cocoa. The regional 
cooperative societies were appointed licenced buying 
agents to the regional boards. The marketing boards 
paid a commission for the cooperative purchase but 
maintained the monopoly right of price fixing and 
exporting the cocoa through their parent body, the 
Nigerian Produce Marketing Company (NPMC). The 
function of NPMC was to receive cocoa from regional 
marketing boards and sell collectively to the World 
cocoa market.
The question one may ask at this juncture, is what 
effect this policy which allowed a statutory board a 
monopoly power over Cocoa Marketing, had on the idea 
clearly put forward by the Government in the 1950's? 
As we noted in Section 3.5, the Government clearly 
support the idea recommended by International 
Cooperative Alliance that marketing cooperatives 
should be democratically controlled. Their affairs 
should be administered by persons elected or appointed 
in a manner agreed by the members and accountable to
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them. Members of the organisation should enjoy equal
voting rights. Every member should enjoy
participation in decision making affecting the pricing 
and marketing of their produce or service. The Cocoa 
Marketing Board Ordinance, 1947 clearly affects the 
right of the cocoa marketing cooperative to manage its 
affairs according to the democratically expressed will 
of its members. The cocoa price decision is
effectively carried out by the government. Since 
1947, the Federal Government of Nigeria enjoys the 
monopoly of price fixing for all cocoa exports. We 
took this issue up with the officials of the 
Cooperative Department in an informal interview. Our 
finding was that cocoa still remains the only Nigerian 
agricultural commodity mainly processed overseas. 
Almost all cocoa produced in Nigeria is exported to 
overseas users. All exports from Nigeria are subject 
to Government regulations. Thus, cocoa marketing 
falls within the jurisdiction of the Federal
Government, Nothing has changed. The cooperatives 
still play the role of mere "price takers”. They 
have no powers to influence domestic prices for cocoa. 
They cannot as a matter of fact challenge the 
authority of the Federal Government,
In principle, the full members' meeting remains the 
ultimate source of authority. Where a general 
committee has been elected democratically by all
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cooperative members, the latter is vested with the 
power to reach decisions in accordance with members' 
interests. Successful meetings are fundamental to the 
democratic principle of cooperatives. General 
meetings create forums in which ideas and prices are 
discussed, grievances aired and plans made 
collectively. If meetings are to be successful and 
fulfil their democratic function, their necessity must 
be recognised and all members or their democratically 
elected representatives must attend. Active
attendance by all members or elected representatives 
means participation in decision taking at the general 
meeting and also participation in control over the 
task cooperatives perform. The principle of
democratic control concerns the participation in power 
to control decision-making through one member one vote 
whilst task performance is influenced by policy 
decision reached through the democratic processes, 
Robert Blauner argues for greater participation and 
describes four conditions of alienation which results 
from the inability to participate in both task and 
control in any organisation, 'powerlessness, 
meanfinglessness, isolation and self-estrangement'. 
He goes on to state four non-alienated conditions 
which correspond to these conditions:
i) The ability to control one's immediate 
work processes.
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ii) The development of a sense of purpose and 
function which connects individual jobs to 
overall organisation.
iii) Belonging to integrated work communities.
iv) Involvement in work as a mode of personal 
self-expression. (154)
Blauner's analysis of participation shows that 
participation is crucial to the success of any 
organisation. We found from this study no evidence to 
support direct democracy involving the participation 
of all members of the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing 
Cooperative. Responsibility for day-to-day decision­
making is largely determined by the Registrar of 
Cooperatives and his staff appointed by the government 
while cocoa price decisions are taken by the 
government itself. The control of the marketing 
cooperatives by the Registrar and the monopoly power 
of price fixing by the government affects the 
democratic nature of the cooperatives. Why this is 
so, is the subject of the following section.
(154) See Blauner, R , , Alienation and Freedom. 1964, pp. 15 - 34
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6.2.1 The Effects of Cocoa Marketing Policy on the _______ Democratic Principle of the Cooperatives
An ideal relationship that should exist between
cooperatives and Nigerian government was accurately
defined by the International Labour Organisation in
1966,
"Governments of developing countries should 
formulate and ca*rry out a policy under which 
cooperatives receive aid and encouragement, of 
an economic, financial, technical, legislative or 
other character, without effect on their 
independence." (155)
Contrary to this recommendation, the government in 
Nigeria started a marketing policy in 1947 which 
allowed the civil servant control over the marketing 
cooperative. Henceforth, the cooperatives assumed a 
pyramid shape with a wide base consisting of primary 
societies, followed up the ladder by their federation 
of Marketing Unions, and then the Association of the 
Nigerian Cooperative Exporters on the top.
(155) See International Labour Organisation(Developing Countries), Recommendation, 1966
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Fig- 6-1
The Associa­tion of the Nigerian Coop. Exporters
Coop. Marketing Unions 
Primary Marketing Societies
Source: Osuntogun in Cooperative and Nigeria'sAgricultural Development, 1983
The prime objective of all cooperative organisations 
is to promote members' interest. To achieve this aim, 
all cooperative organisations must adopt the 
principles recommended by the International 
Cooperative Alliance. These principles have been 
outlined elsewhere in this chapter. We also noted in 
this chapter that degeneration occurs when cooperative 
organisation is structured. The degeneration of the 
cooperative into a structured organisation could work 
against the principle of democratic control which is 
fundamental to an ideal cooperative organisation. The 
analysis of the structure of the cocoa marketing 
cooperatives which emerged over the period under 
study, shows that 1,307 primary marketing societies in 
1967 were affiliated to the 102 produce marketing 
unions which federated to form the apex organisation 
known as the Association of Nigerian Cooperative 
Exporters described earlier.
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This structure allows the primary societies to collect 
members cocoa in small parcels. The small parcels 
formed the bulk of members' cocoa which were delivered 
to the Association of Nigerian Cooperative Exporters. 
The Association is solely responsible for the 
marketing of the cocoa as a Licensed Buying Agent to 
the Cocoa Marketing Board. The total membership of 
cocoa marketing cooperatives in the cocoa producing 
area was 84,000 in 1966 representing 85 per cent of 
cooperators in the whole of the area. As can be seen 
from Table 6.18, the Cooperatives accounted for 
marketing and handling of 23 per cent of cocoa 
produced in 1966 from about 13 per cent in 1952.
225
TABLE 6-1R
.Marketing Cooperatives' Growth, igs? _ i96fi
  1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Number ofCooperativeMarketing
Societies 449 1,380 1,117 1,221 1,420 1,893
Member­
ship 30,190 70,157 55,120 57,917 68,294 84,256
Tonnage of Cocoa Sold 45,694 33,555 34,788 50,569 34,523
Percentage of Cocoa Marketed by Coop, to TotalMarketed in the Western
Provinces 13% 22.7% 19,07% 16.01% 22.1% 23%
Source. Year Book of Agricultural Cooperation, 1969
The above statistics show that between 1964 and 1966 
there was an appreciable rise in the number of 
marketing cooperatives and membership with 
corresponding improvement in the financial 
transactions and operational results. These facts 
put together would make one feel that with the 
accumulation of capital and by wise spending more 
wealth has been produced and subsequently improved the
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living standard of cocoa producers.
Contrary to this expectation, our analysis shows that 
the cooperative structure allowed the appointment of 
leaders who later became very powerful and corrupt. 
Our findings were reinforced by the finding of J,T, 
Caxton-Idowu, a senior Assistant Registrar of the 
Cooperative Department in 1964, The Caxton-Idowu 
report indicated that not only were the operation of 
affiliated societies unbusinesslike, they had also 
departed greatly from the purposes for which they were 
establshed. The paid secretaries of societies used 
their positions for personal enrichment, as did 
prominent members of elected committees. Produce 
advances for example, paid by the union to societies 
from funds lent by the Cooperative Bank (the purpose 
being to allow spot-cash to be given to society 
members on receipt of their cocoa) were not only paid 
to hand-picked members, who thereafter operated as 
commercial sub-buyers in the villages with the 
capital, but were also issued to non-members. The 
manager of the Ibadan Cooperative union. Chief Y.B. 
Ogundipe, consistently allotted such advances to 
unregistered societies - indeed 'unregistered 
Societies had more attraction to the manager and 
members of the Finance Committee of the Union when 
cash advances were used than member Societies'. (156)
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The record of the union was indeed an inventory of 
irregularities. Societies unregistered under the 
Cooperative Societies Law were, as noted above, 
accorded privileged position in the union. Produce 
advances were given out by the union manager to 
private individuals. Union petrol was used for private 
purposes and sold to non-members, and at least one 
union store was operated by a commercial buyer who 
used official cooperative receipts for cocoa 
purchases. There were too many instances of 
corruption? for example, union funds were expended on 
the purchase of land in the central trading area of 
Ibadan city, the subsequent rents from which did not 
cover the interest payable on the bank-loan undertaken 
to finance the purchase, (157)
By march 1963 the total amount owed Ibadan Marketing 
Unions to the Association of Nigerian Cooperative 
Exporters (ANCE) was 69,903 pounds. The debt was 
built up as a result of advance payments to the Union 
to buy members' cocoa over the previous seven cocoa 
seasons. An additional overdraft of 81,499 pounds
(156) J,T, Caxton-Idowu, Report of an Inquiry into the Ibadan Cooperative Produce Marketing Union Ltd., Ibadan Cooperative Press, 1963, pp. 33 - 34(157) Ibid, pp. 35 - 36
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was owed to the Cooperative bank in the same year as 
overdraft. (158)
The Commission also reported that prominent leaders of 
both Omi Egbejoda and Gbedun Cooperative Unions 
established in the cocoa producing area were guilty of 
irregularities. They were found to have made a well 
established practice of using cooperative loan for the 
purchase of cocoa from non-members. The secretary of 
Gbedun society with the knowledge of his Committee 
often travelled as far as Ile-Ife to buy cocoa, and 
employed several sub-buyers to do the same. The cocoa 
was then resold to the union at the approved price, 
presumably leaving a substantial unrecorded profit for 
the secretary and favoured committee members. A 
certain secretary was also successful in buying the 
silence of the committee in respect of shortages in 
cash in his charge which amounted to 1,466 pounds, 
largely by refusing to submit to the union or the 
Cooperative Inspectors a list of Society debtors. 
Some 258 loans were outstanding at the end of 1962-63, 
totalling, over 1.6 million pounds, all of this money 
having come from union advances. (159)
(158) See Ibid, p. 37(159) See Ibid, p. 16
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The report of these Unions showed that the Unions were 
to all intents and purposes bankrupt. These factors 
greatly reduced the cocoa tonnages produced and sold 
by the cooperatives. For example, after the 1963 
inquiry many union leaders were sacked by the 
Registrar of Cooperatives Department. The unions were 
deprived of its cocoa purchasing licence as sub-agents 
of Association of Nigerian Cooperative Exporters 
(ANCE) by the Cocoa Marketing Board because of low 
cocoa tonnage- (160)
Our knowledge of cooperative principles and ideals 
tells us that for any cooperative organisation to 
achieve its aim as a mutual help institution, members 
must be involved in the affairs of the organisation. 
The absence of democratic control culminated in the 
emergence of corrupt leaders whose activities were not 
in the interest of the entire cooperative marketing 
unions. For example, the entire structure of cocoa 
marketing cooperatives was crippled in 1963 by the 
discovery of widespread fraud involving the leaders of 
most of the marketing unions affiliated to the 
Association of Nigerian Cooperative Exporters. As a 
result of the fraud disclosure, members' confidence in 
their cooperatives was badly hit and membership
(160) See Ministry of Trade and Industry,Cooperative Divisions, File No. ICC 42, vol. 4, 1964
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dropped from well over 70 thousand in 1962 to a little 
more than 55 thousand in 1963. The value of cocoa 
handled by the Cooperatives also fell from 5.2 million 
pounds in 1962 to 4.1 million pounds in 1963 and the 
percentage of cocoa marketed by the Cooperatives 
declined from 22.7 per cent in 1962 to 19.07 per cent 
in 1963 (See Table 4,./?). The police action taken 
against these corrupt leaders did not result in any 
prosecutions. The criminal proceedings against them 
were withdrawn by the Director of Public Prosecutions 
in July, 1965. The D.P.P. was reluctant to resort to 
necessarily expensive legal action, (151),
The best way to describe the experience of Ibadan 
marketing unions is to say that of all the 102 
cooperative unions studied, covering the cocoa 
producing area, only Owo Cooperative Produce Marketing 
Union was claimed to uphold the principle of 
democratic control to some extent. The report claimed 
that the union was something of a model of good 
cooperative practice and efficient management. It 
remained extremely well run and was not in debt 
neither to the cooperative Bank or the Association of
(151) See Ibadan Cooperative Produce MarketingUnion, General Meetings Minute Book, Minutes of AGM, 26 July, 1965
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Nigerian Cooperative Exporters. The report further 
claimed that the union owed its success to an 
exceptionally dedicated committee whose members were 
elected. The Union's prosperity has been based wholly 
on the marketing of cocoa, and it is no coincidence 
that Owo is one of the most prosperous cocoa growing 
areas to date. The leaders and members of the 
committee have no power to take major decisions 
without consultation with members. Most major 
decisions are taken at a general meeting well attended 
by members. Regular attendance at meetings by members 
meant that decisions are influenced by the majority of 
votes cast. (152)
There was no evidence, however, to show that the 
prices received by the members of Owo Marketing Union 
were not regulated by the Government. Owo Marketing 
Union, like all other cocoa marketing unions are 
subject to government regulation. However, there were 
evidences which shows that although the union was 
structured in conformity with the Cocoa Marketing 
Board's requirement explained earlier, the internal 
management was based on the principles of democratic
(152) See Cooperative Produce Marketing Society, Annual Reports, 1965/66
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control. By 1970 it has become the only marketing 
union in the whole of the cocoa producing area able to 
operate largely on its own capital resources. 
Corruption and abuse of power by committee members 
were checked through a democratic system which allowed 
people to be removed or re-elected into office on an 
annual basis. The committee members for their part 
were cocoa farmers who engendered among themselves 
considerable feelings of group loyalty. The loyalty 
to the group in particular and the union in general 
enabled the Committee to take many actions which 
enhanced the prosperity of their members. For 
example, the union consistently paid to its members 3 
pounds per ton for their cocoa, over and above the 
Marketing Board's fixed gazetted price for the most of 
1960's. They were able to meet the extra payment by 
reducing its share of the bulk buying allowance paid 
to them by the Marketing Board. The move was 
considered by the Department of Cooperatives to be 
risky but in general, the policy paid off, by bringing 
in increased membership and cocoa tonnage as 
illustrated on Table 6.19.
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TABLE 6-19
OWO CPMÜ; STATISTICAL INFORMATION
1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71
Total paid-up Membership 1,145 1,008 1,304 1,426 1,547 1,684
Total share capital (Pounds M) 1,408 1,510 1,670 1,843 2,070 2,228
Tonnage(cocoa) 1,574 1,970 2,025 1,460 2,118 3,016
Turnover (Pounds M) 206,797 186,931 210,788 167,370 345,099 501,193
Net Profit (Pounds M) 125 2,798 2,159 2,290 2,549 4,595
Loans issued (short-term spraying & WNACC)(Pounds)
23,063 33,258 35,299 40,954 47,298 66,328
Loans repaid in season (Pounds) 8,626 28,124 30,790 28,495 44,702 64,664
Loans overdue (Pounds M) 14,438 5,134 4,509 12,470 2,595 1,664
-Totaldeposits 43,637 42,320 43,535 47,419 47,419 51,608
Source; Owo CPMU'Anual Reports, 1965/66 - 1970/71 (Pounds M)
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The loyalty of one of the union leaders was put to 
test in 1967 when a Mercedes-Benz car worth 2,000 
pounds was offered to Chief Adeleye for his services 
to the Cooperative. Characteristically, Adeleye, 
though grateful for the display of loyalty to the 
members who nominated him, refused the offer on the 
grounds that his loyalty was a matter of duty to his 
cooperative union. (153) Also in July the same year, 
to give further example, the union's committee members 
decided to refuse farmers members' loans for non­
productive purposes, in the instance for the Moslem 
Id-El-Kabir festival. Members were advised instead to 
make voluntary deposits in the Society against such 
festival. (154)
Much as we disagree with the claim that Owo Marketing 
Union is democratic as required by the International 
Cooperative Alliance, the record of Owo marketing 
union shows some remarkable success as could be seen 
from increases in cocoa tonnage and membership. Thus, 
the experience of cocoa marketing cooperatives in 
Nigeria is not all bad. At least, the Owo Union has 
contributed in one way or another in development 
programmes that are hard to secure in any other way. 
Needless to say, cooperators cannot be blind to the
(153) Minutes of General meeting of Owo Cooperative Produce Marketing Society, 5 July, 1969.(154) See Minutes of General Meeting of Owo CPMS, op. cit. 1969
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shortcomings of the government controlled 
cooperatives, but at the same time they are not 
obliged to accept the blanket criticism and 
condemnation contained in Idowu Caxton report.
For example, the Idowu Caxton commissions report is 
rash without sufficient effort to analyse the 
background and causes of failures.
The failure of the cooperative is the direct effect of 
government control which has been chronicled elsewhere 
in this chapter. We noted that the cooperatives 
remained firmly tied to the policy decisions of the 
government and its marketing activities controlled by 
the Marketing Board, As we noted earlier,the 
requirement of the Marketing Policy meant that the 
marketing cooperatives were structured into a three 
tier system. The pyramid structure consisted of all 
primary marketing societies at the base. Usually a 
number of these primary societies came together to 
form marketing unions. At the apex of the pyramid was 
the Associations of the Nigerian Cooperative Exporters 
who acted on behalf of the unions as an agent to the 
Cocoa Marketing Board,
In return for the cocoa delivered to the Cocoa 
Marketing Board, the Association of Nigerian 
Cooperative Exporters received payments which were
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passed on to the marketing unions which formed the 
second intermediary level of the marketihg structure. 
The latter received cocoa for bulking and grading from 
primary marketing societies at the base of the 
structure and also allocated advances between them to 
enable cash payments to be given to their members for 
the cocoa delivered to the primary societies. It was 
this advance payment that was subject of abuse and 
corrupt enrichment by many cooperative leaders.
This author would like to conclude this chapter by 
saying that the problem of cocoa marketing 
cooperatives could have been solved with democratic 
management and appreciation of responsibility to the 
organisation by cooperative leaders. This view is 
based on our knowledge of the cooperative principle of 
democratic control, which teaches us that the 
essential ingredient for success in a venture like the 
cooperative is active participation by members in the 
running of their societies.
The essence of the cooperative movement is in its non- 
official, self dependent and self-reliant character. 
There can be no imposed cooperation. Rather, than 
encourage local initiative and self help, governments 
in Nigeria have pursued coercive policies which gave 
them vast jurisdiction over cooperative marketing of 
cocoa. The cocoa marketing policy is a means of
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reserving powers of control to the government and 
giving rights to officials of the Cooperative 
Department over internal management of the Cocoa 
Marketing Cooperative- The policy to a great extent 
becomes an instrument of ultimate authority over what 
is supposed to be an organisation of members for the 
members- The effect is a bureaucratic structure of 
inefficiency and corruption- Our recommendation which 
will be outlined in Chapter 7, will contain a call for 
the reform of these policies and for the establishment 
of a true cooperative organisation.
6 - 3 The Importance of this Studv
The importance of this Study is based on the view 
that:
"to forecast the future, one has to know the 
past. Knowing the present may not even be 
enough, one has to know how the present has 
come about- Knowing these pieces of 
information, one could then take a comfortable 
stride into the future". (155)
Following this line of reasoning, we have studied the 
development of cocoa marketing cooperative policy
(155) See Folayan, A., Agricultural Development in Nigeria. 1983, p. 8
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during the early years of self-government in Nigeria, 
from 1947 to 1967, in an attempt to examine the effect 
of such policy on the ooperative's principle of 
democratic control. The only comprehensive scholarly 
study of the Nigerian cooperative movement, now 
published, was carried out by a historian, using 
chronological narrative approach. (156) This Study 
offers alternative approach by applying sociological 
documentary research techniques.
Perhaps, one would expect any study on past 
cooperatives' policies to be carried out only by 
historians. This is because sociologists have been 
generally identified with the use of questionnaires 
and various interviewing techniques. On the contrary, 
documentary investigation was the main 
research technique widely used by many notable 
sociologists. Marx Weber in his Study of "Sociology 
of Religion" (157), employed material gathered from 
religious tracts and pamphlets whilst Durkheim studied 
'Suicide' and used extensively, data from official
(156) See Dr. Adeyeye, S.O., Cooperative Movement Nigeria, op. cit.(157) See Weber, M. in Sociology of Religion, 1963
239
records. (158) these and many other great studies of 
our contemporary society have been carried out by 
sociologists using historical data. (159)
Our pioneering effort to offer an alternative approach 
to the study of past cooperatives' policy in Nigeria 
is further justified when the review of the early
scholarly work on the subject shows that no direct
research had been done to explain the development of 
marketing cooperatives with respect to the following;
i) The emergence of cocoa marketing policy
in 1947 which allowed government monopoly
powers over the marketing of Nigerian 
cocoa.
ii) The structure of the marketing 
cooperative which emerged after 1947.
iii) The effect of these changes on the 
Cooperatives' ability to practise its 
principles of democratic control.
(158) See Durkheim E., in 'Suicide' a study of Sociology, 1970.(159) For extensive defence of documentary research in sociology. See Scott, J. A Matter of Record. 1990, Abrams, P. Historical Sociology. 1982, Burke, P. Sociology and History. 1980, Goldthorpe, J. "The Relevance of History to Sociology", 1983 and Platt, J. "Evidence and Proof in Documentary Research", 1981.
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Perhaps the most important achievements of this study 
lies in its revelation of the extent of Government 
control. The earliest marketing cooperatives in 
Nigeria and other British colonies were conceived 
primarily as producers' organisations, with producers' 
representatives prominent in their management and 
control. Our study revealed that the cooperatives 
have in most cases, been denied the opportunity of 
having a say or influence in marketing policies 
affecting their members. The government itself, 
representing the producers as well as all other 
interests in the society, inevitably retains the 
responsibility for all matters relating to 
agricultural exports. The producers' price policy and 
general marketing policy must be determined by the 
Government,
In addition, a study of marketing cooperatives' policy 
within the context of agricultural development has 
immense potentialities for the developing countries, 
especially those like Nigeria with a fast growing 
population. It is the candid hope of many development 
sociologists and economists that the problems of rural 
poverty that might be created by a fast growing 
population could be tackled by agricultural 
development.
Cooperatives could help agricultural development in
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Nigeria by tackling some of its major problems. At 
present many agricultural projects are poorly funded. 
On account of its importance to the economy, it needs 
to be given adequate resources to make it progress as 
desired. In the past, cooperatives through its 
central financing agency have been used as a means of 
providing funds for agricultural development. The 
Cooperative Bank of Western Nigeria was founded in 
1953 with an outright grant of one million pounds from 
the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board. The amount was in 
turn loaned to various cooperative societies at a low 
rate of interest. Since its inception the bank has 
continued to expand with more branches in response to 
cooperative development in the areas concerned. Its 
resources are hardly sufficient to meet the ever 
expanding requirements of Cooperative Societies for 
agricultural investment. Encouraged by the success, 
however, the Government fostered the inauguration of 
the Eastern Region Cooperative Bank in 1961 with an 
outright grant of 150,000 pounds. The aim was to 
support cooperative production and marketing in the 
region. Upon the recommendation of the United Kingdom 
Adviser on Cooperatives, the Government of Northern 
Nigeria in 1963 voted 2 million pounds for the 
establishment of the Cooperative Bank of Northern 
Nigeria. Like the Cooperative banks in the Western 
and Eastern Nigeria, the bank was to commit its 
resources to the support of cooperative farming and
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marketing. This form of credit to the farmer is 
further supplemented by the loans from Cooperative 
Thrift and Credit Societies whose members make regular 
thrift savings, against additional clearing of farm 
land, planting and harvesting. The Cooperative Thrift 
and Credit Societies deposit their savings in the 
Federal Savings Bank. Members are allowed to borrow 
for productive farm work. To ensure that the loans 
are used for farm purposes, it has to be secured by 
two other members standing as sureties. The Credit 
limit is fixed for all members having regard to their 
savings and societies' bye-laws. The rate of interest 
is generally below that of commercial lenders. The 
effectiveness of these forms of cooperative credit to 
farmers have been chronicled elsewhere. (160) Our 
observation, however, is that rather than improve with 
time as a means of agricultural finance, they have 
become restrictive. By 1962, for instance, the 
Federal Government directed that the Cooperative Banks 
should be licensed as Commercial Banks. Following 
this directive, the Cooperative Banks obtained a 
commercial banking licence and were thus compelled to 
serve the dual role as both commercial bank and 
central financing agencies for the cooperative
(160) See Ijere, M.O. "The Lessons of State Credit Institutions in Development Countries; The Nigerian Experience", In Agricultural Administration, University of Reading, England, 1975, pp. 129 - 145 and Ijere, M.O. Modernina Nigerian Cooperatives, Atoki Publishers, Lagos, 1978.
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societies.
Another area where cooperatives can help Nigerian 
agriculture is in the distribution of farm input. 
This problem concerns the inadequate and belated 
supply of inputs such as seed, fertilizer, herbicides, 
insecticides, tractors, implements and storage 
facilities.
At present, agro-service centres have been built by 
the Federal Government to facilitate the acquisition 
and distribution of these inputs. Our 
observation is that many of these centres are not 
functioning at all or satisfactorily due to shortage 
of operating funds and many of the staff have no 
farming experience. In respect of the supply and 
distribution of new seed varieties, we now know that 
it is impossible for the National Seed Service to cope 
with the needs of the whole country in respect of the 
multiplication and distribution of all new seed 
varieties. The production and distribution of 
vaccines for the control of livestock diseases are at 
the moment being carried out by Government laboratory 
in Vom because of the inadequacies of the agro-service 
centres. The Government needs to consider the 
advisability of handing these operations to farmers' 
cooperative societies. This proposal was successfully 
tested by Agricultural Development Project sponsored
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jointly by the Federal Government and the World Bank. 
One of the main achievements of the ÀDP is an input 
distribution and delivery system which ensures that 
farmers need travel no more than 5 - 15 kms to
purchase needed farm inputs, using a project- 
constructed network of farmers' cooperatives, (161)
The acute shortage of experienced, practical 
agriculturalists who are dedicated and motivated to 
live and work in the rural areas where the farmers 
live, is also a hinderance to agricultural development 
in Nigeria, Training in practical farm management 
must be pursued with vigour. Agricultural students 
must be made to understand that the farmers they are 
meant to serve live in the rural areas. These types 
of training ideas have been championed by the 
Cooperative College in Moor Plantation, Ibadan. Since 
its inauguration in 1943 the College has trained 
agricultural students from all over the Country 
including students from other West African Countries 
like Cameroons, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia. The 
College can now boast of graduates who are eminent and 
successful agriculturists. The College is currently 
expanding its facilities to meet increasing demand for 
agricultural training.
(161) See Professor Idachaba, F.S. in Crop Marketing and Input Distribution in Nigeria, F.A.C.U. Ibadan, 1984, pp. 15-23
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The problems of the smallness of the scale in which 
most of our farmers operate militating against an 
effective and efficient drying, storage, marketing and 
processing of their produce, can be tackled through 
cooperative group farming. For our agricultural 
policy to be meaningful, the farmers must be able to 
dry, store, market their surplus produce at a profit. 
Small scale farmers need to organise themselves into 
Cooperatives for these services to be carried out 
effectively and efficiently. This proposal was also 
put to test during the Agricultural Development 
Project and River Basin and Rural Development 
Authorities' projects. In both cases, it became 
necessary to form farmers in the project areas into 
groups for better coordination of the farming and 
processing activities. The cooperative approach to 
group action was seen as effective. (162) The success 
of these projects prompted the Federal Department of 
Cooperative (FADC) to present to the Federal 
Government a proposal for involving the cooperatives 
in agricultural produce marketing in 1983.. The 
proposal contained the following advantages:
(162) See Sholanke, V.O. Federal Department of Agricultural Cooperatives, Lagos in Cron marketing and Input Distribution in Nigeria, op. cit. p. 71
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i) The cooperatives provide the cheapest 
method for effecting appropriate reforms 
for produce marketing in Nigeria, by 
realising economics of scale and 
encouraging self-help in the rural 
population;
ii) They offer a useful framework for 
channelling government aid to the 
farmers;
iii) They allow members to avoid indebtedness 
to the various credit agencies;
(iv) Educational aid and other community 
development projects could be facilitated 
through cooperatives.
(v) They allow more farmers to be effectively 
reached by mass action programmes like 
training, dissemination of market 
information and the teaching of relevant 
marketing techniques. (163)
(163) See Sholanke, V.O, op. cit. p. 72
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This proposal by FADC was not implemented by the 
Federal Government until 1986 when all statutory 
commodity boards were abolished. Since 1986, the role 
of the Federal Government in produce marketing has 
remained that of a buyer of last resort and a 
guarantor of minimum price for non-exportable 
commodities. The price of all commodities with the 
exception of Cocoa is now influenced by the Nigerian 
Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Organisation 
(NACMO). The Cooperative Department, however, still 
provides essential services, such as drying equipment, 
storage, processing equipment and other marketing 
infrastructure.
As for cocoa, it is presently the only exportable 
agricultural commodity in Nigeria. The cocoa industry 
is still under the control of the Federal Government 
of Nigeria. Thus, the cocoa marketing cooperatives 
are still firmly under the control of the Government. 
It has been customary in Nigeria for the Government to 
perform two distinct functions, namely: that of
administering the Cooperative Societies' Law and 
secondly that of encouraging and assisting cooperative 
movements. The assistance takes the form of staff 
paid from public funds whose duties are to promote and 
supervise cooperative societies so that they may 
attain the required standard of cooperative and
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business efficiency. By virtue of registration, a 
society becomes a corporate body and acquires an 
improved status and increased facilities for doing 
business. Much as we acknowledge the importance of 
Government support in the very early stage of the 
societies' development, the control which the 
Government exerts over the cocoa marketing 
cooperatives to date is unacceptable. Hence we should 
be recommending that the final objective in view 
should be to build a marketing cooperative which is 
self-supporting and in all important aspects 
independent of Government control. A basic ideal of 
cooperation is self-help through mutual help, and the 
aim of a cooperative staff is not to afford perpetual 
assistance, financial or otherwise to Cooperative 
organisations but to teach them how to help themselves 
and how to stand by themselves.
Finally, it will be observed that reference has been 
made to the problems and difficulties confronting the 
cooperatives in Nigeria. It is hoped that the 
cooperatives will be an engine of growth for Nigerian 
agriculture if the following proposals are met:
i) they should intensify their efforts in 
order to become financially autonomous; 
to be able to build up their own capital 
and trade and train their own staff;
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ii) increase membership in cooperative 
societies of all types by the quality of 
the services which the Societies are 
rendering to the Community. The existing 
societies must build up good reputation, 
efficient and honest business management.
iii) provide adequate medium for dissemination 
of cooperative information and mass 
education amongst members.
iv) eradicate at all levels the habits of 
bribery and corruption;
v) encourage the formation of Thrift and 
Credit Societies on a large scale as part 
of the cooperative movements' contribution 
to capital formation for rural development 
and
vi) build up a national cooperative 
Consciousness in Nigeria.
The adoption of cooperatives' principle offers a very 
high prospect of achieving self-sufficiency in all 
aspects of Nigerian agricultural production, provided 
serious efforts are made by our governments to place 
agriculture on the highest priority list and encourage
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agricultural cooperatives, research, and offer the 
farmers opportunity to sell their produce to the 
highest bidder. The price paid to the farmer for his 
produce plays an important role as an incentive for 
him to increase his production and improve the quality 
of his produce. Many countries in Western Europe and 
North America have adopted the cooperative principle 
to solve their agricultural problems. There is no 
reason why it should not be done in Nigeria. What is 
lacking is the political will of government officials 
to acknowledge the fact that there is no better 
organisation for reaching the farmers than the 
cooperatives. The above discussion points out one 
major conclusion namely: that the hope for Nigerian
agriculture lies in the cooperative form of 
organisation, as has been suggested by the World Bank 
sponsored agricultural projects in Nigeria, details of 
which have been discussed earlier.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS _______________  _______
The problem of this study as stated earlier, centred 
on the examination of cocoa marketing policy and its 
effects on the cooperatives' principle of democratic 
control. To deal with this problem, attempts were 
made to analyse the cocoa marketing cooperative's 
policy, over the period 1947 to 1967 for which data is 
available, and deduce from the analysis major effects 
of the policy on the democratic principle of the 
Cooperatives. In Chapter 6, we discussed the general 
findings of this study based on documentary evidence, 
interviews with 250 cocoa farmers, 100 ex-cocoa 
marketing officials and senior active officials of the 
Department of Cooperative. In this chapter, attempt 
will be made to summarise our major findings, make 
recommendations which will be based on the general 
result of our findings and finally draw up conclusions 
from our major findings.
7.1 The Cocoa Marketing Cooperatives Policv. 1947-67 
Since the colonial days, cocoa being the most 
important agricultural export from Nigeria, has 
dominated official marketing policies. Two mechanisms 
were developed ostensibly to promote the interest of 
producers. These were the cocoa marketing board and 
the cocoa marketing cooperative. Despite the rosy
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objectives of these two bodies, our study has 
discovered that neither of them has ever been allowed 
to function as originally intended. For example, 
until the abolition of all statutory marketing boards 
in 1986, the Cocoa Marketing Board remained a quasi^ 
Government marketing organisation established by law 
and run on a set pattern in accordance with 
Government's policy. The government, being the owners 
of the Board, has the power of appointing and 
terminating the appointments of the Board's 
executives. Thus, the activities of the executives 
were controlled by the Government, They are therefore 
not true representatives of the peasants.
The Board, on the other hand, served mainly as an 
instrument of government cocoa marketing policy. A 
major function of the Board when it was established in 
1947 was to stabilise producers prices by fixing legal 
minimum buying prices for a whole season at a time and 
by seeking to minimise price alterations between one 
season and the next. How well the Board performed 
with respect to this function was investigated in this 
study. Our finding shows that the Cocoa Marketing 
Board did not perform this function efficiently. We 
studied the performance of this function using time 
series data for the period 1948 to 1967 for which data 
is available. The analysis shows that rather than 
stabilising prices, the Cocoa Marketing Boards' policy
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distorted domestic prices for cocoa (see Tables 5.10 
and 6.17).
As for the Cocoa Marketing Cooperative, there is no 
gain saying that the hope of the common man is in 
cooperation. In Nigeria and indeed most 
developing countries, the cooperative movement is seen 
as a means of general economic development. 
Governments in Nigeria have often seen cooperatives as 
the means through which agricultural productivity 
could be increased. There is no organisation in 
Nigeria that has as many facilities as the cooperative 
movement to operate at the rural level. Thus, the 
cooperative movement has frequently been suggested by 
eminent and articulate scholars as an effective means 
of increasing agricultural productivity. In an effort 
to acknowledge this fact, the Fourth National 
Development Plan, (1981 - 85) emphasised increased
agricultural production. To translate this into 
reality, the plan contended that agricultural 
cooperatives must be developed and financed.
As early as 1952, the importance of Cooperatives as a 
means of increasing agricultural productivity, had 
gained much prominence in Government policy papers. 
In the Western Region where cocoa was the mainstay of 
the economy, the Regional government policy paper on 
cooperative societies of June 1952 emphasised that
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"the extension of cooperative cocoa marketing should 
be encouraged and pushed with ultimate aim of the 
Cooperatives controlling the export of cocoa produced 
in the Western Region," The question as to whether 
this aim was achieved in the course of subsequent 
development of Cooperatives in Nigeria, has formed 
part of our investigation.
Our major finding is that cooperatives to date have 
not been able to achieve total control of the export 
market. They have failed to obtain full Government 
support for their quest for a full control of the 
marketing of their members cocoa. The finding is that 
cooperatives in Nigeria suffer excessive Government 
control attendant on their high dependence on 
Government staff, as well as Government economic and 
political policies. The dependence on Government has 
resulted in the cooperatives' inability to strive for 
self-reliance, a situation that has continued to the 
present time. The mechanism of control has been 
through cocoa pricing and marketing policies 
introduced since 1947. Henceforth, the cooperatives 
were integrated into the Cocoa Marketing Board's 
structure as sub-licensed buying agents. The advent 
of formal independence in 1960 did not alter the 
situation. The new Government fostered the growth of 
cooperatives in general, but did not change the 
structure of the marketing boards because they were
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seen as useful instruments in pursuing their 
development policies.
There was also consensus opinion among the farmers 
that the Government's policy towards cooperative 
marketing has not been very consistent. The farmers 
showed strong resentment over Government's 'lip- 
service' to the Cooperatives as a rural organisation. 
The majority of the farmers, especially cocoa farmers 
who could not market their produce through unofficial 
channels, felt betrayed over the initial effort of the 
Cooperatives to control the export market for cocoa. 
The Government frustrated this initial desire by the 
Cooperatives through an insistence, against the will 
of the latter, that all cocoa exports must pass 
through the marketing boards,
One of the first steps taken to control the 
cooperatives was the evolution of the Cooperative Law 
in 1935 which conferred a distinctive status on 
cooperative societies. Under the ordinance,
cooperative societies became bodies incorporated and 
controlled by the Cooperative Registrar. It has been 
the statutory responsibility of the registrar to 
initiate action, approve rules and check abuses of 
cooperatives in Nigeria. The control by Government 
through the office of the Registrar, meant that 
cooperatives were not truly independent and remained
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only in the interests of the state. Cooperatives in 
Nigeria have never truly represented the interests of 
the peasants.
In the five years since the abolition of the Marketing 
Boards in Nigeria in 1986, the desire for the 
cooperatives to control cocoa marketing has not 
materialised. Our findings reveal that much as the 
cooperatives have been very successful in their price 
decisions on non-exportable commodities, the 
Government still undertakes to fix domestic prices for 
cocoa, contrary to their promise to de-regulate the 
market for agricultural produce. We have appraised 
the price policy implemented through the marketing 
boards. The result of our analysis using time series 
data generated over the period 1948/67, showed that 
the price policy adopted by the government contributed 
to a price instability. No statistical analysis by 
itself can be conclusive in such matters. However, 
when our study is supported by theoretical analysis, 
it does constitute a powerful argument which must be 
taken seriously.
Theoretically, we know that agricultural supply is 
elastic. Thus, any changes in price would produce a 
proportionate change in supply. In other words, any 
drop in agricultural price would produce a 
proportionate fall in agricultural productivity. Our
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analysis show that on many occasions the government 
varied cocoa prices which could cause cocoa output to 
fall. Generally speaking, the Nigerian agricultural 
sector has always responded vigorously to price 
changes. Although, there is no statistical evidence 
to support this claim, the experience of the 1960's is 
still fresh in most minds. The responses to the food 
scarcity caused by the Civil War of the late 1960's is 
an ample example. During the war, the demand for food 
was very high and the subsequent rise in price spurred 
many farmers to increase supply. This experience in 
the food sector which is not under the control of the 
government indicates that Nigerian farmers are 
responsive in their allocative decisions to relative 
market prices. Thus, one can safely say that the 
cocoa marketing policy which alters producer prices 
could have a long-term effect of decreasing output.
One general question raised with my respondents at the 
Cooperative Department, Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture, was, in view of very close relationship 
between the Government and cooperatives, whether it 
makes sense to allow the Government to continue to fix 
cocoa prices while the Cooperative Department 
continues formally to carry responsibility for other 
marketing arrangements. The present institutional 
arrangements reflect the fact that the Government 
originally abolished the marketing boards in order to
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allow cooperatives and others control of the 
agricultural market. The findings from our interviews 
is that the rationale is altered. The cooperatives 
have never been able to control cocoa marketing to 
date. The effects of this policy on the cooperatives' 
self-management is summarised below.
7.2__Effect of Cocoa Marketing Policies on the _____ Cooperatives Democracy____________________
The principle of coperatives' democratic control
demands that for any cooperative organisation to
fulfil the basis of their formation, that is, the
promotion of members' interests, members should
determine for themselves what their needs are and thus
provide the necessary guidelines in the formulation of
the policies affecting them.
The general meeting of the members of a cooperative 
society is the supreme authority with regard to the 
conduct of the affairs of the society. The affairs of 
the cooperative shall be administered in accordance 
with the democratically expressed will of the members. 
The society's management shall be elected or appointed 
in a manner agreed by the members. The management 
shall be accountable to the members. The members 
shall enjoy equal rights of voting and participation 
in decisions affecting their society.
Complementary to this principle is the importance of
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cooperative education. If independence and self- 
government is the essence of the cooperative movement, 
it is quite obvious, that the first condition of 
success is that every member should have a knowledge 
of democratic procedures. This knowledge depends on 
the quality of cooperative education.
Our analysis of the cocoa marketing cooperatives for 
the period under study has shown that the cooperatives 
in Nigeria have not been able to control their own 
affairs and train their members to effectively run the 
organisations. The main reason for this is the 
excessive control of the cocoa marketing cooperatives 
by the Government through the cocoa marketing 
policies. The involvement of government in the 
affairs of Nigerian cocoa marketing cooperatives has 
affected the cooperatives democracy in the following 
ways :
Our major finding is that government set the goals for 
the cocoa marketing cooperatives in Nigeria. This is 
against the principle of cooperatives democratic 
control which demands that the objectives set for a 
cooperative must, in the first place, be those of the 
members, their elected members and their elected 
leaders, not those of government which is seeking to 
control them or civil servants who are remote from 
them. When choice and responsibilities are taken from
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the cooperatives, the effect could be on goals 
becoming indistinct and confusing and results 
disappointing for all concerned (See the finding of 
Idowu Commission discussed in Chapter 6).
The Cooperative Department in Nigeria is headed by a 
Registrar. We had the privilege of interviewing the 
assistant Registrar and few other senior officials of 
the department. We found the position of the 
Registrar very powerful. • He has public authority 
over the registration of all cooperative organisations 
in Nigeria. The Registrar and his senior officers 
derived their powers from the Cooperative Law. This 
coercive law gives them the power of "life and death" 
over any cooperative organisation in Nigeria, even to 
the extent of interfering in virtually all internal 
affairs of the societies. He has the power to appoint 
managers and senior officers of all cooperative 
societies in Nigeria. The general complaint heard 
from the farmers in our sample, is that the 
bureaucratic system allowed the appointment of a 
Registrar and officers of the Cooperative Department 
who know little or nothing about cooperatives and who 
often moved out of their position by the time they learn 
something about cooperation. These practices affect 
the aspect of cooperatives' democracy which demands 
that election or appointment of any cooperative 
management should be carried out in a manner agreed by
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the members and that management should be accountable 
to the members. The failure to adopt cooperative 
principle in the appointment of Cooperative Officer 
has resulted in the appointment of corrupt and 
inefficient leaders (see the evidences given during 
the hearing of Idowu Commission of Inquiries, 
discussed earlier).
Generally, we found the Cocoa Marketing Cooperatives' 
policy in Nigeria to be a means of directing policy 
and reserving powers of control over the marketing of 
cocoa to the government. The Cooperative Ordinance of 
1935 left the fate of the Nigerian Cooperatives in the 
hands of the Cooperative Registrar and his senior 
officers. By 1947 the government passed the Marketing 
Board's Ordinance which gave the government the 
monopoly powers of fixing cocoa prices. The Ordinance 
led to the structuring of the cooperatives into three 
management levels (See figure 6.1 in Chapter 6). 
Henceforth, marketing cooperatives are compelled to 
act as licence buying agents and accept officially 
fixed cocoa prices against the interest of their 
members- The law which relegated the cooperatives to 
the position of a licence buying agent and compelled 
them to accept fixed cocoa prices is an infringement 
of cooperatives democracy. The law affected the right 
of the cooperative to market members' cocoa according 
to the democratically expressed will of its members or
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the influence of market force which all cooperators 
preferred instead of government fixed prices.
Democracy is the very essence of cooperation for the 
reason that, as said by the ICÀ Principles Commission 
of 1966,
"the primary and dominant purpose of a 
Cooperative Society is to promote the 
interest of the members....And what 
constitutes the interest of the 
membership is best determined by the 
members themselves".
The experience of Nigerian cocoa marketing 
cooperatives have showed total government control 
contrary to the recommendation of the International 
Cooperative Alliance.
The ILO Recommendation No, 127 of 1966 entitled 
"Cooperatives (Developing Countries) Recommendation" 
says :
"governments should formulate and carry out 
a policy under which cooperatives receive 
aid and encouragement...without effect on 
their independence and such aid should not 
entail any obligations contrary to the 
independence or interests of cooperatives 
and should be designed to encourage rather
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than replace the initiative and effort of the 
members".
The above recommendation shows that there can be no 
imposed cooperation. The essence of all cooperative 
movement is in its non-official, self dependent and 
self-reliant character. The effect of the
undemocratic practices established in this study, 
would have been avoided if the ILO Recommendations and 
those discussed in Section 3.5 were taken seriously by 
the Nigerian governments.
It will thus be seen that the democracy of the 
cooperatives is a must, not merely for the sake of 
compliance with cooperative principles but more 
because cooperative action will not bear full fruit 
until the cooperatives are free. Thus we shall be 
recommending for a full cooperative autonomy in the 
next section.
7.3 Recommendations
The summary of our finding is that cocoa marketing 
cooperatives in Nigeria is an instrument for the 
administration and implementation of a general 
economic policy managed by the governments. The 
objective, scope and methods of the society are 
planned and prescribed by the government. We did not 
find any practical evidence to show that it is direct
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personal interest of the members which is the motive 
for active participation in the development of the 
society. The cooperative action was brought into 
being by way of compulsory membership, compulsory sale 
of cocoa to the Cocoa Marketing Board and 
administrative control levels by the government.
The major effect of excessive government control are 
official corruption, inefficient administration and 
the inability of the cooperative to control the 
marketing of members' cocoa and train their members in 
cooperatives' democratic procedure. At the moment, 
there exist built-in disincentives for the marketing 
cooperatives to break away from Government control. 
To date, cooperatives in Nigeria still receive grants, 
supervision and inspection from the Department of 
Cooperatives, These supported and encouraged the 
maintenance of the Government over the cooperatives. 
It needs to be replaced by a system which would 
promote the cooperatives' ability for self-government. 
There is no doubt that "as long as the Government pays 
the piper, it will continue to dictate the tune of the 
piper".
Our suggestion did acknowledge the fact that the 
Government still has a duty of care for the 
cooperatives, but such care should be limited to 
providing training schemes and enforcement of
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cooperative laws and principles. Financial support 
should no longer take the form of advances or outright 
grant but soft loan with reasonable terms and 
condition of repayment.
Since a great deal of the effects of Government's 
cocoa marketing policy could be traced to members' 
ignorance as well as leaders' lack of responsibility 
and commitment to cooperatives' ideas and principles, 
we recommend a comprehensive training programme for 
both members and their leaders. The membership 
education must address the practical problems
affecting the Nigerian cooperative movement in
general. The type of training currently run by the 
Department of Cooperatives is inadequate.
The current training programme is meant only for the 
cooperative inspectors who receive no instruction on 
cooperative ideals and principles. The ambitious one 
year syllabus designed for the cooperative inspectors 
at the Cooperative College, Ibadan, is composed of 
bookkeeping, economics, law relating to the
cooperatives, duties of cooperative inspectors, 
secretaries, committees, social psychology, rural
sociology, communication, statistics and business 
management. (164) Our recommendation is that
(164) See Cooperative College, Ibadan Prospectus, 1968 - 69, Government Printers, Ibadan, 1968, p.4
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the facilities at Cooperative Colleges should be 
expanded to include training places for both leaders 
and cooperative members. The scope of the syllabus 
should be widened to include democratic procedures, 
guidance on the complicated problem of cocoa farming, 
harvesting and processing. The training should also 
include the histories and the success stories of early 
cooperative societies such as Rochdale Equitable 
Pioneers Society.
The question of ignorance on the part of members 
should be tackled if absolute independence from the 
government is to be achieved. It is absolutely 
essential that both leaders and members should learn 
cooperative principles because the movement's 
principle of democratic management stipulates that 
responsibility for the general affairs of the 
societies should be the concern of every member of the 
society. All the past and present leaders tend to be 
drawn from the elite class with formal education but 
no knowledge of cooperative principles. They are men 
with some education, who possess the tangible benefits 
of literacy over the oridnary members and are also 
accorded relatively high status. Ordinary members who 
are mainly the illiterate farmers tended to defer to 
those of their members who are able to understand 
documentation and deal with Government functionaries 
on an equal footing. Thus, all the marketing 
cooperatives, consisting of mainly cocoa farmers, have
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a tendency to have leaders with some formal education 
but with a minimal knowledge of cooperative education. 
For example, some well known leaders like E.P. Folarin 
attended St. Andrew's Theological College. Ayoade who 
was a retired railway booking clerk; Odeyenin a former 
reporter to the Daily Times of Nigeria and Chief 
Samuel Abiodun, a successful businessman, are few of 
the many coperative leaders with good formal education 
but lacking in cooperative knowledge before heading 
their cooperative unions. The education and skill of 
these leaders has been used to gain advantages and 
exercise control over the membership other than to 
forward the interest of their members. Lipset has 
pointed out that the wider the status gap between 
leaders and members in any organisation, the stronger 
and more cohesive will be the leaders. (165)
Thus, the standard of cooperative education 
recommended here must be such that ordinary members 
could benefit by knowing the essence of cooperative 
principles. All the five principles of cooperatives 
are straightforward and can be learned easily even by 
the less intelligent members. This suggestion was 
successfully tried in India when faced with a similar 
situation in 1959:
(165) See Lipset, S.M., The Political Process in Trade Union. 1963, pp. 369-370
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"Certificates should be given on the passing 
of a simple examination, given orally to 
members or prospective members who cannot 
read or write. Such certificates should be 
required at least for eligibility to 
office in the society." (166)
The importance of membership education was also 
highlighted by the Caxton-Idowu Commission of Inquiry 
into the Ibadan Coperative Produce Marketing Union 
Ltd., in 1963, The Commission blamed the corruption 
and inefficiency of the cooperative leaders on lack of 
cooperative education when it remarked that:
"It is regrettable that no serious thought . 
has been given to the question of cooperative 
training....there is no consistent training 
scheme and training is spasmodic in some 
places," (167)
As a solution to the unsatisfactory system of the 
marketing cooperatives administration, the Commission
(166) See Hough, E.M., The Cooperative Movement in India. 4th Ed. London, 1959. p.367(167) See Caxton-Idowu Commission, Op. cit. p.8
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recommended that the Government should evolve a 
training scheme aimed at educating ordinary 
cooperative members on the basic principles of 
cooperative management.
There is no doubt that if these faults in the 
cooperative marketing Cooperative are rectified, the 
Society will surely increase its share in the cocoa 
trade. Without Government control, the cooperative 
could sell members' cocoa to the highest bidder. By 
selling to the highest bidder or obtaining the best 
price possible, the cooperative members would be 
encouraged to produce more, which would benefit the 
farmers by way of increased income and in the long run 
benefit the economy, by way of increased earnings from 
cocoa exports.
One may argue at this point that the quality of the 
produce sold by members might be below standard 
whereas if they were controlled by the Government, 
Government inspectors would ensure that the required 
standard of quality be maintained. This argument will 
be defeated on the grounds that for a good number of 
years cooperatives have been appointed licensed buying 
agents for cocoa and have acted successfully in this 
capacity. Thus, with many years of marketing 
experience, the cooperatives are quite capable of 
organising the export sales of their members' cocoa
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and ensure high standards through quality inspection 
and membership education on processing and quality 
maintenance.
There is no doubt that the present Cocoa Marketing 
Cooperative law need to be reformed as one step 
towards the establishment of true Cooperative Society. 
As we have noted earlier, cocoa marketing policy in 
Nigeria is to a greater extent a symbol of ultimate 
authority over cocoa marketing cooperatives. The 
policy in general runs counter to the most basic 
concepts underlying cooperative organisations. The 
proposed legislation should provide adequate and clear 
policies on cooperation, regulating the rights and 
duties of cooperatives and their members, their 
liability, legal personality and the like without 
affecting their democracy.
The government should establish information and 
inspection services to the cooperatives. The service 
will encourage and play advisory and supervisory role 
to the cooperatives. It is hoped that through such 
regular inspection and supervision service, official 
corruption and abuse of office can be prevented. 
Regular inspections and audit checks are also the 
means of ensuring that both union leaders and members 
adhere to the cooperative principles.
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Government should also provide financial assistance to 
the cooperatives in the form of loans and grants. 
Lack of working capital for the cooperatives and 
investment capital for members were widely observed 
during my field work. The corrupt practices of 
cooperative leaders meant that a great majority of the 
cooperative funds had been diverted for private uses 
as evidenced in Caxton-Idowu's report (Op. cit). In 
agricultural production, credit is essential in 
increasing output and raising the level of income for 
the producers. In a developing country like Nigeria, 
few farmers can save enough from their meagre earnings 
to enable them to take full advantage of the ever- 
increasing range of improved techniques and tools 
which modern science has made available for profitable 
farming. Numerous inventions and innovations which 
are products of farming technology would have no 
meaning to mankind if they were not put into actual 
practice on the farm. But adoption of such devices 
involves a lot of capital outlay which the average 
Nigerian cocoa farmer cannot finance from his savings. 
Credit has thus become an important tool in modern 
agriculture.
Amongst the majority of farmers in our representative 
sample, the need for financial help arises from both 
the low level and seasonal nature of farm income. 
With an average of twenty acres of cocoa farm, the
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level of income to the farmers is low. With low level 
of income, savings or surplus after consumption are 
small. And since it is only what is saved that can be 
invested, a low level of savings leads to low level of 
investment in new cocoa trees. Even when income is 
adequate and regular, there is often the need for 
medium or long-term credit to purchase fixed capital, 
increase labour utilisation and promote the growth and 
continuity of income. These considerations explain 
that farmers in general can do very little towards 
adopting improved farm practices or marketing farm 
products efficiently without financial help.
In accordance with cooperative principles and practice 
and by their nature, cooperative marketing unions are 
allowed to obtain unsecured advances for the purchase 
of cocoa from the Cooperative Bank established in 
September 5, 1953. The implementation of the credit 
policy of the bank was fraught with corruption- Due 
to misuse and misappropriation, the cooperatives 
invariably failed to repay most part of the advances 
and the Cooperative banks were left with nothing to 
fall back upon. The position was very bad in the case 
of Cooperative Bank Limited, Ibadan, which nursed a 
debt of 2 million pounds owed by defaulting 
cooperatives in 1966.
Many appeals to successive Governments to come to the
273
aid of the Bank by accepting responsibility for all 
the advances which the Bank has made in pursuance of 
Government policies have not been responded to as at 
the time of compiling this report. Our recommendation 
is that government should provide direct financial 
assistance to the cooperatives. However, such help 
should be supplementary only, in order to ensure that 
cooperatives attempt to provide as far as possible for 
their own financial needs. Cooperatives could 
generate their own funding through members' share- 
capital, reserves built up from undistributed trading 
surpluses and voluntary deposits by members. The 
provision of government grants or loan taken up by the 
cooperatives would give them greater autonomy than the 
present advance system fraughted with corruption and 
mismanagement. The existing advance system is like a 
"tied aid" to developing countries. Â tied aid bonds 
a recipient country to one form of agreement or 
another to the donor country. The advance system 
binds the cooperatives to a permanent indebtedness to 
the government, thereby, ensuring government control 
of the cooperatives.
Finally, we recommend the withdrawal of the government 
from the position of a manager and controller of the 
cocoa marketing cooperatives in Nigeria. The 
suggested role of government in relation to the 
marketing cooperatives should be one of active
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assistance, intended to stimulate self-help, self- 
reliance and self-administration without affecting 
cooperatives' independence. Government should, in 
addition, promote conditions under which cooperatives 
will thrive and develop. Cooperatives are essentially 
independent and voluntary organisations of 
participants. They are not organisations of which 
membership is by compulsion or coercion. Nigerian 
governments should appreciate these cooperative's 
tradition and limit their involvement to giving 
encouragement and advice, coordinating and exercising 
supervision.
It is crystal clear that in order to avoid past 
mistakes, there should be a change in the past cocoa 
marketing policy. A system should be evolved for the 
independent cooperative marketing^ processing and 
storage of cocoa. The domestic price should be 
influenced by the demand and supply situation in the 
world cocoa market. Evidence has shown that past 
attempts to regulate cocoa marketing have resulted in 
abysmal failure. Hence, the recommended role of the 
Federal government should be more of supervision than 
that of control. The cooperatives should be free to 
operate in a genuine spirit of self-help through 
mutual help.
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7.4 Conclusions
We have examined the cocoa marketing cooperatives' 
policy, 1947-67 and its effect on the democratic 
principle of cooperation. Our finding defied the 
orthodox definition of cooperative. The experience of 
the cocoa marketing cooperatives in Nigeria for the 
period under study contrasted the experience in the 
Western world where cooperatives operate in a free 
economic system and do not suffer from serious 
restrictions. The Cooperative policy in the Western 
free economies is largely for the purpose of 
establishing their legitimacy and securing the special 
features of cooperative organisation, but in Nigeria 
it is as well a means of reserving the power of 
control to the government and giving rights to civil 
servants over internal affairs and management of the 
marketing cooperatives.
The erosion of the cooperative system as a self- 
governing movement has made it extremely difficult to 
study cooperation in Nigeria within a general 
conceptual framework of cooperation. For example, we 
noted in Section 3.5 of this study, that under a 
capitalist system which characterised the economics of 
the Western countries, there exists only one form of 
capitalist organisation and a single style of 
management. Thus, in order for the Cooperatives to 
survive and prosper within the system, they must adopt
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the prevailing mode of organisation and the mono-style 
management. Subversion of cooperative organisations 
in any capitalist society, therefore, would stem 
entirely from the wider capitalist relations of 
production. In other words, it is not possible for an 
isolated cooperative to change the wider forces and 
relation of production that have developed under 
capitalism and instead subject itself to requirement 
of the wider system, especially, with regards to 
competition and profit maximisation.
Contrary, to this commonly held view of cooperation in 
Capitalist economies, though debatable, we find 
subversion of cooperatives in Nigeria as a necessary 
consequence of government intervention in cooperative 
management. The idea of adopting democratic system of 
management by the marketing cooperatives in Nigeria is 
an illusion from an economic point of view, in that 
the cooperatives cannot implement decisions against 
government policies. But worse still, the democratic 
decision of the cooperative became more and more 
restricted by the government insistence that 
cooperatives must make maximum contribution to 
national economic development. In the Fourth National 
Development Plan, 1981 - 85, like other past
Development Plans, the government succinctly expressed 
its desire to make use of cooperatives for the 
implementation of its development programmes. To
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ensure government control, cooperatives' organisation 
were first administered by the Colonial Cooperative 
Department. The Ministry of Cooperative was created 
in the early years of self-government and was 
dissolved in 1978 as a result of the austerity measure 
adopted by the government, the Cooperative Department 
was transferred to the Ministry of Employment, Labour 
and Productivity. Later in 1979, a new department was 
formed and named the Federal Department of 
Agricultural Cooperatives (FDAC). The Cooperative 
Department is headed by a Registrar whose duty is to 
manage the affairs of the Nigeria Cooperatives, Thus, 
the principle of democratic control, which is the 
liberation of cooperatives, whereby members dominate 
the process of decision making, is unrealisable in an 
economy which allows state control of the cooperatives 
for national economic goals. In a condition of 
development, no right thinking person would expect 
cooperatives in Nigeria to operate without due regards 
for national development goals. What the cooperators 
in our sample object to, is the movement being 
manipulated by civil servants who have no 
responsibility to the members of cooperatives.
As a matter of opinion, we do not object to what the 
Nigerian governments had done or tried to accomplish, 
but only to have done it under the name of cooperation 
and calling the resultant practice "cooperative", when
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it is not. As long as government calls the system it 
creates and controls by the name "Cooperative", the 
people will never know the true meaning of cooperation 
and may end up being confused. For example, there is 
existing confusion as to the difference between a 
producer cooperative and a marketing cooperative.
Theoretically, we know that producer cooperatives or 
production cooperatives is a joint production as a 
community. The proceeds of the joint production 
effort is shared out amongst members in proportion to 
individual contribution to the joint effort. The 
surplus we mean here is strictly different from profit 
of a purely commercial undertaking where production is 
market oriented and directed to profit maximisation. 
This contrasts with the cooperative which aims at 
covering costs. In a production cooperative
undertaking, the aim of having a surplus could be 
directed towards the highest possible return on the 
labour of the members. (168) Thus, surplus is the 
difference between total revenue and total labour cost 
of members plus general expenditure.
(158) See Dulfer, E. "Operational Efficiency of Agricultural Cooperatives in Developing Countries", F.A.O.. 1974, p. 71
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The aim of the production cooperative is the promotion 
of the income of its members from their labur, working 
on a simple communal farming enterprise to which the 
members contribute their labour. In other words, a 
farmer who becomes a member of a production 
cooperative ceases to be an independent producer. He 
surrenders the freedom of his position as an owner or 
lease-holder of his own holding and enters into a 
dependent relationship as an employee with the 
collective farming enterprise. Members of the 
production Cooperative do not often join voluntarily. 
It is usually an attempt to nationalise farming 
enterprise as in the case of former Soviet Union or 
farm settlement, as in the case of Nigeria during the 
late 1960's and 1970's when the government decided to 
form small holding farms into a large farm settlement. 
(169)
Neither of these cases has proved very successful. 
The only recorded successful farm-settlement in 
developing countries, is the Israeli 'Kibbutzim', The 
Israeli experience was shaped by the following 
exceptional circumstances.
a) Those involved were groups of immigrants, in the 
early years of the new State of Israel. These
(169) See Federal Ministry of Information Report on the Second All-Nigeria Cooperative Seminar, 11th April, 1966 Lagos, 1968, p. 36
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immigrants were principally from Europe, whose 
immediate background was not in agriculture.
The people saw themselves as pioneers and had 
no reluctance to work hard. The pioneering 
effort was aimed at the defence of the new 
Jewish State in a hostile environment in 
the cultivation of the desert and in the country's 
economic development. The entire members of 
Kibbutzim worked very hard for the general good 
of their country.
b) The immigrants who became the members of the 
Kibbutzim had absolutely no need to surrender 
individual farms or private landholdings 
because all the land which were settled was in the 
ownership of the Jewish Agency. The government 
ensured absolute equality amongst men and 
women involved in Kubbutzim in relation to the 
work and decision-making process. The 
government was also very successful in 
'campaigning for the superiority of the communal 
lifestyle of Kibbutzim without imposing it on 
members by compulsion. The influence derived 
from the political campaigns created prestige, 
good moral and incentive to make Kibbutzim 
very successful. The members saw themselves 
as actors in the making of a new Jewish
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nation. All these culminated in the success 
of Jewish farm settlement programme. (170)
This type of cooperative is different from what is 
known to be marketing cooperatives. The objective of 
a marketing cooperative is to bring together the 
relatively small amounts of crops produced by members, 
and sell them in bulk at the highest obtainable price.
The marketing cooperatives, by bringing together the 
small lots of members' produce and selling in bulk, 
can both exercise a strong influence on price and make 
profit which would otherwise go to the middlemen or 
dealers.
As a means of increasing market share, marketing 
cooperative also work towards improvements in quality 
or the grading of the product on the basis of quality, 
size, colour, shape and the like. The grading or 
quality control measure makes it possible to conform 
to market requirements in order to obtain the highest 
price for their produce. Thus the price received by 
the cooperative is influenced by the market situation
(170) See Landau, Y.H. and Konopnicki, M.(eds), Rural Comunities. 1976
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at any given time.
Membership of a marketing cooperative ideally is 
voluntary and available without artificial restriction 
or any social, political or religious discrimination, 
to all persons who intend to use its service as long 
as the applicant is ready and willing to accept 
duties, obligations and responsibilities of 
membership. Marketing Cooperatives are democratic 
organisations in that their affairs are administered 
by persons elected or appointed in a manner agreed by 
the members and accountable to them. Members enjoy 
equal voting right and participate in decisions 
affecting their societies.
Any surplus or savings, if any, arising out of the 
operation of the society belongs to the members and 
are shared in such a manner as would avoid one member 
gaining at the expense of the other. This could be 
done either by the provision for development of the 
business of the society or by distribution among the 
members in proportion to their transaction with the 
society.
Marketing Cooperatives require a considerable amount 
of capital. They need investment capital for 
buildings and equipment for drying, processing, 
fumigation, storage, transportation and the like,
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They also need working capital for loans and advances 
to their members for produce delivered to the society. 
The payment for produce to the society precedes the 
resale by the cooperative of its members' produce. 
Marketing Cooperatives are financed through share 
capital provided by its members and sometimes 
augmented by reserve fund built up from retained 
trading surpluses which were not distributed amongst 
its members.
The above characteristics of an ideal marketing 
cooperative contrasted those of marketing cooperatives 
in Nigeria. Our finding was that the cocoa marketing 
cooperatives in Nigeria for many years were forced to 
act as Licenced buying agents to the Cocoa Marketing 
Board. The authorities required that members of the 
cooperative shall be obliged to deliver their cocoa to 
a cooperative buying centre. The cocoa marketing 
cooperative are also in turn obliged to supply the 
government marketing boards. The government enjoyed 
the monopoly power of decision-making and price fixing 
for cocoa. The choice of the type of cocoa marketing 
cooperative in Nigeria is not the choice of members 
but a political choice. The government took the 
initiative in setting up the cocoa marketing 
cooperative and subsequently encouraging and 
influencing them. The membership were made compulsory 
and the organisational structure imposed by the
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government (See figure 6.1 Chapter 6).
The control exercised by the government over the cocoa 
marketing cooperative has the effect of slowly 
eliminating the internal energy of self determination, 
self-supporting, self-government and the latent 
sources of economic potentiality that could have 
developed under a free cooperative enterprise. The 
introduction of compulsion in membership and 
undemocratic decision-making takes away the real 
cooperative character and makes it impossible to talk 
of this type of cooperative as a self-help farmers 
organisation.
However, the evidence of inefficiency and offical 
corruption presented in this study showed that the 
autonomy of the cooperatives is a must not merely for 
the sake of compliance with cooperative ideology but 
more because cooperative actions will not bear full 
fruit until it is free.
Finally, we must stress that if the cocoa marketing 
cooperative in Nigeria were to achieve self- 
government, the first condition for success is that 
every member should have a basic knowledge of 
democratic procedure in order that the temptation and 
pitfalls that accounted for the past failures should 
be avoided. There is no doubt that the only guarantee
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tp cooperatives' efficient and democratic 
administration is the quality of its members. This 
quality is to a large extent, dependent on cooperative 
education. Cooperative education is recommended here 
because we perceive that the reaslisation of workers' 
participation depends on the fulfilment of the 
educational function. The importance of education is 
recognised in all social and economic systems. The 
history of Rochdale Equitable Pioneer Society in 
England, referred to in Chapter 3, has shown that 
education has a unique place in the cooperative 
movement. The Society was not only interested in 
educating members in the business of cooperation but 
also a wider understanding of good citizenship.
The final objective in view should be to build up a 
cooperative marketing organisation which is self- 
supporting. Government control should be replaced by 
a system which would allow all members to attend 
general meetings during which affairs of the society 
should be directed. Each member should be entitled to 
one vote during the general meeting. The general 
meeting should formulate and approve byelaws and other 
issues affecting the society. The general meeting 
could appoint a management committee to carry out the 
policies decided upon. The committee should be 
accountable to the general meeting and responsible for 
conducting the day to day business of cooperative
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marketing. The committee should protect the assets of 
the cooperatives and ensure that accounts are kept and 
are in accordance with the rules agreed upon at the 
general meeting. The committee should be given the 
power to delegate responsibilities to the leaders of 
primary marketing societies. The committee should 
also ensure that the local leaders carry out the 
decision of the general meeting and also inspect the 
books and records of the primary marketing societies.
In concluding this Chapter, we wish to stress that this 
study acknowledges the difficulties which may arise in 
implementing these recommendations. The
implementation of the principle of democratic control 
may not be easy in practice, as the cooperatives have 
to survive in our competitive world. It is important, 
however, that the cooperatives must find a way of 
putting their principles into practice as there is no 
other way cooperatives could fulfil the basis of their 
formation, that is, as institutions of self-help 
through mutual help. The principle to some extent 
indicates who the members are and allows them the 
right to determine for themselves what is their common 
need and how the need would be mutually met through 
active participation of all members.
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Appendix I
Linguistic Social Groups in Nigeria
Hausa & Fulani
O ther Northern Groups
r Yoruba
O thers
Ibibio
kilometers 300
Adopted from new Geography of Nigeria, Ileoje, M.P op. cit.
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Appendix III
The Geographical Location of Nigeria in Africa
Algiers
Tripoli Cairo
Dakar . Kano NdjamenaAccra^^NIG I^A
Lagos i ( Addis AbabaFreetown
Johannesburg
km 1600
Adopted from New Geography of Nigeria, Ileoje, M.P Op. Cit.
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Appendix IV
Content: of Questionnaire No. 1 Administered on 2 50 Cocoa Farmers
1 o1 Farmers
1.1 The farmers name
1.2 The farm settlement and name of the village
1.3 The farmers age and marital status
1.4 The farmers family, number of wives, 
children and dependants
1.5 The level of farmers educational
qualification or any cooperative training.
1, 2 The Farmer's Farming Land
1.2.1 Location of the land
1.2.2 The size of land owned and rented in 
acres
1.2.3 The size of land used for cocoa farming 
and the size used for other crops
1.2.4 How old are the cocoa trees and the 
period the land had remained cocoa farm?
1.2.5 How the land was acquired
1.2.6 Is it community or family land?
1.2.7 The distance of the farm from homestead
1.2.8 The distance from the settlement to the 
village and village to the market
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1.2.9 The type of soil in the cocoa farm and 
whether the soil is satisfactory
1.2.10 What types of input used and how the 
inputs were acquired
1,3 Membership of Cooperative
1.3.1 Membership of cooperative or any other 
marketing organisation
1.3.2 How long has the farmer remained member 
of the cooperative
1.3.3 What quantity of his cocoa is sold 
through the cooperative and other 
organisations
1.3.4 Present and previous membership of any 
agricultural organisation
1.3.5 The present knowledge of any 
agricultural organisations listing them 
in order of importance
1.3.6 The farmer's experience with marketing 
organisations and the role of the 
marketing organisation in improving the 
peasants output and income
1.4 Labour
1.4.1 Number of wives, children and 
dependents supplying labour at the 
farm.
1.4.2 Additional labour supply, is it by hire
292
or cooperative labour force?
1.4.3 The farmer's knowledge of farming and 
what he thinks of his methods compared 
to his parents
1.4.4 The farmer's source of credit and 
annual requirement
1.5 Sources of Market Information
1-5.1 Enumerate all sources of market 
information, i.e. radio, film, 
marketing boards, cooperatives, 
government officials, friends and 
family, and rank them in order of 
effectiveness
1.5.2 Who fixes the price of his crop i.e. 
government, marketing boards or the 
cooperatives?
1.5.3 Would he have preferred to have a say 
in the pricing of his goods, allow 
government to fix it or the market 
itself?
1.6 Land Use and Cropping Patterns
1.6.1 The main crops grown and livestock 
raised since Independence
1.6.2 Does price have any influence in his 
cropping decisions?
1.6.3 Does his cropping experience predate
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independence?
1.7 Production and Productivity
1.7.1 The acreage (hectarage) planted with 
cocoa before and after Independence 
and the proportion of his land left 
fallow and reasons
1.7.2 À comparison of the acreage of cocoa 
before and after Independence
1.7.3 Did his productivity increase after 
Independence
1-7.4 An evaluation of investment in new 
cocoa trees resulting from the 
Government's policy
1.8 Manor Problems
1-8,1 The major problems retarding the
development of cocoa, ranking them in 
order of their severity and effects in 
reducing the farmers yield
1.8.2 The major pests and diseases affecting 
cocoa yield and proposed solution
1.8.3 The Government's role in solving the
identified problems comparing pre- 
Independence Governments and the 
present Government
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1.9 Retrospect and Prospect
1.9.1 The contributions made by marketing 
agencies and other bodies to develop 
or under-develop cocoa farming
1.9.2 The role of pre-Independence and 
present government in improving cocoa 
productivity
1.9.3 All the factors both physical and 
human which have or have not helped 
the development of cocoa farming
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Appendix V
Content of Questions Administered on 100 Retired Government Officials
2.1 Personal Details
2.1.1 Name, Address
2.1.2 Retired officer's age and marital 
status
2.1.3 The officer's family, number of wives 
children and dependants
2.1.4 How long did he serve in the Government 
or Cooperative?
2.1.5 What is the reason for the retirement?
2.2 Training and Experience
2.2.1 Officer's qualification and when 
qualified
2.2.2 Officer's experience, the area, 
district, province where the interviewee 
worked
2.3 Agricultural Policv
2.3.1 The Government Ministries responsible 
for formulating and administering 
agricultural marketing policies, since 
the interviewee joined the Cooperative 
or Ministry
2.3.2 Which of the Ministries or agencies 
best suited to deal with agricultural 
problems?
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2.3.3 The number of cocoa farmers in the 
interviewees area
2.3.4 What is the aim of agricultural 
marketing policy and who dominates 
policy making, the government or 
cooperatives?
2.3.5 What is the main objective to be 
achieved?
2.3.6 The main method employed to achieve 
the objectives, ranking them in order 
of effectiveness
2.3.7 The adequacy or inadequacy of marketing 
policy and suggestion for improvements
2.4 Manor Problems and Measures
2.4.1 The problems hindering the interviewee's 
department from achieving the set
of objectives and proposed action to 
solve them
2.4.2 The major problems retarding the 
development of cocoa farming as the 
interviewee see them
2.5 Production and Productivity
2.5.1 The average yields per acre of cocoa 
crop grown by the peasants, 
differentiating between cooperators and 
non-cooperators.
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2.5.2 The main yield tendencies, whether 
increasing or decreasing during the 
interviewee's active years
2.5.3 The most profitable peasant cash crops 
and livestock, ranking them in order 
of profitability
2.5.4 The level of cocoa output resulting 
from Government's policies
2.5.5 The level of peasant income resulting 
from Government's agricultural policy.
2.7 Incut Supplies
2.7.1 The proportion of the interviewee's 
community farmers using new seeds, 
fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, 
compost, manure, etc. and their effect 
on output of cocoa
2.7.2 The adequacy and efficiency of the 
sources of the necessary agricultural 
inputs and general farming hardware
2.8 Organisations
2.8.1 What are the contributions made by 
different organisations towards 
promoting cocoa farming, ranking them 
in order of preference?
2.8.2 The contribution made by various 
Governmental departments, ranking them
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in order of preference
2.8.3 How effective has the marketing policy 
helped the cocoa farmers?
2.8.4 Is there any economic gain to be derived 
by the cocoa farmers if they should 
market jointly through the Cooperatives?
2.9 Cocoa Farming Patterns
2.9.1 The major peasant crops produced and 
livestock raised
2.9.2 The main cropping patterns
2.9.3 The tendency for intercropping amongst 
cocoa farmers, showing major crop 
combination and reasons for practice
2.9.4 The role of Government in current 
cropping patterns
2.10 Government Contribution
2.10.1 The role of pre-Independence Government 
in development or underdevelopment of 
cocoa farms, ranking them in order of 
importance
2.10.2 The role of post-Independence 
Government in under-development or 
development of cocoa farms, ranking 
them in order of importance
2.10.3 The pre-Independence and post- 
Independence Government's policy
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towards increasing the output of 
cocoa
2.10.4 Explain the fiscal role of Government 
marketing agencies if any
2.10.5 What is the nature of Government 
marketing agencies, their present role 
and future role?
2.10.6 What role has the marketing agencies 
play before and after Independence with 
regards to Government revenue?
2.10.7 General comments on cooperative and 
cocoa marketing policy
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Appendix VI 
Questionnaire Administered to the 
Active Cooperative Officials
3.1 The Aims and Objectives of the CooperativeDepartment
3.1.1 The overall aim of the Department on 
cocoa farming and marketing
3.1.2 The past, present achievements of the 
organisation with regards to marketing
3.1.3 What are the problems impairing the 
achievement of objectives?
3.1.4 What are the methods used in promoting 
cocoa farming?
3.1.5 What is the nature of the department's 
price policies?
3.1.6 What is the aims and objectives of the 
price policy?
3.1.7 What is the immediate price objective to 
be achieved?
3.2 Organisation
3.2.1 What is the nature of the organisation?
3.2.2 What are the sources of funds for the 
organisation, listing them in order of 
importance?
3.2.3 What is the size of the organisation, 
when did it start and its present?
301
3.3 Problems and Measures
3.3.1 What are the main problems facing cocoa 
farming, listing them in order of 
importance?
3.3.2 The solution prescribed and its 
effectiveness
3.3.5 What is the peasants response to the 
department's price and marketing 
policies?
3.3.5 Comparative response rate within given 
sets of selected in terms of area, age 
and sex
3.3.6 The effectiveness of the department's 
services to the farmers, i.e. use of 
input, and sales of farm produce
3.4 Contribution of Cooperative Department toCocoa Farming
3.4.1 The types of cooperatives engaged in 
cocoa farming and organisation's 
relationship with any of the identified 
cooperatives
3.4.2 The contributions made towards the 
development of cocoa farming, ranking 
them in order of contributions and 
failures
3.4.3 The interviewee's opinion on the 
usefulness of Government role in 
agricultural marketing
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3.4.4 The organisation working relationship 
with marketing agencies including 
other Government departments
3.4.5 The Department's opinion on pre- 
Independence policies on cocoa farming 
and marketing
3.5 Future Developments
3.5.1 The Department's evaluation of their 
future role in promoting cocoa marketing 
and productivity
3.5.2 Prospects for future changes in cocoa 
prices and peasant response
3.5.3 The present Government's policies 
towards cocoa farming and marketing, 
ranking them in order of priority
3.5.4 Interviewers personal comment on cocoa 
farming and marketing
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Appendix VIII
Contextual Definition of Terms used in this Thesis
4.1 Agricultural Inputs - include all factors used 
in production, namely, labour, land, capital, 
fertilizer, insecticides, herbicides, 
pesticides, fungicides, improved seeds, 
management services and extension services
4.2 Transformation a process which leads to 
improved changes in farmer's managerial 
efficiency in farming patterns and techniques 
which result in noticeable increase in 
productivity
4.3 Farming - is man's husbandry of the land, 
exercised through the tending of crops and 
livestock for both economic gain and 
subsistence
4.4 Inter-Cropping or mixed cropping, is an 
agricultural system in which several crops are 
cultivated simultaneously on the same piece of 
land with usually a major and minor crop. Most 
cocoa farmers practice mixed cropping. They 
grow side by side with cocoa trees some crops for 
subsistence. Cocoa is often the major
cash crop while food crops remain minor 
crops
4.5 Extension services - is an informal out-of­
school vocational service for training and
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influencing farmers and their families to 
adopt improved farming techniques, management, 
conservation and marketing.
4.6 Producer's Price - is the price paid to local
cocoa producers by marketing agencies
4.7 World Market Price - represents the price
marketing agencies receive by selling cocoa in
the World Commodity Markets
4.8 Imperialist ruling class - a ruling class who 
monopolised political power during the colonial 
era. They consisted of colonial Governors, 
resident officers, district officers (DO), 
merchants, financiers and those foreigners who 
were able to influence Government policies
4.9 Bourgeoisie - owners of the means of 
production, production, economic powers and 
able to influence economic policies
4=10 Petty Bourgeoisie - Nigerians serving the
interest of members of the ruling class and 
bourgeoisie. This class include Nigerian 
lawyers, teachers, clerks, agents of merchant 
houses, civil servants and so on
4.11 Exploitation - the application of cocoa earning 
to uses other than those that benefitted the 
producers
4.12 Degeneration - Deviation from practising the 
principles recommended by the International 
Cooperative Alliance (I.C.A.)
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Appendix IX
The Abbreviations Used in this Thesis
Co-op
NISER
ibid
etc.
Dept, 
Govt. 
Fig. 
i.e. 
AWAM
U.A.C.
N/A
No.
%
Vol.
N.P.A.
£
N.P.M.C,
R.P.D.B
PID
NACMO
Cooperative
Nigerian Institute of Social 
and Economic Research 
(Ibidem) in the same place 
(et cetera) and so on, and the 
rest
Department
Government
Figure
(id est) that is 
Association of West African 
Merchants
United Africa Company
Not available or Not applicable
Number
Percentage
Volume
Nigerian Ports Authority 
Pounds sterling 
Nigerian Produce Marketing 
Company
Regional Production Dev. Board 
Produce Inspection Division 
N a t i o n a l  A g r i c u l t u r a l  
Cooperative Marketing Organisation
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ÀDP
RBRDÀ
ISI
CUWM
ANGE
AGP
WNDC
WRFC
CRIN
ICA
TCPP
$
N
F.A.C.U. 
A.C.G.S.
Op. cit.
G . D o P «
Agricultural Development Project 
River Basin and Rural 
Development Authorities 
I m p o r t  S u b s t i t u t i o n  
Industrialisation 
Cooperative Union of Western 
Nigeria
Association of Nigerian 
Cooperative Exporters 
Action Group Party 
Western Nigeria Development 
Corporation
Western Region Finance 
Corporation
Cocoa Research Institute of 
Nigeria
International Cooperative 
Alliance
Technical Committee on Producer 
Prices
American Dollar 
Nigerian Naira
F e d e r a l  A g r i c u l t u r a l  
Coordinating Unit 
Agricultural Credit Guarantee 
Scheme
Referred above
Gross Domestic Product
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NpA.C.B. - Nigerian Agricultural And
Cooperative Bank 
Ph.D - Doctor of Philosophy
I.L.O. - International Labour Organisation
F.A.O, - Food And Agricultural Organisation
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APPENDIX X 
THE TERMS USED IN COCOA MARKETING
ACTUALS - The physical commodity as opposed to
future contracts,
ARBITRAGE - The simultaneous purchase and sale o £  
similar quantities of the same 
commodity in different markets, e.g. 
the purchase of New York Cocoa and 
the sale of London cocoa.
BACKWARDATION - When nearer dates or months are 
higher compared with more distant 
dates or months. SEE PREMIUM.
BID - An undertaking to purchase at a
specified price,
BEAR - One who is of the opinion that prices
will lower - "A Bear". A Market in
which prices are declining - "A Bear 
Market".
BULL - One who is of the opinion that prices
will rise - "A Bull". A Market in 
which prices are rising - "A Bull 
Market".
BEST (AT) “ i.e. "Buy at Best", or "Sell at
Best". An order to buy or sell at the 
best possible price.
CASH - A physical commodity for immediate
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delivery.
CALL (1) - A period in which trading is
conducted on a particular Market by 
a "Call Chairman" inviting Bids and 
Offers, usually held at the beginning 
and end of a trading session. Inter­
spersed with trading by open Outcry.
CALL (2) - Call Options - An option to declare
oneself as a buyer by a predetermined 
date for an agreed premium. (See 
Joynsons Commodity Guide on Option 
Trading).
CARRYING CHARGE - The cost of taking actual delivery 
in a given month, storing, financing 
and redelivering against the next 
delivery month on the same Market.
CERTIFICATED STOCK - Stocks of a Commodity that have 
been graded and appraised and passed 
as acceptable to be rendered on 
particular Futures Market.
CLEARING HOUSE - Viz. International Commodities 
Clearing House, An Institution with 
whom Futures Contracts are registered 
and through whom financial settlement 
is effected in the name of a 
Broker.
CLOSE (The) - The closing period or Call of a 
session.
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CLOSE (TO) - A transaction to liquidate an 
existing position.
CLOSING PRICE - The last quoted Buyers and Sellers 
prices recorded at the end of the 
trading session for each day.
COMMISSION - Commission or Brokerage charged
by Commodity Brokers for buying and 
selling on any of the Commodity 
Markets, minimum rates of Commission 
are laid down by each Market.
COMMISSION HOUSE - An Organisation that specialises 
in executing buying and/or selling 
orders for clients as opposed to 
trade activities,
CONTANGO “ When nearer dates or months are
quoted at a lower price than later 
dates or months. See DISCOUNT (1),
CONTRACT " The unit of weight laid down by the
individual markets as being the 
standard Contract, i.e. Cocoa in 
units of 10 tons, thus 5 Contracts =
50 tons.
DAY ORDER -=* Orders given at a limited price which
are valid for that day only and, if 
not executed are automatically 
cancelled at the end of the day.
DEPOSITS “ The amount required by brokers to act
as an original deposit against each
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bought or sold contract, on a Futures 
Market. The amount of deposit varies 
from market to market,
DIFFERENTIALS (1) - The difference in price between
various grade of the same commodity. 
DIFFERENTIALS (2) - The difference in price
between adjacent quoted months on the 
same Market,
DISCOUNT (1) - When nearer months or positions are
quoted at lower price than the more 
distant months or positions- 
DISCOUNT (2) - On some Markets, various grades or
qualities of a commodity are
tenderable - some inferior grades or 
qualities qualify for a discount 
below the basic contract price, the 
extent of the discount is 
predetermined, varying according to 
the grade or quality,
DOUBLE OPTION - An option to declare oneself either 
as a buyer or seller by a
predetermined date for an agreed 
premium. (See Joynsons Commodity 
Guide on Option Trading),
FIRST TENDER DAY - The first day upon which the
delivery of actual commodities
against Futures Markets transactions
may be affected and is usually the
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first trading day of the delivery 
month in question.
GOOD-TIL-CÀMCELLED (G.T.C.) - An order given, which 
will remain in force for execution at 
any time in the future until
cancelled.
HEDGE - The establishment of a position on a
Futures Market in the opposite
direction to the transactions made on 
an actual or physical market, i.e. a 
manufacturer buying cocoa beans would 
sell on the Futures Markets as a 
"HEDGE".
LAST TRADING DAY - The day on which trading ceases 
for a particular delivery month.
LIFE OF CONTRACT - The duration of the period for
which trading in a specific month on 
a particular market is possible, i.e. 
the day a new month is quoted until 
its expiration.
LIMIT (UP OR DOWN) - The maximum price movement up or 
down, permitted in any one trading 
session, as laid down by the rules of 
the individual markets.
LIMIT (ORDER) - An order to a broker, which is
restricted so far as the price level 
at which it may be transacted is 
concerned.
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LIQUIDATION - The closing out of a "long" or 
"bought" Contract. May also be used 
to denote the closing out of a 
"short" or "sold" position, this is 
usually termed as "covering".
LONG “ Term applied to a bought position on
a Futures Market.
LONG LIQUIDATION - The liquidation or closing out a
"long" or "bought" Contracts by 
selling to close out.
LOT - Standard weight of Contract. See
CONTRACT.
MARGIN - Funds remitted to broker in order that
original deposit is maintained,
MARGIN CALL - A request for additional funds,
necessary to maintain original 
deposits as the result of the adverse 
movement of the market.
MARKET ORDER - An order for immediate execution at 
prevailing market prices.
NOMINAL PRICE ~ Used to indicate a price when no
traded price is really available 
and/or buyers and sellers quotations 
are wide apart,
MINIMUM FLUCTUATION - The minimum amount a 
particular commodity is able to 
fluctuate, varies from market to 
market.
315
MAXIMUM FLUCTUATION - The maximum fluctuation that 
can occur in a predetermined period 
(usually one day's trading) laid down 
by the various markets.
OFFER - or OFFERED - An offer to sell at a given 
price.
OPENING - Term used when opening a fresh
commitment as opposed to closing or 
liquidating an existing commitment.
OPENING (THE) - Reference to the official call Over
at the start of a trading session.
OVERBOUGHT - A technical situation where a
market may have advanced too rapidly, 
due to excessive buying.
OVERSOLD - A technical situation where a Market
may have declined too rapidly due to 
excessive selling,
PREMIUM (1) - When nearer quoted months or dates
are quoted higher than more distant 
months or dates. See BACKWARDATION.
PREMIUM (2) - On some markets, various grades or
qualities of a commodity are 
tenderable - some superior grades or 
qualities qualify for a premium over 
and above the basic contract price, 
the extent of the premium is 
predetermined and varies with the 
grade or quality.
316
PUT - An option to declare oneself as a
seller by a predetermined date for an 
agreed premium. (See separate 
Joynsons Commodity Guide on Option 
Trading).
ROUND TURN - A completed transaction, viz, an 
initial purchase and a subsequent 
sales (or vice versa), of the same 
month which offset each other, on the 
same market.
SHORT - Term applied to a sold position on a
Futures Market.
SHORT COVERING - The covering of "short" or "sold"
positions, by buying back to close out 
the sold contract,
SPOT PRICE - The price at which the physical or 
actual commodity is selling for 
prompt delivery. In metal trading, 
this is called "Cash price".
STOP LOSS ORDER - An order which becomes operative 
only when the market reaches the 
level stipulated in the order, A 
"Buy" Stop Loss Order only becomes 
operative when the price is traded 
or bid, at, or above the "Stop Loss 
Limit" thereafter the order must be 
executed at best. A "Sell" Stop Loss 
Order adopts the reverse procedure in
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which the price must be either traded 
or offered at, or below the "Stop Loss 
Limit" before becoming operative. Stop 
Loss Orders are invariably used to open 
fresh commitments in the event of the 
market reaching a predetermined 
price, but they do not guarantee the 
fulfilment of the order at the 
precise price of the Stop Loss 
Limited, although this is usually 
possible, apart from wide price 
variations overnight.
STRADDLE - The simultaneous purchase of one
month and the sale of another month 
on the same Futures Market.
SWITCHING - The simultaneous liquidation of one
Futures commitment and establishment 
of another in the same Market.
TERMINAL MARKET - Another name for Futures markets.
TENDERS
VOLUME
Notice of intent to delivery the 
physical commodity onto the Futures 
market in fulfilment of a selling 
Contract.
The number of contracts transacted on 
a particular market usually published 
at the end of each trading session 
with a grand total for each day's 
trading.
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